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ABSTRACT
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) seamlessly integrate computational devices, communication
networks, and physical processes. The performance and functionality of many critical infrastruc-
tures such as power, traffic, and health-care networks and smart cities rely on advances in CPS.
However, higher connectivity increases the vulnerability of CPS because it exposes them to threats
from both the cyber domain and the physical domain. An attack or a fault within the cyber or phys-
ical domain can subsequently affect the cyber domain, the physical domain, or both, resulting in
anomalies. An attack or a fault on CPS can have serious or even lethal consequences. Traditional
anomaly diagnosis techniques mainly focus on cyber-to-cyber or physical-to-physical interactions.
However, in practice they can often be subverted in the face of cross-domain attacks or faults. In
summary, the safety and reliability of CPS become more and more crucial every day and existing
techniques to diagnose or mitigate CPS attacks and faults are not sufficient to eliminate vulnera-
bility.
The motivation of this dissertation is to enhance anomaly diagnosis and mitigation for CPS,
covering physical-to-physical and cyber-to-physical attacks or faults. With the advantage of deal-
ing with system uncertainties and providing system state estimation, observer-based anomaly diag-
nosis is of great interest. The first task is to design a multiple observers framework to diagnose sen-
sor anomalies for continuous systems. Since CPS contain both continuous and discrete variables,
CPS are modeled as hybrid systems. Utilizing the relationship between the continuous and discrete
variables, a conflict-driven hybrid observer-based anomaly detection method is proposed, which
checks for conflicts between the continuous and discrete variables to detect anomalies. Lastly, the
observer design for hybrid systems is improved to enable observer-based anomaly diagnosis for a
wider class of hybrid systems.
xii
The novel observer-based anomaly diagnosis and mitigation approaches introduced in this dis-
sertation can not only diagnose anomalies caused by traditional faults, but also anomalies caused
by sophisticated attacks. This research work can benefit the overall security of critical infrastruc-
tures, preventing disastrous consequences and reducing economic loss. The effectiveness of the
proposed approaches is demonstrated mathematically and illustrated through applications to var-
ious simulated systems, including a suspension system, the Positive Train Control system and a
microgrid system.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Through new measurement science, advanced Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, increas-
ing computational power, and communication network speed, the cyber world and the physical
world are integrated together in a scalable way to form new type of systems, Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS). CPS combine physical processes, computational resources, and communication
capabilities in a unified design effort [12]. CPS are ubiquitous in critical infrastructures, such as
transportation systems, power systems, and industrial control processes [12]. CPS security re-
search faces unique challenges due to the complex ways cyber components interact with physical
systems. To improve the security of CPS, the contribution of this dissertation is to extend the abil-
ity of anomaly diagnosis and mitigation to address more types of anomalies, which are caused by
not only faults but also attacks.
I.1 Security of Cyber-Physical Systems
Faults or attacks on CPS can cause damage to public safety as well as economic losses. With
the integration of the cyber and physical components, the security of CPS requires a three compo-
nent perspective: cyber, physical and cyber-physical interaction. Traditional security techniques
mainly focus on either cyber or physical components. Security of cyber components is usually
associated with mechanisms such as cryptography, intrusion detection, and many other solutions
commonly used in IT systems. Security of physical components is usually associated with model-
based or non-model based fault diagnosis and fault tolerant control traditionally used in industrial
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control systems. Although the traditional cyber and physical security mechanisms can improve the
security of CPS, in practice, they can be subverted by cross-domain attacks or faults because the
cyber-physical interaction is not taken into consideration [12, 40]. The failure to detect attacks or
faults is especially undesirable as these attacks or faults can result in safety concerns. Much more
needs to be done to secure CPS.
An example physical-to-cyber attack is side channel attack [27]. If an audio recorder is
placed closed to a 3D printer, the attacker was able to regenerate the G code of the 3D printer by
analyzing the recorded sound. Some attacks from the cyber domain can impact the physical assets,
especially the critical infrastructure. In 2000, some hackers attacked Maroochy Shire Council’s
sewage control systems in Queensland, Australia, and caused flooding with millions of liters of
sewage [81]. In 2010, Stuxnet was found to sabotage Iran’s nuclear facilities, causing the nuclear
centrifuges to spin out of control [45]. In 2015, a YouTube video demonstrated how cyber-attacks
allow hackers to remotely gain control of a vehicle through the 3G network while a driver is driving
it on a highway [60]. These real-life examples illustrate the importance and urgency of developing
new approaches to expand the capabilities of traditional techniques regarding cross-domain attacks
or faults.
Three security goals are required for a CPS: integrity, availability, and confidentiality [13].
Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data or resources, which include the data or resources sent
or received by the sensors, actuators or controllers. Availability refers to the ability of a system
to be accessible and usable upon demand. Confidentiality refers to the ability to keep information
secret from unauthorized users. Both faults and attacks can cause anomalous behaviors in systems,
impacting the ability to achieve at least one of these three goals.
We give the formal definitions of anomaly, fault and attack [57].
Definition 1. An anomaly is an occurrence that is different from what is standard, normal, or
expected.
Definition 2. A fault is an anomaly that is related to an unwanted situation and may be associated
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with failure, malfunction, or quality degradation.
Definition 3. An attack is a purposeful action by an element external to the system that breaches
the security goals of the system.
In this dissertation, we are concerned with the anomalies caused by both faults and attacks.
Recognizing that the national and economic security depends on the reliable functioning of
critical infrastructure, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a vol-
untary framework for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure, which consists of standards,
guidelines, and best practices [21]. The framework core includes five high-level functions: identify,
protect, detect, respond, and recover. These five functions are not only applicable to cybersecurity
risk management but also to risk management at large. The work of this dissertation falls into the
detect and respond functions. We expand the capability of traditional anomaly diagnosis and mit-
igation by considering the cyber-physical interaction components. Diagnosis consists of detection
and isolation1, which are defined as [87]
Definition 4. Detection makes a binary decision on whether an anomaly has occurred or not.
Definition 5. Isolation determines the location, and assesses the extent of the anomaly.
Additionally, mitigation is defined as [25]
Definition 6. Mitigation reduces the effect of the anomaly.
The most popular anomaly diagnosis techniques can be classified into two main categories:
model-based diagnosis and non-model based diagnosis [89]. Model-based anomaly diagnosis re-
quires a process model running in parallel with a physical process and diagnoses an anomaly by
comparing the estimates and measured process [42]. However, it assumes a system model is avail-
able. The system model is either built based on expert knowledge or learned based on a set of
data or a combination of the two. Non-model based diagnosis checks the symptoms of a set of
data, such as mean values or trends, to diagnose an anomaly [70]. This method has the advantage
1In the NIST security framework, detection process identifies the occurrence of a security event [21], which is
different from the definition of detection in this dissertation. The definition of detection process in NIST security
framework corresponds to detection and isolation in this dissertation.
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when a system model is unavailable. However, non-model based methods are limited to a process
in the steady state and not applicable to a process with a wide operation range. Additionally, due
to the lack of system knowledge, non-model based methods have to rely on data and data history
to determine acceptable operating region and therefore can be subject to false positives or false
negatives.
As a starting point, we begin with model-based anomaly diagnosis. Among various model-
based anomaly diagnosis techniques, the observer-based anomaly diagnosis technique is one of the
central schemes, and it has the advantage of reducing the impact of system uncertainties [80]. Gaps
still exist in addressing anomalies caused by cross-domain faults or attacks for CPS using observer-
based anomaly diagnosis framework. In the next section, we discuss the gaps of observer-based
anomaly diagnosis in detail and the specific contributions this dissertation makes towards filling
the gaps.
I.2 Contributions to the Research Areas
To improve the security of CPS, this dissertation makes contributions to the following three
research areas.
We first focus on anomalies in sensors because sensors play a vital role in CPS estimation
and control and they are also the most vulnerable part of CPS [82]. We model the CPS as contin-
uous systems and work on anomaly diagnosis for continuous systems. Under the observer-based
framework, we propose new detection, isolation, and mitigation methods to improve the overall
performance of sensor anomaly diagnosis.
Then, we extend our work to hybrid systems which consist of both continuous dynamics
and discrete behavior. For CPS, considering a continuous system alone is not adequate, because
CPS contain both continuous and discrete variables. Additionally, the anomaly type is not limited
to sensor anomalies. Assuming that the discrete behavior of the hybrid systems is current-state
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observable2, we propose a new method that utilizes the relationship between the continuous and
discrete variables to identify anomalous behaviors.
Finally, we consider a wider class of hybrid systems, including hybrid systems with unob-
servable discrete events. For some hybrid systems, the discrete system is not current-state observ-
able. One of the reasons is that the discrete system contains some unobservable discrete events. To
extend our work to hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events, we propose another method
which can determine the current discrete state of the system by estimating the current continuous
dynamics of the system.
We further describe our contributions in the three main research areas in the following sub-
sections.
I.2.1 Sensor Anomaly Diagnosis and Mitigation for Continuous Systems
Although observer-based anomaly diagnosis has been developed for decades for continuous
systems, existing methods mainly focus on anomalies that occur during steady state operation.
However, an anomaly caused by an attack can happen any time, including during an observer’s
transient state. In addition, an attack can be designed to bypass a closed-loop observer-based
anomaly detection method. For example, an attack targets critical sensors which are essential for
system observability and the attack signal gradually changes the sensor value. Moreover, because
sensor anomaly diagnosis takes time, a mitigation method is needed to potentially reduce the im-
pact of a sensor anomaly during the time required for anomaly diagnosis.
Consider a train system as an example. Suppose there are two noisy sensors measuring the
train position and velocity, respectively, and an observer estimating the train position and velocity.
Since the initial state of the train is not precisely known, it takes some time for the observer to
converge. During the observer’s transient state, the estimation error is large and thus the residual
2A discrete system is current-state observable if the discrete state of the system can be uniquely determined after a
finite number of discrete events. The formal definition is introduced in Chapter IV.
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signal is large. A large residual signal may trigger an alarm even though the system is under normal
operation. Traditionally, anomaly diagnosis is disabled during observer’s transient state to reduce
false alarms. But anomalies occurring during the observer’s transient state are not detected, which
is undesired for critical infrastructure. In addition, the position sensor is a critical sensor because
it is indispensable for state estimation. If the measurement given by the position sensor is gradu-
ally drifting, the residual signal may not exceed the threshold and a residual-based method using
closed-loop observer fails to detect it. As shown in Fig.I.1, to diagnose more sensor anomalies
and mitigate sensor anomaly during anomaly diagnosis, our contributions are to propose three new
methods that respectively:
1. enable sensor anomaly detection and reduce false alarms during the observers’ transient state;
2. detect anomalies on critical sensors; and
3. potentially mitigate the impact of the anomalous sensor during the anomaly diagnosis process.
Figure I.1: The two contributions to sensor anomaly diagnosis positioned in the space of critical
vs. non-critical sensors, and observers’ transient vs. steady state
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I.2.2 Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems With Current-State Observ-
able Discrete Dynamics
The improved sensor anomaly diagnosis framework for continuous systems is not enough
for systems that have both continuous variables and discrete variables, i.e., hybrid systems. In this
section, we first introduce the limitation of the sensor anomaly diagnosis framework for hybrid
systems. Then we describe the contributions to the area of anomaly detection for hybrid systems.
I.2.2.1 Limitation of the Sensor Anomaly Diagnosis Framework for Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems contain both continuous dynamics and discrete behavior. The improved sen-
sor anomaly diagnosis framework only considers the continuous dynamics to diagnose anomalies,
which has limitations when used for hybrid systems. As an example, a train system can have dif-
ferent operation modes, i.e., discrete states, under different scenarios. When the train is running
freely on the track, a speed controller is regulating the train speed. When the train is approaching
the next scheduled station, a position controller makes sure that the train stops at the designated
position. Since the train system considered in Section I.2.1 is a continuous system, we consider a
hybrid system example to study anomaly detection for hybrid systems with current-state observ-
able discrete dynamics [69].
I.2.2.2 Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems Utilizing the Relation Between the Discrete
and Continuous Components
In order to detect more types of anomalies including anomalies in continuous variables men-
tioned in Section I.2.1, we expand our work to hybrid systems which include both continuous
and discrete states. Here, we consider that each discrete state has an invariant which describes
the set of allowable continuous states and there is no discontinuity in continuous states when dis-
crete transition occurs. The proposed anomaly detection method benefits from a hybrid observer,
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which consists of a Finite State Machine (FSM) and a Set-Valued Observer (SVO). Based on all
possible anomalies for hybrid systems, three types of conflicts are defined. A conflict is a con-
tradiction between the continuous and discrete variables. The conflict-driven anomaly detection
method takes advantage of the knowledge from these continuous-discrete interactions to identify
anomalous behaviors. In the work presented in Chapter IV, the contributions are four-fold:
1. We propose a conflict-driven method with three conflict types defined based on the relation between
the discrete and the continuous variables of the hybrid systems. In addition to anomalies that can
be detected by traditional observer-based and residual-based methods, the conflict-driven anomaly
detection approach is capable of providing guarantees on the detection of some types of attacks
and faults that are undetectable using the traditional methods.
2. We define a classification taxonomy for anomalies in hybrid systems. An anomaly in a hybrid
system may affect the continuous variables or the discrete variables or both. Some anomalies are
undetectable by only considering the continuous component of the system because the anomalous
system may have a consistent input-output data with the system model under normal operation.
Some anomalies are undiagnosable by only considering the discrete component of the system
because the observed discrete event sequence of the anomalous system is the same as the system
under normal operation. In this dissertation, we classify the anomalies into eight different types
based on the variables that are affected, input-output data consistency, and diagnosability of the
anomaly.
3. We develop a new hybrid observer for anomaly detection. We use a Set-Valued Observer (SVO)
as the continuous state observer of the hybrid observer. With the SVO, we can apply the conflict-
driven method to hybrid systems with unobservable continuous components.
4. We provide a mapping between conflict types and anomaly types. Based on the occurrence of the
conflict types, we can identify if the anomaly is related to the continuous component of the system,
the discrete component or both.
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Additionally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method in detecting different
types of anomalies in a realistic system, namely a simulated Positive Train Control (PTC) system
that is used as the illustrative example [69].
I.2.2.3 Positive Train Control System
The PTC system is designed to ensure safe and collision-free operation as well as high
throughput of trains in a safety-critical environment [69]. The PTC system is a hybrid system
that consists of a train and a Radio Block Controller (RBC). The train is modeled as a continuous
system, and the RBC is modeled as a discrete system. Faults or attacks can occur in either the train
system or the RBC system or both.
I.2.3 Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems With Unobservable Discrete
Events
The conflict-driven method described in Section I.2.2 is proposed for hybrid systems with
current-state observable discrete components. However, some hybrid systems contain unobserv-
able discrete events such that the discrete components are not current-state observable. In this
section, we first discuss the limitation of the conflict-driven method for hybrid systems with unob-
servable discrete events. Then, we describe the contributions to the area of anomaly detection for
hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events.
I.2.3.1 Limitation of the Conflict-driven Method for Hybrid Systems With Unobservable
Discrete Events
The conflict-driven method described in Section I.2.2 assumes that 1) the discrete behavior
of the hybrid systems under normal operation is observable, 2) the invariant of each discrete state
under normal operation is known, and 3) no discontinuity exists in continuous variables when a
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discrete transition occurs. However, the above three assumptions may not be true for some hybrid
systems. As an example, in the PTC system, consider a scenario where a train a is running to a
railway junction with a sensor measuring the distance from train a to any front object. There is
another train b running on one of the tracks and a human operator doing some work on the other
track. Suppose the default position of the railroad switch indicates that the front object of train a is
train b. Suddenly an unexpected (unobservable) fault occurs, causing the railroad switch to direct
train a to the other track. The front object of train a changes to the human operator. Thus there is a
discontinuity in the variable representing the position of the front object. Then the hybrid observer
used in the conflict-driven method cannot be used to detect the anomaly in this scenario. A new
anomaly detection method is thus needed for hybrid systems.
I.2.3.2 State Estimation and Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems With Unobservable
Discrete Events
To estimate state and detect anomalies for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events,
we propose a new observer framework which consists of two continuous state observers. The two
continuous state observers use different sets of sensors and the same continuous system model of
the current estimated discrete state (assuming that the initial discrete state of the system is given)
to estimate the continuous state of the system. Based on the estimated continuous state trajectories,
the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) method is used to help identify the current continuous dynamics
of the system, thus knowing the current discrete state of the system. In the work presented in
Chapter V, the contributions are as follows:
1. We propose a new observer framework to estimate both the discrete and the continuous variables
for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events;
2. We use the proposed observer framework to detect anomalies which can be modeled as unobserv-
able discrete events; and
3. We apply the proposed anomaly detection method to a realistic microgrid system to validate its
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effectiveness.
The reason we use microgrid system, instead of the PTC system, to validate the effectiveness of
the new observer framework is that the PTC system is not complex enough for our purpose. For
the PTC system, we can use the measured distance from train a to the front object to reset the
estimated continuous state by the continuous state observer. The continuous state observer can
still give a good state estimation because the continuous dynamics of the PTC system are simple
and stay the same before and after the fault mentioned in Section I.2.3.1. Such an example does
not provide enough complexity to show the need for a new observer design for hybrid systems with
unobservable discrete events. Therefore, we look to a power microgrid, which is a more complex
system, to show that a new observer is needed for state estimation and anomaly detection for hybrid
systems with unobservable discrete events.
I.2.3.3 Microgrid System
A microgrid system is an electrical energy generation, consumption, and grid-interaction
system, which consists of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) such as solar, wind, fuel cells, etc.,
loads and transmission lines, as shown in Fig. I.2 [72]. Depending on the status of the system,
either grid-tied or islanded, the switch at the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) will connect the
microgrid to the main grid or not. Knowing the status of the microgrid can help ensure worker
safety and DER management. However, the transition from the grid-tied to islanded is an unob-
servable discrete event in the case of unplanned islanding [56]. Islanding Detection Methodology
(IDM) is an algorithm that allows for the presence of an electrical island to be detected [4]. Tradi-
tional IDM can be classified into remote and local methods [48]. Remote methods are based at the
grid level where the communication between the utility and the DER is monitored. Local methods
are based at the inverter where the information at DER side is gathered to determine whether or not
the DER is islanded. Traditional IDMs are developed for single DER instead of a system with mul-
tiple DERs. In addition, the traditional IDMs cannot provide state estimation before the unplanned
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islanding is detected. Without a good state estimation during the unplanned islanding detection,
the controller of the system cannot provide a good control performance, and may even damage the
system in severe cases. An extended IDM theory is needed to address unplanned islanding detec-
tion problems in microgrids with multiple DERs, as well as provide good state estimation during
the islanding detection time period. Our proposed state estimation and anomaly detection method
for hybrid system with unobservable discrete events can be used to detect the unplanned islanding
of the microgrid system consisting of multiple DERs.
Figure I.2: Microgrid Architecture.
I.3 Expected Impact
This dissertation is expected to have the following impacts:
1. Enhance capabilities to diagnose anomalies and mitigate the impact of anomalies in CPS which
are modeled as continuous systems;
2. Enhance capabilities to detect anomalies in hybrid systems with current-state observable discrete
components; and
3. Enhance capabilities to detect anomalies in hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events.
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With the proposed anomaly diagnosis and mitigation approaches, the overall security of CPS will
be improved by expanding the types of anomalies that can be diagnosed.
I.4 Dissertation Outline
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant
literature to identify the gaps of anomaly diagnosis and mitigation for continuous systems, discrete
systems, and hybrid systems, respectively. In Chapter 3, we present our improved sensor fault
diagnosis and mitigation framework. In Chapter 4, the proposed conflict-driven anomaly detection
method for hybrid systems is introduced and validated using the PTC system. In Chapter 5, we
describe the new observer framework and present the effectiveness in state estimation and anomaly
detection for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events. In Chapter 6, we conclude the work
of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
Background
A significant amount of research has been carried out for both observer-based anomaly di-
agnosis and mitigation. An observer is a system that provides an estimate of the internal state of
a given system, using measurements of the input and output of the system. The estimated internal
state of the system can give an insight into how the system is behaving internally, thus helping
diagnose anomalies in the system. Different observers have been designed for different types of
systems. For continuous systems, the continuous state observers can be classified into two major
types. One gives a single estimated continuous state, such as the Kalman filter. The other is the
Set-Valued Observer (SVO). In contrast to Kalman filter, the SVO takes a measurement history of
some time horizon and gives a non-empty set of estimated continuous states [79]. For discrete sys-
tems, a discrete state observer is usually designed as a finite state automaton to estimate the discrete
state of the system [14]. For hybrid systems, a hybrid observer is typically used as it is computa-
tionally efficient [5]. A hybrid observer consists of a continuous state observer and a discrete state
observer, estimating the continuous state and the discrete state of the system, respectively.
In this chapter, we first summarize the methods that use observers to diagnose sensor anoma-
lies and mitigate the impact of sensor anomalies for continuous systems. Then, we provide a brief
review of observer-based anomaly detection in hybrid systems that have current-state observable
discrete components. Finally, we review observer-based anomaly detection for hybrid systems
with unobservable discrete events.
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II.1 Sensor Anomaly Diagnosis and Mitigation for Continuous
Systems
A significant amount of research has been carried out to diagnose sensor anomalies using
observer-based methods due to their cost efficiency [41]. Observer-based approaches use a con-
tinuous state observer to estimate the continuous state of the system. As mentioned above, there
are two major types of continuous state observers for continuous systems. If a continuous state
observer, such as the Kalman filter, is utilized, we can estimate system output based on the es-
timated continuous state. Then a residual, which is the difference between the measured output
and the estimated output, is analyzed to detect an anomaly [20, 29, 85]. If a SVO is utilized, an
anomaly is detected when the estimated state set is empty [73, 76]. Based on our literature review,
we identified three research gaps in anomaly detection, isolation and mitigation, respectively.
The first research gap we identified is that no existing method detects a sensor anomaly dur-
ing the observers’ transient state. For sensor anomaly isolation, a system of multiple continuous
state observers is usually used, which is called the Dedicated Observer Scheme (DOS). In [19],
each continuous state observer in the DOS uses only one sensor for state estimation based on the
assumption that the system is observable with any one of the sensors. Similarly, in [9], the authors
design multiple robust sliding mode observers with different subsets of sensor measurements to
generate residuals for sensor anomaly diagnosis. Each sliding mode observer is designed to ex-
clude a particular sensor so that the residual generated by this observer is sensitive to an anomaly
in this sensor, but insensitive to anomalies in other sensors. In addition to observers designed
using different inputs and outputs of the physical system, some DOSs consist of unknown input
observers. In [1], the authors combine multiple local unknown input observers which can decou-
ple the unknown disturbances from the residual to achieve robust anomaly diagnosis for nonlinear
systems. In [46], instead of isolating unknown disturbances, the authors consider a single additive
anomaly as an unknown input, and attempt to reconstruct the anomaly with a bank of unknown
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input observers for each sensor. All of the methods mentioned above assume that the observers
have reached their steady state, so that the effect of the uncertain initial condition on a residual has
died out. Otherwise, the methods may miss alarms or generate false alarms. A method that can
detect a sensor anomaly during the observers’ transient state is needed.
The second research gap we identified is that no existing method can detect critical sensor
anomalies without hardware redundancy. Although the above mentioned methods are developed
to diagnose anomalies that occurs during the observers’ steady state, some anomalies may not be
detected by traditional anomaly diagnosis, such as anomalies caused by intelligent attacks. In [55],
the authors propose a cyber attack that injects false data in the sensor measurements and show that
a static residual-based anomaly detector cannot detect this attack. In [8], the authors propose to
protect the subset of sensor measurements which are necessary to ensure the system observability
with a static residual-based anomaly detector in order to detect sensor anomalies caused by the
cyber attacks introduced in [55]. In [62], the authors propose another kind of cyber attack, which
can bypass not only a static anomaly detector but also an anomaly detector utilizing the system
dynamics, such as a χ2 anomaly detector1. The failure to detect a sensor anomaly caused by the
cyber attack occurs because the system is not detectable according to classical control theory2
when removing the anomalous sensor and, as a result, the attacker could impose arbitrarily large
errors between the anomalous sensor measurements and the actual system outputs. The anomalous
sensors in [62] are a subset of the critical sensors that are indispensable for system observability.
A method using open-loop observers instead of closed-loop observers is needed to detect critical
sensor anomalies.
The third research gap is that no method can mitigate the impact of sensor anomalies during
the diagnosis process [50]. Some anomalies may happen quickly in systems with fast dynamics.
Although the diagnosis of an anomaly can lead to appropriate maintenance [17, 26], the physical
system may be in jeopardy during the diagnosis process. A timely mitigation technique during the
1A χ2 anomaly detector converts a Gaussian distributed residual to a χ2 distributed signal and detects an anomaly
by comparing the χ2 distributed signal with a pre-defined threshold.
2In control theory, a system is detectable if all the unobservable states are stable.
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diagnosis process may help maintain acceptable performance of the physical system. To the best
of our knowledge, sensor anomaly mitigation techniques that can be applied during the diagnosis
process have not yet been developed for sensor anomalies [50].
Based on our literature review of sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation for continuous
systems, three research gaps are identified for sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation for contin-
uous systems:
1. no existing method detects a sensor anomaly during the observers’ transient state;
2. no existing method can detect critical sensor anomalies without hardware redundancy; and
3. no method can mitigate the impact of sensor anomalies during the diagnosis process.
II.2 Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems with Current-State
Observable Discrete Component
Hybrid systems consist of both continuous dynamics and discrete behavior. We have re-
viewed anomaly detection techniques for continuous systems in the previous section. Even though
the aforementioned methods are effective for systems with continuous dynamics, they are com-
putationally demanding for hybrid systems with many different continuous dynamics in different
discrete states because observers with different continuous models need to run in parallel [91].
Various discrete model-based anomaly detection methods have been proposed up to date.
The fault diagnosis problem is closely related to anomaly detection. To diagnose a fault, fishbone
diagramming and fault-tree analysis are popular approaches because they are easily understood. A
fishbone diagram is a cause-effect diagram, which maps potential root causes to the problems of
the system [32]. Fault-tree analysis is a structural logic diagram (fault-tree) representing a phys-
ical system, in which low-level (software failure, hardware failure or human errors) causes are
combined with boolean logic leading to one specified top event (undesired system failure) [49].
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However, both fishbone diagramming and fault-tree analysis have certain limitations particularly
in incorporating the ordering of events [90], which can be captured by finite-state automata. Two
types of anomaly detection methods based on finite-state automata have been proposed: state-based
and event-based approaches [14,54]. A state-based approach determines if the current discrete state
is nominal or anomalous. An event-based approach determines whether an (unobservable) anoma-
lous event has occurred or not, based on observed events. Even though discrete model-based
methods are computationally efficient [78], they cannot provide sufficient resolution of continu-
ous degradations for hybrid systems [31]. Discrete model-based methods can only detect drastic
anomalies, such as a valve stuck closed. Other types of anomalies such as small changes in sensors
or actuators cannot be addressed because they cannot be efficiently modeled in a discrete system
framework [90].
As many CPS consist of both continuous dynamics and discrete behavior, hybrid model-
based approaches are promising in anomaly detection. Hybrid model-based methods include set
membership-based methods [36] and observer-based methods [39]. Given a data trajectory gen-
erated by the system, set membership-based methods check whether or not it is possible that the
trajectory is generated by the model of the system. In [35], the concept of T -detectability is defined
as a time horizon length that is enough to provide detection guarantees when given nominal and
anomalous system models. Although these methods provide necessary and sufficient conditions
in some cases for anomaly detection, they are computationally demanding as they require costly
set calculations or mixed integer programming. Set membership-based methods are also utilized
in active anomaly detection, where the goal is to design a minimal excitation that guarantees the
detection of anomalous behavior [11,34,65]. In observer-based methods, a hybrid observer is used
as it is computationally efficient [39]. A hybrid observer consists of two components: a discrete
state observer identifying the current discrete state and a continuous state observer estimating the
continuous state [5, 39]. With the estimated discrete state given by the discrete state observer, the
continuous state observer uses the corresponding continuous model and provides an estimate of the
continuous state of the system. Usually a continuous state observer that gives a single estimated
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state is used for anomaly detection. With the hybrid observer framework, traditional residual-based
methods can be applied for hybrid systems, including different residual generation methods, such
as the unknown input observer scheme [15], and some residual evaluation methods, such as fuzzy
decision logic approaches [2].
Even though residual-based methods with a hybrid observer are efficient, intuitive and easy
to implement, they can easily be circumvented by a smart attacker or by sensor faults [61, 62].
This is because the relationship between the continuous component and discrete component is
not considered in the residual-based methods. The research gap we identified is that no existing
method utilizes the relationship between the continuous component and discrete component to
detect anomalies in hybrid systems.
II.3 Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems with Unobservable
Discrete Events
In the previous section, we mentioned that a hybrid observer is typically used in anomaly
detection for hybrid systems. In order to use a hybrid observer, the discrete component of the
system should be current-state observable such that the discrete state observer, which is designed
as a finite state automaton, can give a unique estimated discrete state after a finite number of
discrete transitions [5]. However, for some hybrid systems, some of the discrete events may be
unobservable, thus the discrete component is not current-state observable. For these systems, the
type of hybrid observer proposed in [5] cannot be used for anomaly detection.
Traditionally, if the discrete events are unobservable, a bank of continuous state observers is
designed, each corresponding to the continuous system in one discrete state [6, 28]. Based on the
estimated continuous state provided by each continuous state observer, we can calculate a residual,
which is the the difference between the measured output and the estimated output. By analyzing
the residuals, the discrete state can be uniquely determined if the continuous dynamics of different
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discrete states are distinguishable. However, this method is computationally complex for hybrid
systems with a large number of different continuous dynamics [91]. Multiple-model estimation
algorithms have been presented in [33,51,52,92] which track the most likely discrete state set, but
the set is still very large for online estimation.
More methods have been proposed for hybrid systems with autonomous discrete transitions
triggered by continuous dynamics, where the real-time discrete events are unobservable but the
discrete transitions (guard condition3, reset function4, and linear-time properties5) are known a
priori. In [44], a particle filter-based estimation algorithm is proposed, assuming that the guard
conditions are known a priori. A method based on qualitative reasoning mechanisms using the
discrete knowledge is proposed in [63, 64] assuming that a priori and a posteriori state vector
values corresponding to the discrete transitions are known.
However, these above approaches cannot be used to distinguish discrete states of hybrid sys-
tems when only the continuous variables are measurable, the discrete events are unobservable, and
the guard conditions and the reset functions are unknown a priori. Additionally, most practical
anomalies occur with unknown conditions and times, and cannot be represented as observable
discrete events. These anomalies should be described as unobservable discrete events which tran-
sition the system from nominal discrete states to anomalous discrete states. Additionally, the guard
conditions and the reset functions corresponding to the anomaly discrete transitions are unknown
a priori. In [84], a robust hybrid observer is proposed for hybrid systems. The robust hybrid
observer consists of a continuous state observer and a discrete state observer. The continuous
state observer estimates the continuous state and monitors the discrete transitions by comparing
the residual with a threshold. When the residual exceeds the threshold, a discrete transition is de-
tected and the discrete state observer is activated to identify the new discrete state. The discrete
state observer consists of a bank of mode isolators. A mode isolator is an algorithm which checks
3Guard condition indicates when the discrete transition occurs.
4Reset function resets the value of the continuous state of the hybrid system when the corresponding discrete
transition occurs.
5 Linear-time properties specify the traces that a discrete system should exhibit [3].
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whether or not the input-output signal from the system is consistent with one specific continuous
model of the system. The mode isolators are designed as unknown input extended Kalman filters
in [84]. The number of mode isolators is the same as the number of continuous models of the
system. However, method of using mode isolators to track the emergence of unforeseen discrete
states with continuous dynamics is computationally complex when identifying the discrete state
if the hybrid system contains a large number of different continuous dynamics. Additionally, this
method assumes that there is no discontinuity in continuous states. To estimate state and detect
anomalies for hybrid systems with discontinuities in continuous variables, a predictor–corrector
set-membership method is proposed in [71]. For the prediction step, a forward reachable set is
calculated based on a union of zonotopes constructed by the current possible continuous states for
each discrete state. For the correction step, the reachable set is filtered using the image projected
by the measurements. The emptiness of the filtered reachable set indicates the infeasibility of the
corresponding discrete state. With the prediction and correction steps, the inconsistent discrete
states and inconsistent continuous state vectors in each consistent discrete state are discarded at
each time step. However, this predictor-corrector set-membership method has the drawback of
being computationally demanding because it requires intense set computation for several discrete
states at each time step.
Based on this literature review, existing state estimation and anomaly detection methods for
hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events at least have one of the following drawbacks:
1. a priori knowledge of discrete transitions is needed;
2. no discontinuity exists in continuous variables; or
3. they are computationally demanding.
The research gap we identified is that no existing observer design can effectively estimate states
and detect anomalies for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events, with discontinuity in
continuous variables, and without a priori knowledge of discrete transitions.
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II.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a literature review of sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitiga-
tion for continuous systems, anomaly detection for hybrid systems with current-state observable
discrete transitions, and anomaly detection for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events.
Based on the detailed literature review, we identified several research gaps that need to be ad-
dressed in order to enhance the capability of observer-based anomaly diagnosis and mitigation to
improve the overall security of CPS.
The research gaps identified for sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation for continuous
systems are addressed in Chapter III. The research gaps for anomaly detection for hybrid systems
with current-state observable discrete components are addressed in Chapter IV. The research gaps
found for anomaly detection for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events are addressed in
Chapter V.
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CHAPTER III
Improved Sensor Anomaly Diagnosis and Mitigation Using Multiple Observers Approach
III.1 Introduction
As introduced in Chapter I, sensors are considered to be the weak link in Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) [13, 22]. A sensor anomaly that may be caused by a fault or an attack can be a
major problem that may degrade the performance of the CPS, and even put the CPS in jeopardy
in severe cases. Anomaly diagnosis and mitigation mechanisms are crucial for protecting a sys-
tem that is susceptible to sensor faults or attacks. As defined in Chapter I, diagnosis consists of
detection and isolation. Sensor anomaly detection determines the occurrence of a sensor anomaly.
Sensor anomaly isolation identifies the anomalous sensor and estimates the anomaly signal. Sensor
anomaly mitigation reduces the impact of the sensor anomaly [87]. Traditional anomaly diagnosis
mechanisms mainly focus on anomalies caused by sensor faults. However, CPS are also subject
to cross-domain attacks, i.e., attacks from the cyber domain that can cause anomalies in the phys-
ical domain. Some cross-domain sensor attacks can bypass the existing sensor anomaly diagnosis
mechanisms.
As a starting point for developing a sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation mechanism for
CPS, we model a Cyber-Physical System as a continuous system and assume that only one sensor
is anomalous at a time. Based on our literature review in Chapter II, we identified the following
three research gaps:
1. No existing method detects a sensor anomaly during the observers’ transient state;
23
2. No existing method can detect critical sensor anomalies without hardware redundancy; and
3. No method can mitigate the impact of sensor anomalies during the diagnosis process.
We will fill these research gaps in this chapter.
In reviewing the existing methods in Section II.1 we note that one of the central schemes for
sensor anomaly diagnosis is the Dedicated Observer Scheme (DOS), which consists of multiple
observers [19]. Different observer-based approaches have been proposed under the DOS frame-
work [1, 9, 46]. Most of these methods analyze residuals, which are the difference between the
measured output and the estimated output, to diagnose anomalies. However, these residual-based
methods assume that the observers have reached their steady state, so that the effect of the uncertain
initial condition on a residual has died out. Otherwise, these methods may generate false alarms
during the observers’ transient state. An anomaly caused by an attack can happen any time, in-
cluding during the observers’ transient state. If we disable anomaly detection during the observers’
transient state, then we can have missed alarms, resulting in severe consequences. Therefore, the
first research gap we identified is that no existing method detects a sensor anomaly during the
observers’ transient state.
Based on the assumption of only one anomalous sensor, the sensors can be divided into two
sets: critical sensor set and non-critical sensor set. Critical sensors are indispensable for system
observability; if any critical sensor is removed, the system is unobservable. Non-critical sensors
are redundant; the system is still observable if any one of the non-critical sensors is removed. An
anomaly in a non-critical sensor can be diagnosed using a closed-loop observer which is designed
excluding the anomalous sensor. Some anomalies in the critical sensors may not be detected by
existing anomaly diagnosis approaches, such as anomalies caused by False Data Injection Attack
[55,61,62]. Therefore, the second research gap we identified is that no existing method can detect
critical sensor anomalies without hardware redundancy.
Some anomalies may happen quickly in systems with fast dynamics. Although the diagnosis
of an anomaly can lead to appropriate maintenance, the physical system may be in jeopardy dur-
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ing the diagnosis process. A timely mitigation technique during the diagnosis process may help
maintain acceptable performance of the physical system [50]. Therefore, the third research gap
we identified is that no method can mitigate the impact of sensor anomalies during the diagnosis
process.
In this chapter, we propose three new methods to improve the performance of the traditional
sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation by filling the three research gaps. With respect to the
research gaps, the contribution of this chapter is to propose three new methods that respectively
1. enable anomaly detection for some sensor anomalies during the observers’ transient state;
2. detect some anomalies on critical sensors; and
3. potentially mitigate the impact of the anomalous sensor during the diagnosis process.
These three methods are then systematically integrated with a previously developed residual-based
method to create an improved sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework. The first two
contributions are outlined in Fig. I.1.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section III.2, an overview of problem
statement and solution is provided. In Section III.3, the mathematical description of the system is
given. In section III.4, we introduce three new methods to address the research gaps, and the pro-
posed methods are integrated with a previously developed method. In Section III.5, an illustrative
example validates the proposed methods. The summary of this chapter is given in Section III.6.
III.2 Problem / Solution Overview
As mentioned in Section III.1, we model the CPS as a linear time-invariant discrete-time
system. The problem addressed in this Chapter can be formulated as: given a linear time-invariant
discrete-time system with multiple sensors, multiple observers, a state feedback controller, a residual-
based anomaly detector, and the following assumption
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Assumption 1. Only one sensor is anomalous at a time.
The specific goals of this chapter are to
• propose a non-residual based method for sensor anomaly detection during the observers’ transient
state (Contribution 1);
• propose a method for critical sensor anomaly diagnosis (Contribution 2);
• propose a method to potentially mitigate the impact of the anomalous sensor during the diagnosis
process (Contribution 3); and
• systematically integrate the three new methods with a previously developed residual-based method
for diagnosis and mitigation.
As described in Section III.1, the sensors can be divided into two sets: critical sensor set and
non-critical sensor set. To diagnose anomalies in these two different sets of sensors, we use both
closed-loop and open-loop observers. A closed-loop observer estimated the system internal state
with a feedback from the sensor measurements. An open-loop observer is running in parallel with
the physical system, reproducing the behavior of the system.
To detect anomalies in non-critical sensors, we design one closed-loop observer with all of
the sensor measurements, and multiple closed-loop observers each with one non-critical sensor
excluded. Each observer is compared with all other observers, and the difference of estimated
states between two observers is decoupled to calculate the estimation errors of these two observers.
Thus, each observer has multiple calculated estimation errors. These calculated estimation errors
are combined to determine the overall estimation error of the observer. The convergence ratio of the
estimation error of an observer should be related to the designed state matrix of the observer, and
not affected by the uncertain initial condition. But a sensor anomaly or a disturbance can change
the convergence ratio of the estimation error. Note that a disturbance is also a kind of anomaly.
In this dissertation, we model the disturbance as the system disturbance, i.e., a disturbance added
to the state equation. A disturbance should be distinguished from a sensor anomaly. To detect
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a sensor anomaly or a disturbance, we propose the Convergence Ratio (CR) method which can
reduce the false alarms during the observers’ transient state. To distinguish a sensor anomaly from
a disturbance, bias analysis based on the calculated estimation errors is developed. In the ideal
case, the biases calculated based on the estimation errors of all observers should be the same when
the system is under disturbance, but should be different under sensor anomaly. With bounded
system noise, the bound of the difference between the calculated bias and the actual disturbance
signal can be determined. Therefore, a threshold can be selected and compared with the difference
between any two calculated biases. The threshold is specific for each pair of biases. If at least one
pair of them exceeds their threshold, the system is under sensor anomaly. If none of them exceeds
their threshold, the system is under disturbance.
To diagnose anomalies in critical sensors, we design Multiple Open-Loop Observers (MOLO),
and analyze the residuals formed based on the difference between the measured outputs of the sys-
tem and the estimated outputs. This method is only applicable to an open-loop stable or marginally
stable system. If the system is open-loop unstable, the estimation error of an open-loop observer
could diverge exponentially. To increase the estimation accuracy, we periodically update the states
of multiple open-loop observers with the state estimated by the closed-loop observer using all of
the sensor measurements when no sensor anomaly is detected. There is a trade-off between esti-
mation performance and the ability to detect a sensor anomaly. Therefore, we divide the multiple
open-loop observers into several groups. The observers within the same group are updated with
the same update frequency. To mitigate the impact of noise, the update time steps of the observers
in the same group are distributed evenly within one update period, and the residuals generated
by the observers within the same group are averaged. The averaged residual is compared with a
threshold, which is related to the known upper bound of noise and the update frequency. If the
residual is larger than the threshold, then an alarm is triggered and the states of the open-loop
observers of that group are not updated with the estimated state of the closed-loop observer until
the alarm is cleared. Logic is provided to determine whether or not the system is under sensor
anomaly based on which groups of open-loop observers trigger alarms. Then the residuals of the
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groups that trigger alarms are analyzed to determine which sensor is anomalous.
For sensor anomaly mitigation, we also need to consider two cases: anomalies in critical
sensors and anomalies in non-critical sensors. For anomalies in non-critical sensors, a closed-loop
observer without the anomalous sensor provides a better state estimation, based on which a state
feedback controller can give the control input closest to the ideal control input. Pinpointing this
closed-loop observer during the diagnosis process is the key for sensor anomaly mitigation. There-
fore, we propose the Calculated Control Input (CCI) method to switch among different observers,
and potentially mitigate the impact of the anomaly in a non-critical sensor during the diagnosis
process. For anomalies in critical sensors, none of the closed-loop observers can provide a good
state estimation. If the system is open-loop stable, we can use an open-loop observer for state
estimation to mitigate the impact of the sensor anomaly. If the system is marginally stable, the
only way to mitigate the impact of sensor anomaly is to repair the anomalous sensor.
We also need a residual-based method based on closed-loop observers for non-critical sensor
anomaly isolation. In this dissertation, we use a method adopted from [9], and call it the Calcu-
lated Outputs (CO) method. The method in [9] consists of several sliding mode observers, each
excluding a particular sensor or actuator. The sliding mode observer without the anomalous sen-
sor generates a significant residual signal. In contrast, we use a bank of Luenberger observers (or
Kalman filters) 1 for the CO method. In this case, the observers with the anomalous sensor generate
significant residuals. However, the CO method is not robust to disturbance in the system.
Table III.1 shows the abilities of the CO, CR, MOLO, and CCI methods. The CO method can
detect and isolate non-critical sensor anomalies that occur during the observers’ steady state. The
CR method can detect non-critical sensor anomalies that occur during both the observers’ transient
and steady state. The MOLO method can detect and isolate critical sensor anomalies that occur
during the observers’ steady state. The CCI method can mitigate the impact of non-critical sensor
anomalies during the sensor anomaly diagnosis process. Fig. III.1a shows when to use those four
1 The reason we use the Luenberger observers (or Kalman filters) instead of sliding mode observers is that we can
decouple observers’ estimation errors for the CR method.
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Table III.1: Abilities of the CO, CR, MOLO and CCI methods
Anomaly Detection Anomaly
Isolation
Anomaly
MitigationObservers
Transient State
Observers
Steady State
S nc CR CR, CO CO CCI
S c MOLO MOLO
methods based on their abilities. We systematically integrate them as shown in Fig. III.1b. During
the observers’ transient state, we use the CR method for non-critical sensor anomaly detection. If
a sensor anomaly is detected and the observers have already reached their steady state, then we
use the CO method for sensor anomaly isolation. The CCI method is used for non-critical sensor
anomaly mitigation during both the observers’ transient state and steady state. Suppose an anomaly
on a non-critical sensor starts at t f , and it is detected and isolated at td. During the detection delay
td − t f , the CCI method may have already switched to the observer without the anomalous sensor,
providing estimated state to the controller. The MOLO method is running in parallel with the CR,
CO, and CCI methods to diagnose a critical sensor anomaly.
III.3 Mathematical Formulation of the Problem
The analysis is carried out based on a linear time-invariant discrete-time system equipped
with multiple observers, a state feedback controller and a residual-based anomaly detector.
III.3.1 Notation
Let ‖ · ‖ denote ∞-norm, ·˜ denote estimated variables by a closed-loop observer, ·ˆ denote
estimated variables by an open-loop observer. In addition, x ∈ Rnx represents a vector, where its
ith element is indicated by x(i). A ∈ Rm×n represents a matrix, where its element at the ith row and
the jth column is indicated by A(i, j). xe is the estimation error between system real state and the
estimated state by an observer. xe,µ,ν is the difference of estimated states between two closed-loop
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(a) Integration of the four methods: CO, CR,
MOLO and CCI
(b) Flow chart of the integration
Figure III.1: The improved sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework description
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observers µ and ν. x˜e,µ(ν) is the calculated estimation error of closed-loop observer µ, and the
calculation is based on xe,µ,ν. Detailed notations are shown in Appendix A.
III.3.2 Physical System
We model the physical system as a linear time-invariant discrete-time system. It has the
following form:
x(t+ 1) =Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Dd(t) +w(t),
y(t) =Cx(t) +v(t) +Γγ(t),
(III.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rnx is the system state, y(t) ∈ Rny is the sensor measurement, u(t) ∈ Rnu is the control
input, d(t) ∈ Rnd is the unknown disturbance, γ(t) ∈ R is the sensor anomaly signal added to the
sensor measurements, the process noise w(t) ∈ Rnx and the sensor noise v(t) ∈ Rny are zero mean
random vectors with bounds ‖w(t)‖ ≤ w and ‖v(t)‖ ≤ v, respectively, A ∈ Rnx×nx , B ∈ Rnx×nu , C ∈
Rny×nx , D ∈ Rnx×nd are real constant matrices, and Γ = [0 ... 1i f ... 0]ᵀ ∈ Rny is a sensor
anomaly vector, with 0 corresponding to the anomaly-free sensor, and 1i f corresponding to the
anomalous sensor, and i f is the index for the anomalous sensor. Based on Assumption 1, Γ has at
most one non-zero element.
III.3.3 Closed-Loop Observers and Open-Loop Observers
At each time step, all of the sensor measurements y(t) and the control inputs u(t) are gathered
for state estimation. Two different types of observers can be utilized: closed-loop observers and
open-loop observers.
III.3.3.1 Closed-Loop Observers
A closed-loop observer corrects the estimation with a feedback from the sensor measure-
ments as shown in Fig. III.2. Based on Assumption 1, sensor measurements can be divided into
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Figure III.2: Structure of a closed-loop observer
two sets: S nc and S c. S nc contains mnc non-critical sensors. S c contains critical sensors. In order
to design multiple closed-loop observers, we need the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Set S nc contains at least one non-critical sensor, i.e., mnc > 0.
We assume without loss of generality that the rows of the output matrix C are ordered such
that the first mnc sensors are non-critical sensors. Thus, mnc + 1 closed-loop observers can be
designed. Observer 0 uses all of the sensor measurements. Observer i uses all but sensor i (i =
1,2, ...,mnc). For the closed-loop observers, we use Luenberger observers with the following form
x˜i(t+ 1) =Eix˜i(t) +Liyi(t) +Bu(t)
=Eix˜i(t) +Li(Cix(t) +vi(t) +Γiγ(t)) +Bu(t),
(III.2)
where x˜i(t) ∈Rnx is the state estimated by the closed-loop observer i (i= 0,1,2, ...,mnc), yi(t) ∈Rny−1
is the sensor measurements used by observer i which does not contain the ith element of y(t), vi(t)
does not contain the ith sensor noise, Ei = A−LiCi, Li ∈ Rnx×(ny−1) is the observer gain, placing
the eigenvalues of Ei in the unit circle, Ci ∈ R(ny−1)×nx is the output matrix for observer i and it
does not contain the ith row of C, and Γi ∈ Rny−1 is the sensor anomaly vector of observer i which
does not contain the ith element of Γ. If i = i f , then Γi = 0ny−1. This means that observer i f does
not use the anomalous sensor i f for state estimation. The corresponding observer state matrix and
observer gain that do not use the anomalous sensor are Ei f and Li f , respectively.
Remark 1. Our assumption indicates that the system is detectable without one of the sensors in
S nc. If the system is detectable and the noise is truncated Gaussian, the time varying gain of a
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Kalman filter converges in a few steps. Therefore, for the closed-loop observers, we can also use
Kalman filters with the steady-state Kalman gains [61].
III.3.3.2 Open-Loop Observers
An open-loop observer is running in parallel with the physical system, reproducing the be-
havior of the system as shown in Fig. III.3. Due to the lack of guaranteed estimation error con-
Figure III.3: Structure of an open-loop observer
vergence, the state of the open-loop observer is updated periodically by the closed-loop observer
0 which uses all of the sensor measurements. As mentioned in Section III.2, we design M groups
of open-loop observers, each group with N observers. The observers in the same group have the
same update period. Then, an open-loop observer has the following form after one update period
xˆg,i(t+ κ f ,g) =Aκ f ,g x˜0(t) +Σ
κ f ,g−1
j=0 A
jBu(t+ κ f ,g−1− j), (III.3)
where xˆg,i(t) ∈ Rnx is the state estimated by the open-loop observer i in group g (i = 1, ...,N, g =
1, ...,M), and κ f ,g is the update period of group g, and x˜0 is the estimated state by closed-loop
observer 0.
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III.3.4 State Feedback Controller
A state feedback controller calculates a control command based on the system state, and
applies it to the input of the system. The following assumption enables the utilization of a state
feedback controller
Assumption 3. The system is controllable.
Since the real state of the system is unknown, the controller can only use the state estimated
by a closed-loop observer with the following form [67]
u(t) = Fx˜i(t), (III.4)
where F ∈Rnu×nx is the controller gain placing the eigenvalues of A+BF in the unit circle. Notice
that an open-loop observer cannot provide as good of an estimation of performance as a closed-
loop observer due to system noise. Therefore, we use a closed-loop observer for the state feedback
controller if the system is under normal operation or under non-critical sensor anomaly. If an open-
loop stable system is under critical sensor anomaly, then we can switch to an open-loop observer
to help mitigate the impact of the sensor anomaly.
III.3.5 Residual-based Anomaly Detector
In this chapter, the residual-based anomaly detector uses the CO method, which is adopted
from [9]. In contrast to the method in [9], the CO method consists of multiple Luenberger ob-
servers as shown in (III.2), and generates the residuals based on the subtraction between the sensor
measurements yi (without the ith output) and the estimated outputs Cix˜i as shown in (III.5)
ri(t) =(yi(t)−Cix˜i(t))ᵀQi(yi(t)−Cix˜i(t)), (III.5)
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where Qi is a real constant weighting matrix for observer i2, and ri(t) ∈R is the residual generated
based on observer i.
The residual generated based on observer 0 is compared with a selected threshold θCO to de-
termine the occurrence of an anomaly. Note that the CO method cannot distinguish a disturbance
from a sensor anomaly since Luenberger observer is not robust to disturbances. So the illustration
of the CO method is under the assumption that the anomaly in the system is a sensor anomaly.
When a sensor anomaly occurs, the closed-loop observer i f , which does not use the anomalous
sensor, is not affected by the sensor anomaly, and thus provides a better state estimation compared
to other observers3. Then the residual generated by observer i f is smaller than the residuals gen-
erated by other observers (i 6= i f ). Therefore, we can locate the anomalous sensor by finding the
smallest residual among the observers from 1 to mnc. After the anomalous sensor is located, the
sensor anomaly vector Γ is known and the estimated sensor anomaly signal is given by
γ˜(t) = Γᵀ(y(t)−Cx˜i f (t)), (III.6)
where γ˜(t) ∈ R is the estimated sensor anomaly signal.
Algorithm 1 gives the procedure of the CO method. First, we calculate the residuals based on
different observers. Then, we use the residual of observer 0 for anomaly detection, and compare the
rest of the residuals for sensor anomaly isolation. The issue that the CO method cannot distinguish
a disturbance from a sensor anomaly is addressed by complementing the CO method with the
CR method introduced in Section III.4.3 which has the ability to distinguish a disturbance from a
sensor anomaly.
2Qi should be designed to make the element y
( j)
i (t)−C( j,:)i x˜i(t)( j ∈ S c), where j corresponds to the critical sensors,
have larger weighting ratios than the element corresponding to non-critical sensors.
3The demonstration is shown in Appendix VI.2.
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Algorithm 1: CO method for sensor anomaly diagnosis
function CO;
Input : y(t), x˜i(t) (i = 0,1, ...,mnc)
Output: IF , i f
//Residual generation for all observers;
for i = 0 to mnc do
ri(t) = (yi(t)−Cix˜i(t))ᵀQi(yi(t)−Cix˜i(t));
end
//Anomaly detection;
if r0(t) ≥ θCO then
IF = 1;
//Sensor anomaly isolation;
i f = mini ri(t);
IFB = i f ;
Γ = [0 ... 1i f ... 0]
ᵀ;
γ˜(t) = Γᵀ(y(t)−Cx˜i f (t));
else
IFB = 0;
end
III.4 Framework Components Description and Integration
Throughout this section, a simple system of a moving object is utilized as an illustration.
First, we simulate sensor anomalies in the moving object system equipped with the CO method-
based anomaly detector to understand its limitations. Then, three new methods are introduced and
analyzed in the deterministic case (noise free). The impact of random system noise is discussed for
each method thereafter. The simulation result shows the improvements of the proposed methods
compared to the CO method. Finally, we provide an algorithm to integrate the CO method and the
three new methods.
III.4.1 Moving Object System
The moving object system is a 1kg mass moving along a horizontal line. Two sensors are
measuring the two outputs: the velocity yv and the position yp, respectively. A state feedback
controller applies a horizontal force on the mass. The sampling time is 0.1s. The system has
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an initial state (0,0), the process noise with bound 0.001 (m/s or m), and the sensor noise with
bound 0.01 (m/s or m). The initial states of the observers are chosen as (1,0.5)4. The state space
representation of the moving object system is shown as
x(t+ 1) =Ax(t) +Bu(t) +w(t),
y(t) =Cx(t+ 1) +v(t),
(III.7)
where x =
 xvxp
, y =
 yvyp
, A =
 1 00.1 1
, B =
 0.10.005
, and C =
 1 00 1
.
By checking the rank of observability matrix, the moving object system is observable with
yv and yp or only yp, but unobservable with only yv. Therefore, yp ∈ S c, and yv ∈ S nc. Two
observers can be designed with observer poles placed at [0.1 0.11]. Observer 0 uses both sensor
measurements yv and yp. Observer 1 uses only yp.
Two sensor anomaly scenarios are considered:
1. anomaly α: a ramp signal with slope 0.05m/s2 (0.005m/s per time step) added to the velocity
sensor yv, saturating at 1m/s; and
2. anomaly β: a ramp signal with slope 0.001m/s (0.0001m per time step) added to the position sensor
yp, saturating at 1m.
Both anomalies start at 10s and run until the end of the simulation. Here we consider ramp anoma-
lies with small slopes because they are hard to detect compared to ramp anomalies with large slopes
or step anomalies with large magnitudes.
4The initial estimation errors of the observers are large to help us understand the limitations of a residual-based
method using closed-loop observers during the observers’ transient state
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(a) The estimated position states of both
observers x˜0, x˜1, the real state x, and the
sensor measurement y of the system un-
der sensor anomaly α
(b) Alarms IF of the CO method under
sensor anomaly α
(c) Observer index IFB selected for the
state feedback controller under sensor
anomaly α
Figure III.4: Moving object system under sensor anomaly α
III.4.2 The Impact of Sensor Anomalies
Two sensor anomaly scenarios are run on the moving object system equipped with the CO
method-based anomaly detector to show the limitations of the CO method-based anomaly detector.
Based on each limitation, a new method is discussed and proposed.
Fig. III.4-III.6 show the estimated position states of both observers x˜0, x˜1, the real state x,
and the sensor measurement y of the system equipped with the CO method-based anomaly detector
under sensor anomaly α, β and normal operation, respectively. In both Fig. III.4 and Fig. III.5,
false alarms are generated by the CO method during the observers’ transient state, which are about
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(a) The estimated position states of both
observers x˜0, x˜1, the real state x, and the
sensor measurement y of the system un-
der sensor anomaly β
(b) Alarms IF of the CO method under
sensor anomaly β
Figure III.5: Moving object system under sensor anomaly β
0.2s, when the system is actually under normal operation. From Fig. III.6, it can be seen that the
imperfect initial state of the observers causes the CO method to generate false alarms. According
to (III.5), the residual ri(t) of the CO method is a function of the observer’s estimation error under
normal operation. A large estimation error makes the residual exceed the threshold, causing false
alarms during the observers’ transient state. To enable sensor anomaly detection during observers’
transient state, the CR method, described in Section III.4.3, which utilizes the convergence ratio of
observers’ estimation error, will be applied.
As shown in Fig. III.5b, when the system is under sensor anomaly β, no alarm is generated
since the sensor anomaly is not detected by the CO method-based anomaly detector. The reason
behind this behavior is that the system is not detectable when the position sensor yp is removed,
and the sensor anomaly signal is changing slightly at each time step to avoid significant change in
the residuals. An open-loop observer (III.3) does not use any sensor for state estimation. Thus,
this issue can be potentially addressed by the MOLO method introduced in Section III.4.4.
As shown in Fig. III.4b and Fig. III.4c, although the CO method successfully locates the
anomalous sensor and then the system switches to observer 1 for state estimation after 18s, there
is an 8s detection delay and the system switches between the two observers during 13s to 18s.
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(a) The estimated position states of both
observers x˜0, x˜1, the real state x, and the
sensor measurement y of the system dur-
ing the observers’ transient state under
normal operation
(b) Alarms IF during the observers’ tran-
sient state
Figure III.6: Moving object system under normal operation
This is caused by the relatively small sensor anomaly signal compared to the system noise and the
threshold. Thus, the anomalous sensor cannot be located immediately. This detection delay makes
the maximum absolute value of the position of the mass reach 30cm as shown in Fig. III.4a. The
direct reason for this divergence is the discrepancy of the control input provided by the observer-
based state feedback controller. To address this issue, we need to switch to the closed-loop observer
without the anomalous sensor as soon as possible and continue using that observer during the
sensor anomaly diagnosis process. Thus, we propose the CCI method to compare the control input
calculated based on the state estimated by each closed-loop observer with an “ideal” control input
calculated based on the state estimated by an open-loop observer, and to switch to the observer
which gives the smallest difference between the calculated control input and the ideal control
input. This method has the potential to mitigate the impact of a non-critical anomalous sensor
during the sensor anomaly diagnosis process. The maximum absolute value of the position of the
system under the CO method will be compared with that under the CCI method in Section III.4.5.
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III.4.3 CR Method for Sensor Anomaly Detection during Transient and
Steady State
This method is proposed to detect the occurrence of an anomaly based on the convergence
of estimation error. It enables sensor anomaly detection during the observers’ transient state.
To achieve robust anomaly detection, a disturbance in the system is distinguished from a sen-
sor anomaly by analyzing the bias of the estimation error. First, this method is introduced on an
ideal control system. Then the impact of the process noise and the sensor noise are discussed.
III.4.3.1 Ideal System Case
Three different situations are considered for this method: normal operation, disturbance, and
sensor anomaly. Estimation error xe,i of closed-loop observer i, and the difference of estimated
states xe,µ,ν between two closed-loop observers µ and ν under three situations are shown in (III.8)
through (III.13).
Under normal operation
xe,i(t+ 1) =x(t)− x˜i(t) = Eixe,i(t), (III.8)
xe,µ,ν(t+ 1) =x˜µ(t+ 1)− x˜ν(t+ 1) = Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t). (III.9)
Under disturbance
xe,i(t+ 1) =Eixe,i(t) +Dd(t), (III.10)
xe,µ,ν(t+ 1) =Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t). (III.11)
Notice that (III.9) and (III.11) are the same.
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Under sensor anomaly
xe,i(t+ 1) =Eixe,i(t)−LiΓiγ(t), (III.12)
xe,µ,ν(t+ 1) =Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)− (LνΓν−LµΓµ)γ(t). (III.13)
The first step of the CR method is to calculate the estimation error of each closed-loop ob-
server. The dynamics of xe,µ,ν under both normal operation and disturbance are the evolution of
the estimation errors of the two closed-loop observers xe,µ and xe,ν. Therefore, the estimation
errors of both observers can be decoupled over two time steps. However, the dynamics of xe,µ,ν
under sensor anomaly involves two unknown sensor anomaly vectors Γµ and Γν, and the unknown
sensor anomaly signal γ(t). Thus, the estimation errors cannot be correctly decoupled under sen-
sor anomaly. Lemma 1 gives the formulas for estimation error decoupling of any two different
observers.
Lemma 1. Given an ideal control system (III.1) with w(t) = 0 and v(t) = 0, the calculated esti-
mation error x˜e,µ(ν) and x˜e,ν(µ) are derived based on (III.14) and (III.15), respectively, with the
following results:
1. When the system is under normal operation or under disturbance, x˜e,µ(ν) = xe,µ and x˜e,ν(µ) = xe,ν;
2. When the system is under sensor anomaly, x˜e,µ(ν) 6= xe,µ and x˜e,ν(µ) 6= xe,ν if LνΓν 6= LµΓµ.
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) =(Eν−Eµ)−1(xe,µ,ν(t+ 1)−Eνxe,µ,ν(t)), (III.14)
x˜e,ν(µ)(t) =(Eν−Eµ)−1(xe,µ,ν(t+ 1)−Eµxe,µ,ν(t)), (III.15)
where Eν−Eµ = A−LνCν−A+LµCµ = LµCµ−LνCν.
Remark 2. We design Lµ and Lν to make Eν−Eµ invertible.
Proof. 1) Under normal operation or under disturbance, the evolution of xe,µ,ν (III.9) and xe,µ,ν(t) =
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xe,ν(t)−xe,µ(t) are substituted to (III.14),
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) =(Eν−Eµ)−1(Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)−Eν(xe,ν(t)−xe,µ(t))) = xe,µ(t). (III.16)
Similarly, x˜e,ν(µ)(t) = xe,ν(t).
2) Under sensor anomaly, the evolution of xe,µ,ν (III.13) and xe,µ,ν(t) = xe,ν(t)− xe,µ(t) are
substituted to (III.14),
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) =(Eν−Eµ)−1(Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)− (LνΓν−LµΓµ)γ(t)−Eν(xe,ν(t)−xe,µ(t)))
=xe,µ(t)− (Eν−Eµ)−1(LνΓν−LµΓµ)γ(t),
(III.17)
if LνΓν 6= LµΓµ, then x˜e,µ(t) 6= xe,µ(t).
Similarly, x˜e,ν(µ)(t) 6= xe,ν(t) if LνΓν 6= LµΓµ.
Based on Lemma 1, mnc estimation errors can be calculated for each observer. In ideal system
case, these mnc estimation errors are averaged to be the estimation error x˜e,i of each observer. The
combination of mnc estimation errors for a noisy system is introduced in Section III.4.3.2.
After getting the estimation errors of all of the observers, the next step is to analyze the con-
vergence behavior of the estimation error of each observer. For each observer, x˜e,i ∈ Rnx contains
nx states. The evolution matrix Ei of the estimation error of observer i may not be a diagonal ma-
trix. This causes the coupling of estimation errors between different states, which makes the ratio
of estimation error of each state non-constant. Therefore, instead of using the estimation errors
directly, we diagonalize the evolution matrix Ei using a basis of eigenvectors Vi. The diagonal
elements in the diagonalized matrix EΛ,i (eigenvalues of Ei), where EΛ,i = (Vi)−1EiVi, are the
same as the time-invariant observer poles. Then, we can define the convergence ratio to specify
the convergence of the estimation error for each state.
Definition 7. Convergence ratio is the ratio of the absolute value of estimation error along with
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time step t (III.18) is called the convergence ratio.
cri, j(t) =
1
κCR

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t)
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
κCR∑
ki=2
ki
√√∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t)
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t− ki)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 , (III.18)
where x˜e,Λ,i(t) = (Vi)−1x˜e,i(t), x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t) is the j
th element in x˜e,Λ,i(t), and κCR is a selected integer to
average the convergence ratios over κCR time steps.
Based on the above definition, the convergence ratio of each estimation error cri, j is actually
the same as the corresponding jth observer pole under normal operation. This is also indicated by
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t)
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t− ki)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(E j, j
Λ,i)
ki x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t− ki)
x˜( j)e,Λ,i(t− ki)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣(E( j, j)Λ,i )ki ∣∣∣∣ , (III.19)
where E( j, j)
Λ,i is the j
th diagonal element of matrix EΛ,iTherefore,
cri, j(t) =
∣∣∣∣E( j, j)Λ,i ∣∣∣∣ ,∀t ≥ 0. (III.20)
An anomaly (a sensor anomaly or a disturbance) can change the convergence ratio of the
estimation error in two possible cases. One case is that an anomaly makes the estimation error
converge faster to zero. The other case is that an anomaly makes the estimation error converge
slower or diverge to some other non-zero value. In ideal system case, the anomalies in both cases
can be detected by comparing the convergence ratios with observer poles. If a convergence ratio
is larger or smaller than its corresponding observer pole, then this convergence ratio indicates the
occurrence of an anomaly. Definition 7 shows that (mnc + 1)×nx convergence ratios are calculated
at each time step. Because of the system noise, it is possible that some of the convergence ratios
indicate an anomaly even though there is no anomaly. So we define the system as an anomalous
system if as least half of the convergence ratios indicate anomaly. A threshold is selected for noisy
system as discussed in Section III.4.3.2.
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To achieve robust anomaly detection, a disturbance should be distinguished from a sensor
anomaly [41]. For this purpose, bias is defined
Definition 8. The term b(t) in an affine function x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +b(t) is called bias.
Under disturbance, the bias is Dd(t), which is the same for all observers. Under sensor
anomaly, the bias is −LiΓiγ(t), which is different for different observers. The disturbance signal
d(t) can be correctly determined when the system is under disturbance because of the correct
decoupled estimation error. In contrast, the sensor anomaly signal cannot be correctly determined
because of the incorrect decoupled estimation error and unknown Γi. Based on this analysis, the
bias is calculated based on each observer according to (III.22) in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Given an ideal control system (III.1) with w(t) = 0 and v(t) = 0, the biases d˜µ(ν)(t) and
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) are calculated according to (III.21) and (III.22) respectively, with the following results:
1. When the system is under disturbance,
∀µ,ν =0,1, ...,mnc∧µ 6= ν,
d˜µ(ν)(t) =d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) = d(t).
2. When the system is under sensor anomaly,
∀µ,ν =0,1, ...,mnc∧µ 6= ν,
d˜µ(ν)(t) =d˜ν(µ)(t),
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) 6=d˜Λ,ν(µ)(t) i f Vµ 6= Vν.
d˜µ(ν)(t) =(DᵀD)−1Dᵀ[x˜e,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−Eµx˜e,µ(ν)(t)],
(III.21)
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ[x˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−EΛ,µx˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t)], (III.22)
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where DΛ,µ = (Vµ)−1D, and EΛ,µ = (Vµ)−1EµVµ.
For the proof of Theorem 1, see Appendix VI.2.
Theorem 1 shows that (mnc + 1)×mnc biases are calculated at each time step. Each bias is
compared with other biases. If any two biases disagree with each other, then the system is under
sensor anomaly. If all of the biases agree with each other, indicating that the system is under
disturbance, then we can determine the disturbance signal by averaging all of the biases. The
combination of all of the biases for a noisy system is introduced in Section III.4.3.2.
III.4.3.2 Noisy System Case
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in Section III.4.3.1 show the effectiveness of the CR method in
sensor anomaly detection when the system is ideal. In practice, we also need to consider system
noise: process noise and sensor noise. When only process noise exists in the system, the output
of the system can still be correctly measured, which means the state of the system can be exactly
known. Therefore, process noise does not affect the accuracy of the estimation error calculation.
However, when sensor noise contaminates the sensor measurements, the estimation error cannot
be correctly calculated. The boundedness of sensor noise ensures the boundedness of the error of
estimation error ‖x˜e,µ(ν) − xe,µ‖. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 give the impact of process noise and the
impact of sensor noise on the estimation error calculation, respectively.
Lemma 2. Given a control system (III.1) with bounded process noise and v(t) = 0, x˜e,µ(ν)(t) = xe,µ(t)
still holds when the system is under normal operation or under disturbance.
Proof. When the system is subject to the process noise w(t), the estimation error evolution be-
comes:
xe,µ(t+ 1) =Eµxe,µ(t) +w(t). (III.23)
Then the difference of the estimated states between two observers µ and ν is the same as (III.9).
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By substituting (III.9) to (III.14), the calculated estimation error becomes
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) =(Eν−Eµ)−1[Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)−Eν(xe,ν(t)−xe,µ(t))] = xe,µ(t). (III.24)
Lemma 3. Given a control system (III.1) with bounded sensor noise and w(t) = 0, ‖x˜e,µ(ν)(t)−
xe,µ(t)‖ is bounded by ‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v.
For the proof of Lemma 2, see Appendix VI.2.
Lemma 3 shows that the impact of sensor noise is different for estimation errors calculated
based on different pairs of observers. Thus, when calculating the estimation error of each observer,
we combine its mnc decoupled estimation errors with different weighting ratios. The weighting
ratio is determined based on the bound of ‖x˜e,µ(ν)−xe,µ‖. If the bound of ‖x˜e,µ(ν)−xe,µ‖ is larger, then
the corresponding weighting ratio is smaller. The combined estimation error and the weighting
ratio are shown as follows
x˜e,µ(t) =Σmncν=0,ν 6=µφνx˜e,µ(ν)(t),
Σ
mnc
ν=0,ν 6=µφν =1,
φν =
1
mnc−1
Σ
mnc
j=0, j6=µ, j 6=νeµ( j)
Σ
mnc
j=0, j6=µeµ( j)
,
xe,µ(ν) =‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v.
(III.25)
The sensor noise affects the accuracy of estimation error decoupling, thus affecting the con-
vergence ratios and sensor anomaly detection. Lemma 3 indicates that the impact of sensor noise
can be mitigated by choosing the observer gains Lµ and Lν with smaller norms. An observer gain
with a smaller norm, however, may reduce the convergence speed of the estimation error. Thus,
there is a trade-off in choosing observer gains. The impact of sensor noise on the convergence
ratios can also be mitigated via averaging over κCR time steps as shown in Definition 7. In addi-
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tion to techniques for mitigating the impact of sensor noise, a threshold θCR for convergence ratios
should be selected to balance the tolerance of system noise and the ability to detect an anomaly.
As discussed in Section III.4.3.1, the convergence ratios are the same as the observer poles under
normal operation but they are different from observer poles under anomaly in ideal case. However,
the observer poles are usually selected to be close to 0 to ensure fast observer’s estimation error
convergence and noise exists on the system. So we select a upper threshold θCR, which is larger
than the largest observer pole but less than one. Then the sensor anomaly, which makes the esti-
mation error converge faster, cannot be detected by the CR method. With the threshold θCR, the
lower bound of the sensor anomaly signal that can be detected is (κCR = 1)
‖γ(t)‖ ≥‖{(Eν−Eµ)−1} j(LνΓν−LµΓµ)‖−1
(θCR‖x( j)e,µ(t−1)‖+ (1 + θCR)‖{(Eν−Eµ)−1} j‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v+ ‖x( j)e,µ(t)‖),
(III.26)
where {(Eν−Eµ)−1} j is the jth row of matrix (Eν−Eµ)−1. This lower bound is proportional to the
threshold θCR and the bound of the sensor noise v.
Both the process noise and the sensor noise affect the accuracy of the bias calculation, thus
affecting the ability to distinguish a disturbance from a sensor noise. Based on the boundedness
of the process noise and the sensor noise, the error of the bias calculation ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)− d(t)‖ is
also bounded when the system is under disturbance. Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 give the bound of
‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖ under disturbance when the system is subject to either the process noise or the
sensor noise, respectively.
Lemma 4. Given a control system (III.1) with bounded process noise and v(t) = 0, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖
is bounded by ‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖w.
For the proof of Lemma 4, see Appendix VI.2.
Lemma 5. Given a control system (III.1) with bounded sensor noise and w(t) = 0, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖
is bounded ‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖(1 + ‖Eµ‖)‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v.
For the proof of Lemma 5, see Appendix VI.2.
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Combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, the bound of the error of the bias calculation is
‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖ ≤ ‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖(w+ (1 + ‖Eµ‖)‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lµ‖+ ‖Lν‖)v).
(III.27)
Notice that the bounds are different for biases calculated based on different pairs of observers,
and that they are all zero-mean. Based on the bounds, one specific threshold θd,µ(ν),ζ(η) (µ,ν,ζ,η =
0, ..,mnc ∧ µ 6= ν∧ ζ 6= η) can be selected to compare with the difference between any two biases
averaged over κCR time steps, thus determining whether the system is under disturbance or sensor
anomaly. If any one pair of the biases exceeds the corresponding threshold, then the system is
under sensor noise. Otherwise, the system is under disturbance.
If the system is under disturbance, the combination of the weighted biases is considered
as the disturbance signal. The weighting ratio of each bias is determined based on the bound of
‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖. If the bound is larger, then the corresponding weighting ratio is smaller. The
combined bias and the weighting ratio are shown as follows
d˜(t) =Σmnc
ν=0,ν 6=µΣ
mnc
µ=0ψµ(ν)d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t),
Σ
mnc
ν=0,ν 6=µΣ
mnc
µ=0ψµ(ν) = 1,
ψµ(ν) =
1
(mnc + 1)mnc−1
Σ
mnc
j=0, j6=iΣ
mnc
i=0,i6=µdi( j) +Σ
mnc
j=0, j6=νdµ( j)
Σ
mnc
j=0, j6=iΣ
mnc
i=0di( j)
,
dµ(ν) =‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖(w+ (1 + ‖Eµ‖)‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lµ‖+ ‖Lν‖)v).
(III.28)
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure of the CR method. The CR method contains three steps.
The first step is to calculate the estimation error for each observer. Then the convergence ratios of
the estimation errors are used to detect the occurrence of an anomaly. If an anomaly is detected,
biases are calculated and analyzed to determine whether the anomaly is a disturbance or a sensor
anomaly.
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Figure III.7: Alarms IF of the CR method under sensor anomaly α
Fig. III.7 shows the alarms generated by the CR method under sensor anomaly α. During
the observers’ transient state, false alarms are eliminated compared to Fig. III.4b, Fig. III.5b and
Fig. III.6b. When the system is under sensor anomaly α, there is an 2s detection delay, which is
caused by κCR for averaging the convergence ratio and the threshold θCR. The detection delay is
decreased compared to the 8s detection delay in Fig. III.4.
III.4.4 MOLO Method for Critical Sensor Anomaly Diagnosis
The MOLO method has the potential to diagnose anomalies in critical sensors. It consists of
multiple groups of open-loop observers. The states of the open-loop observers are updated period-
ically by the estimated state of the closed-loop observer using all of the sensor measurements. The
open-loop observers in different groups have different update frequencies. Residuals are formed
based on the difference between the measured outputs of the system and the estimated outputs
calculated based on the estimated states by the open-loop observers. Then the averaged residual
is analyzed to determine the occurrence of a critical sensor anomaly, and to isolate the anomalous
sensor.
In noise-free case (w(t) = 0,v(t) = 0), the MOLO method only works if the open-loop system
is stable or marginally stable. This is due to the fact that the estimation error of open-loop observer
xe,o(t) will diverge if the system is unstable, i.e., the eigenvalues of A lie outside of the unit circle,
50
Algorithm 2: CR method for sensor anomaly detection
function CR;
Input : x˜i(t− κCR : t+ 1)(i = 0,1, ...,mnc) from time step t− κCR to t+ 1
Output: IA, IF , ID, d˜(t−1)
//Estimation error calculation;
for µ = 0 to mnc do
for ν = 0 to mnc do
if µ 6= ν then
xe,µ,ν(t) = x˜µ(t)− x˜ν(t);
xe,µ,ν(t+ 1) = x˜µ(t+ 1)− x˜ν(t+ 1);
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) = (Eν−Eµ)−1(xe,µ,ν(t+ 1)−Eνxe,µ,ν(t));
x˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t) = (Vµ)−1x˜e,µ(ν)(t);
end
end
x˜e,µ(t) = Σmncν=0,ν 6=µφνx˜e,µ(ν);
x˜e,Λ,µ(t) = (Vµ)−1x˜e,µ(t);
//Convergence ratio calculation;
for j = 1 to nx do
crµ, j(t) = 1κCR

∣∣∣∣∣∣ x˜( j)e,Λ,µ(t)x˜( j)e,Λ,µ(t−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+∑κCRki=2 ki
√∣∣∣∣∣∣ x˜( j)e,Λ,µ(t)x˜( j)e,Λ,µ(t−ki)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
;
//Anomaly detection;
if crµ, j(t) > θCR then
IA = IA + 1;
end
end
end
//Determine whether it is a sensor anomaly or a
disturbance;
if IA ≥ (mnc+1)×nx2 then
for i = 1 to mnc do
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t−1) = ((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ[x˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t)−EΛ,µx˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t−1)];
end
if
Any avg(d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t−1− κCR : t−1)− d˜Λ,ζ(η)(t−1− κCR : t−1)) > θd,µ(ν),ζ(η)
then
IF = 1;
else
ID = 1;
d˜(t−1) = Σmnc
ν=0,ν 6=µΣ
mnc
µ=0ψµ(ν)d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t−1);
end
end
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according to (III.29).
xe,o(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) = Atxe,o(t0), (III.29)
where xe,o(t0) is the initial estimation error. After introducing system noise, the condition for the
estimation error of an open-loop observer to be bounded is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given a control system (III.1), and an open-loop observer (III.3), the following
results can be drawn:
1. If all of the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle, then the estimation error of an open-loop
observer is bounded; and
2. If one or more of the eigenvalues of A lie on the unit circle and ‖A‖ = 1, then the estimation error
of an open-loop observer is bounded.
For the proof of proposition 1, see Appendix VI.2.
For systems that do not satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1, we need to periodically update
the state of the open-loop observer with the state estimated by the closed-loop observer 0 which
uses all of the sensor measurements when no sensor anomaly is detected. The initial estimation
error of the open-loop observer is then the same as the estimation error of the closed-loop observer.
There is a trade-off between the estimation performance and the ability to detect a critical
sensor anomaly. If the update frequency is fast, then the state estimated by the open-loop observer
can track the state estimated by the closed-loop observer well, which is indicated by
xe,o(t) =Atxe(t0) +Σt−t0−1i=0 A
iw(t−1− i), (III.30)
where xe(t0) is the estimation error of the closed-loop observer 0. If t is smaller, then the divergence
of Σt−t0−1i=0 A
iw(t−1− i) is smaller, which means a better estimation under normal operation. How-
ever, fast update frequency can degrade the ability to detect a sensor anomaly, which is indicated
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by
r(t) = y(t)−Cxˆ(t) = C(Atxe(t0) +Σt−t0−1i=0 Aiw(t−1− i)) +v(t) +Γγ(t). (III.31)
The ramp sensor anomaly signal γ(t) is increasing with the time step t. At the time step that γ(t) is
significant, the sensor anomaly can be detected.
The above discussion on the trade-off shows the necessity to have multiple open-loop ob-
servers for a marginally stable system with ‖A‖ > 1. In this chapter, we divide the multiple open-
loop observers into M groups. Group 1 has the slowest update frequency and group M has the
fastest update frequency. Each group has N observers with the same update frequency. Based
on the trade-off, if one group triggers an alarm, then the groups with slower update frequencies
generate alarms as well, but the groups with faster update frequencies may not generate alarms. So
if all of the groups detect a sensor anomaly, then we can say that the sensor anomaly signal has a
large slope. If only some of the groups detect a sensor anomaly, then we can say that the sensor
anomaly signal has a small slope.
Although the estimated state under the case that ‖A‖ > 1 may diverge for a marginally stable
system, we can mitigate the impact of the process noise via averaging because the process noise has
zero mean. To average the residuals, we need to find the time steps that the open-loop observers
have similar divergence caused by system noise. Taking one open-loop observer for example,
the state of the open-loop observer is updated every κ f ,g time steps and has been updated for jN
times. At time step t+ ( jN − 1)κ f ,g, we need to average the residual at time steps t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g
( j = 1, ..., jN) to mitigate the impact of system noise. Proposition 2 validates the effectiveness of
averaging.
Proposition 2. Given a control system (III.1), an open-loop observer is updated every κ f ,g time
steps. The impact of the system noise on the averaged residual (VI.24) is mitigated.
ravg,g(t+ ( jN −1)κ f ,g) = 1jN Σ
jN
j=1rg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g), (III.32)
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where jN is a positive integer.
For the proof of proposition 2, see Appendix VI.2.
Proposition 2 shows the averaging method if we only have one open-loop observer in each
group. Then the time steps that are needed for averaging is about jN · κ f ,g, which is large. To
reduce the time steps for averaging, we have N (N ≤ κ f ,g) open-loop observers in each group. We
evenly distribute the time steps to update the states of the open-loop observers within the same
group during one update period and we have
N =
⌊
κ f ,g
κ∆,g
⌋
, (III.33)
where κ∆,g is the update time step interval between two adjacent open-loop observers i and i+ 1 in
group g. Then we calculate the average of the residuals generated by the open-loop observers in
the same group.
In order to average the residuals of N observers, we need the following definition
Definition 9. The leading observer is the open-loop observer which has not been updated for the
longest time steps among all of the observers in the same group during the time steps ( j−1) · κ∆,g
and j · κ∆,g, where j is a positive integer. The leading observer could be found according to the
following formula
Hg = d
t− κ f ,gb tκ f ,g c
κ∆,g
e+ 1. (III.34)
Note that if d
t−κ f ,gb tκ f ,g c
κ∆,g
e equals N, then set Hg = 1.
To average the residuals, the first step is to find the leading observer during the time steps
( j− 1) · κ∆,g and j · κ∆,g. Fig. III.8 helps explain how we average the residuals generated by a
group of three observers. Suppose we are at time step t1, which is during the first update period
κ f ,g. We simply average all the estimated states at time step t1. Suppose we are at time step t2.
Observer (g,1) has not been updated for t2 − κ f ,g time steps, which is larger than that of observer
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Figure III.8: Residuals averaging
(g,2) (t2− κ f ,g− κ∆,g) and that of observer (g,3) (t2− κ f ,g−2κ∆,g). Therefore, observer (g,1) is the
leading observer at time step t2. Based on this leading observer, we find the corresponding time
steps when the divergence is similar for the other two observers. After getting the three estimated
states, we can calculate the averaged residual at time step t2. It can been seen that the averaged
residual is generated over 2κ f ,g time steps. The following formula shows the averaged residual at
time step t
ravg,g(t) =
1
N
(ΣHgi=1rg,i(t− (Hg− i)κ∆,g) +ΣNi=Hg+1rg,i(t− κ f ,g + (i−Hg)κ∆,g)). (III.35)
The average of the finite zero-mean random vector (N <∞) does not exactly equal the zero
vector. Based on the bounds of the system noise and update period κ f ,g, a threshold θMOLO,g can
be set for each group to compare with the averaged residual ravg,g. Notice that θMOLO,g ∈ Rny is a
vector. We compare each element r( j)avg,g(t) in ravg,g(t) with the corresponding element θ
( j)
MOLO,g in
θMOLO,g. If r
( j)
avg,g(t) ≥ θ( j)MOLO,g, then group g triggers an alarm. Once the alarm is triggered, the
states of the group of the open-loop observers are not updated by the closed-loop observer until the
alarm is cleared.
Logic is applied to determine whether the system is under sensor anomaly or under normal
operation based on which groups trigger alarms. Based on the discussion about the trade-off, if
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a group triggers an alarm, the groups with slower update frequencies should also trigger alarms
theoretically. Therefore, we find the group g′ which has the fastest update frequency among the
groups that trigger alarms. If the majority of groups from 1 to g′ trigger alarms, i.e., the inequality
(III.36) holds, then the system is under sensor anomaly. Otherwise, it could be false alarms and
the system is under normal operation.
1
g′
Σ
g′
g=1IF,g(t) ≥ θ f , (III.36)
where θ f is a selected value with range 0.5 to 1. The sensor j, which makes the most of the groups
that trigger alarms have r( j)avg,g(t) ≥ θ( j)MOLO,g(g = 1,2, ...,g′), is identified as the anomalous sensor.
When the system is subject to a sensor anomaly on a critical sensor, the averaged residual is
ravg,g(t) =
1
N
(ΣNi=1rg,i(t− (N − i)κ∆,g)
=
1
N
ΣNi=1CA
t3e(t− t3− (N − i)κ∆,g) + 1NΣ
N
i=1Γγ(t− (N − i)κ∆,g).
(III.37)
The above equation is drawn based on the assumption that observer N is the leading observer at
time step t and it is updated at time step t− t3. Suppose the sensor anomaly starts between time
step t− t3 and t. Theorem 1 in [61] indicates that ‖xe(t− t3− (N− i)κ∆,g)‖ < ,∀N, where  is a small
positive number and it is related to system noise and initial estimation error. Therefore, the sensor
anomaly signal could increase the averaged residual generated by multiple open-loop observers,
thus detected by the MOLO method. If the slope of the ramp sensor anomaly signal is arbitrarily
small, then the sensor anomaly signal can still bypass the MOLO method.
Remark 3. The sensor anomaly signal could be designed to make ΣNi=1Γγ(t− (N − i)κ∆,g) = 0 in
order to bypass the multiple open-loop observers. That means, however, the sensor anomaly signal
is changing around zero every κ∆,g time steps. If the change is small, then the impact of the
sensor anomaly is insignificant. If the change is large, then the sensor anomaly signal can cause a
significant change in the residual generated by a closed-loop observer.
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Although this approach cannot guarantee the detection of a sensor anomaly with arbitrarily
small slope, a sensor anomaly with a small slope would take a long time to disrupt the performance
of the system. In addition, if the sensor anomaly is caused by an attack, this long time increases
the cost of the attack implementation. During this time, other techniques, such as sensor fusion,
may have already detected the sensor anomaly.
Algorithm 3 shows the procedure of the MOLO method. At each time step, we first find
the leading observer. Then we average the residuals for each group. Then the averaged residual
is analyzed to determine the occurrence of a critical sensor anomaly, and isolate the anomalous
sensor. After the anomalous sensor is detected, if the system is stable or marginally stable with
‖A‖= 1, then we can directly use the state estimated by an open-loop observer for the state feedback
controller as indicated in Proposition 1. Otherwise, we need to replace the anomalous sensor.
Fig. III.9 shows the performance of the MOLO method under sensor anomaly β. In this
example, we have two groups of open-loop observers. Group 1 has update period 8s and group 2
has update period 2s. There are 20 observers in each group and the update time steps are distributed
evenly within one update period. Fig. III.9a shows the averaged residuals and Fig. III.9b shows
the alarms of the two groups. After the first update period, the averaged residual is less noisy
and the threshold of each group could be smaller. It can also be seen that the sensor anomaly is
successfully detected by Group 1 at about 27s but bypasses Group 2. This is because the update
period of Group 2 is too short compared to the slope of the sensor anomaly signal. Overall, sensor
anomaly β is successfully detected by the MOLO method compared to Fig. III.5.
III.4.5 CCI Method for non-Critical Sensor Anomaly Mitigation
The CCI method can potentially mitigate the impact of an anomaly in a non-critical sensor
during the diagnosis process. At each time step, this method selects the closed-loop observer,
based on which the state feedback controller gives the smallest divergence of the control input.
This divergence is defined as follows:
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Algorithm 3: MOLO method for critical sensor anomaly diagnosis
function MOLO;
Input : y(t),u(t), x˜0(t), IF,g(t−1), xˆg,i
Output: IF , IF,g(t), i f , xˆg,i(t+ 1)
for g = 1 to M do
Hg = d
t−κ f ,gb tκ f ,g c
κ∆,g
e+ 1;
if Hg > N then
Hg = 1;
end
for i = 1 to N do
if time to update xˆg,i then
xˆg,i(t) = (1− IF,g(t−1))x˜0(t) + IF,g(t−1)xˆg,i(t);
xˆg,i(t+ 1) = Axˆg,i(t) +Bu(t);
else
xˆg,i(t+ 1) = Axˆg,i(t) +Bu(t);
end
//Residuals generation;
rg,i(t) = y(t)−Cxˆg,i(t)
end
//Averaged residual;
if t ≤ κ f ,g then
ravg,g(t) = 1NΣ
N
i=1rg,i(t);
else
ravg,g(t) = 1N (Σ
Hg
i=1rg,i(t− (Hg− i)κ∆,g) +ΣNi=Hg+1rg,i(t− κ f ,g + (i−Hg)κ∆,g));
end
end
//Sensor anomaly diagnosis;
tmp = 0; //The number of groups that trigger alarms;
tmpsensor, j = 0; //The sensor that each group thinks it is
anomalous;
for g = 1 to M do
for j = 1 to nx do
if r( j)avg,g(t) ≥ θ( j)MOLO,g then
IF,g(t) = 1;
g′ = g;
tmp = tmp+ 1;
tmpsensor, j = tmpsensor, j + 1;
end
end
end
if 1g′Σ
g′
g=1IF,g(t) ≥ θ f then
IF = 1;
i f = max j tmpsensor, j;
end
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(a) The averaged residuals of the two
groups of observers: Group 1 has update
period 8s and Group 2 has update period
2s
(b) Alarms of the two groups IF,1 and IF,2
Figure III.9: The performance of the MOLO method under sensor anomaly β
Definition 10. Divergence of the control input ‖∆ui‖ is the absolute difference between the calcu-
lated control input based on the closed-loop observer and that based on an open-loop observer.
‖∆ui(t)‖ = ‖Fx˜i(t)−Fxˆ(t)‖. (III.38)
The open-loop observer in the CCI method is slightly different from those used in the MOLO
method. Since the CCI method switches among several closed-loop observers from time to time,
the state of the open-loop observer should be updated to be the estimated state by the closed-loop
observer which is used for feedback at time step t. For example, if closed-loop observer i is used
for feedback at time step t, then we need to calculate the estimated state xˆ(t+ 1) of the open-loop
observer with the initial state x˜i(t).
First, we analyze this method in ideal system, and give the lower bound of the sensor anomaly
signal that the CCI method can switch to the observer without the anomalous sensor during the
diagnosis process. Then, we analyze the impact of system noise on the lower bound of the sensor
anomaly signal.
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III.4.5.1 Ideal System Case
Under normal operation, the divergence of the control input calculated based on a closed-
loop observer is a function of its estimation error. Under sensor anomaly, the closed-loop observer
without anomalous sensor gives the best state estimation, thus the smallest divergence. Theorem
2 demonstrates that the divergence of the control input ‖∆ui f (t+ 1)‖ based on the closed-loop ob-
server i f without the anomalous sensor i f is smaller than that based on other closed-loop observers
with the anomalous sensor.
Theorem 2. Given an ideal control system (III.1) with w(t) = 0 and v(t) = 0, and a sensor anomaly
starting at time step t on sensor i f , observer i f gives the smallest divergence of the control input
‖∆ui f (t+ 1)‖ if the lower bound of the sensor anomaly signal satisfies (III.39).
∀i =0,1, ...,mnc, i 6= i f ,
‖γ(t)‖ ≥‖FLiΓi‖−1[‖FLi fCi f xe,i f (t)‖+ ‖FLiCixe,i(t)‖+ ‖FAxe,i f ,i(t)‖].
(III.39)
Proof. With anomalous sensor i f starting at time step t, observer i f is not affected by the anoma-
lous sensor. The estimated state x˜i(t+1) of observer i (i 6= i f ) containing the anomalous sensor and
the estimated state x˜i f (t+ 1) observer i f are
x˜i(t+ 1) =Eix˜i(t) +Li(Cix(t) +Γiγ(t)) +Bu(t),
x˜i f (t+ 1) =Ei f x˜i f (t) +Li fCi f x(t) +Bu(t).
(III.40)
Since the initial state of the open-loop observer is the same as the estimated state of the
observer which is used for feedback at time step t, two cases should be considered:
1. At time step t, observer i (i 6= i f ) is used for feedback,
xˆ(t+ 1) = Ax˜i(t) +Bu(t). (III.41)
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2. At time step t, observer i f is used for feedback,
xˆ(t+ 1) = Ax˜i f (t) +Bu(t). (III.42)
Under case 1), the divergence of the control input of observer i f and observer i (i 6= i f ) are
shown in (III.43) and (III.44), respectively.
‖∆ui f (t+ 1)‖ =‖FAxe,i f ,i(t) +FLi fCi f xe,i f (t)‖, (III.43)
‖∆ui(t+ 1)‖ =‖FLiCixe,i(t) +FLiΓiγ(t)‖. (III.44)
So when the lower bound of the sensor anomaly signal satisfies (III.39), observer i f gives the
smallest divergence of the control input, and is selected to provide feedback for the state feedback
controller at time step t+ 1. The same result is also drawn for case 2).
Based on Theorem 2, when the system is under non-critical sensor anomaly and the sensor
anomaly signal satisfies (III.39), the CCI method can switch to the observer without the anomalous
sensor before the anomalous sensor is identified. If the magnitude or the slope of the sensor
anomaly signal is too small, then the CCI method may not be able to select the observer without
the anomalous sensor to mitigate the impact of sensor anomaly; and the lower bound of the sensor
anomaly signal during the observers’ transient state is larger than that during steady state because
of the relatively large estimation error. In order to reduce the lower bound of the sensor anomaly
signal, horizon size κCCI is introduced to calculate the divergence of the control input to consider
the impact of the integral of the sensor anomaly signal over κCCI steps. Therefore, at each time
step t, we need to recalculate the state of the open-loop observer with initial state same as the
estimated state x˜i(t+ 1− κCCI) of the selected closed-loop observer at time step t+ 1− κCCI . Then,
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the divergence of the control input of observer i f and i are
‖∆ui f (t+ 1)‖ =‖F(−(Ei f )κCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI) +AκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI))‖, (III.45)
‖∆ui(t+ 1)‖ =‖F(−(Ei)κCCIxe,i(t+ 1− κCCI)−ΣκCCI−1j=0 (Ei) jLiΓi f (t− j) +AκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI))‖.
(III.46)
Thus, the lower bound of the integral of the sensor anomaly signal is
‖ΣκCCI−1j=0 F(Ei) jLiΓiγ(t− j)‖ ≥2‖FAκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖
+ ‖F(Ei f )κCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖+ ‖F(Ei)κCCIxe,i(t+ 1− κCCI)‖.
(III.47)
If the sensor anomaly starts between time steps t + 1− κCCI and t, xe,i f (t + 1− κCCI) and
xe,i(t+ 1− κCCI) are very small. In addition, the absolute value of the eigenvalues of Ei f and Ei
are smaller than 1. Increasing the horizon step κCCI and placing the observer poles closer to the
origin can reduce both ‖F(Ei f )κCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖ and ‖F(Ei)κCCIxe,i(t+ 1− κCCI)‖. For the term
‖FAκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖, however, we need to consider three conditions: A is stable, marginally
stable and unstable. If the open-loop system is stable or marginally stable, i.e., the eigenvalues of
A lie inside or on the unit circle, the term ‖FAκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖ is bounded. Thus, increasing
κCCI can reduce the lower bound of the sensor anomaly signal and increase the ability of the CCI
method to select the observer without the anomalous sensor. If the open-loop system is unstable,
i.e., the one or more eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle, the term ‖FAκCCIxe,i f (t+ 1− κCCI)‖
is diverging, which reduces the ability of the CCI method. Therefore, the selection of the optimal
horizon step κCCI depends on the property of the physical system.
III.4.5.2 Noisy System Case
With system noise, the lower bound of the sensor anomaly signal is increased as shown in
Lemma 6 (the horizon step κCCI is not considered in Lemma 6).
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Lemma 6. Given a control system (III.1), and a sensor anomaly starting at time step t on sensor
i f , observer i f gives the smallest divergence of the control input if the lower bound of the sensor
anomaly signal satisfies (III.48).
∀i =0,1, ...,mnc, i 6= i f ,
‖γ(t)‖ ≥‖FLiΓi‖−1(‖FLi fCi f xe,i f (t)‖+ ‖FLiCixe,i(t)‖+ ‖FAxe,i f ,i(t)‖+ ‖FLi f ‖vi f + ‖FLi‖vi).
(III.48)
The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2.
The transient dynamics caused by switching among observers may degrade the performance
of the control system [53]. To avoid frequently switching, a threshold θCCI is used to decide when
to enable or disable the switching. θCCI should be selected to balance the frequency of switching
and the ability to mitigate the impact of the sensor anomaly.
Algorithm 4 gives the procedure of the CCI method. At each time step, the CCI method
calculates the estimated state of an open-loop observer with the initial state the same as the se-
lected observer at time step t+ 1− κCCI . Then it switches to the observer which gives the smallest
divergence of the control input if the switching is enabled.
Fig. III.10 shows the system with the CCI method under sensor anomaly α. The maximum
absolute value of position under sensor anomaly is 4cm, which is smaller than that with the CO
method as shown in Fig. III.4a. During the detection delay (2s), the CCI method has already
switched to observer 1 for state estimation at 13s, thus mitigating the impact of the sensor anomaly.
III.4.6 Integration of CO, CR, MOLO and CCI Methods
In this section, the three new methods, CR, MOLO, and CCI methods are introduced and
compared with the CO methods through simulation to show the improvements.
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Algorithm 4: CCI method for non-critical sensor anomaly mitigation
function CCI;
Input : t, x˜i(t+ 1), x˜i(t+ 1− κCCI) (i = 0, ...,mnc), IFB(t+ 1− κCCI)
Output: IFB(t+ 1)
//Open-loop observer state estimation;
if t > κCCI then
xˆ(t+ 1) = AκCCI x˜IFB(t+1−κCCI)(t+ 1− κCCI) +ΣκCCI−1j=0 A jBu(t− j)
else
xˆ(t+ 1) = At+1x˜0(t0) +Σtj=0A
jBu(t− j)
end
//Control input calculation;
uo(t+ 1) = Fxˆ(t+ 1);
ui(t+ 1) = Fx˜i(t+ 1);
‖∆ui(t+ 1)‖ = ‖ui(t+ 1)−uo(t+ 1)‖;
if ‖∆ui(t+ 1)‖ ≥ θCCI for all i then
IFB(t+ 1) = mini ‖∆ui(t+ 1)‖;
else
IFB(t+ 1) = IFB(t);
end
(a) Estimated states of both observers
x˜0, x˜1, real state x, and sensor measure-
ment y of the system
(b) Selected observer index IFB with the
CCI method during time 10s and 20s
Figure III.10: The performance of the CCI method under sensor anomaly α
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• The CR method enables sensor anomaly detection during the observers’ transient state, and no
false alarms generated compared to CO method;
• The MOLO method successfully detects the critical sensor anomaly, while CO method fails; and
• The CCI method switches to the observer without the anomalous sensor during the diagnosis pro-
cess, and the position of the object during sensor anomaly is reduced to 0.04m compared to 0.3m
with CO method.
We systematically integrate all of the above methods to utilize their advantages, improving
the overall performance of sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation. Algorithm 5 shows the in-
tegration of the CO, CR, MOLO, and CCI methods. At each time step, the CCI method is used
to mitigate the impact of a potential sensor anomaly. Then the CR method determines whether
there is a anomalous sensor on the system. If the CR method flags an alarm, and if the system
observers have reached their steady state under normal operation (t > tss, where tss is the number
of time steps that is needed for observers to reach their steady state), the CO method is used to
isolate the anomalous sensor, and the system switches to the observer that can mitigate the impact
of the sensor anomaly after the anomalous sensor is isolated. Meanwhile, the MOLO method de-
tects whether there is an anomaly on a critical sensor. Robust control design in the presence of a
disturbance is not within the scope of this dissertation.
III.5 Illustrative Example
A simplified suspension system (a two-mass-two-spring system) [83] is used to test the pro-
posed algorithm with four methods. The system shown in Fig. III.11 has five states: position h1 of
mass 1, velocity h˙1 of mass 1, distance between two mass h, velocity h˙, and integral of h, which
is used to achieve zero steady-state error. The five states are measured by five sensors directly, as
shown in Table III.2. A controller controls the system through u. Potential disturbance comes from
the ground. We want to maintain h to stay at 0m, which is also the reference signal of this system.
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Algorithm 5: Integration of four methods
for t = t0 to the end of simulation do
//Estimated state of closed-loop observers;
x˜i(t+ 1) = Eix˜i(t) +Liyi(t) +Bu(t);
//Diagnosis and Mitigation begins;
IFB(t+ 1) =CCI(t, x˜i(t+ 1), x˜i(t+ 1− κCCI), IFB(t+ 1− κCCI));
u(t+ 1) = Fx˜IFB(t+1)(t+ 1);
[IA, IF , ID, d˜(t−1)] =CR(x˜i(t− kCR : k+ 1));
if ID = 0 and t ≥ tss then
[IF , IF,g(t), i f , xˆg,i(t+ 1)] = MOLO(y(t),u(t), x˜0(t), IF,g(t−1), xˆg,i);
end
if IF = 1 and t ≥ tss then
[IF , i f ] =CO(y(t), x˜i);
IFB(t+ 1) = i f ;
u(t+ 1) = Fx˜IFB(t+1);
else if IF,g = 1 for any g then
if A is stable or A is marginally stable and ‖A‖ ≤ 1) then
u(t+ 1) = −Fxˆg,1(t+ 1);
else
Replace the anomalous sensor i f
end
else
Robust control to tolerate disturbance
end
end
Figure III.11: Simplified suspension system
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The system has sampling time 0.01s, process noise bound 0.001 (m or m/s) and sensor noise
bound 0.01 (m or m/s). The observers’ transient state is about 0.1s (10 time steps). The initial
state of the system is (0,0,0,0,0). The initial state of the observers is (0.02,0.01,1,0,0). Table
III.3 shows part of parameters of the four methods.
Table III.2: Sensors of the Simplified Suspension System
Variable Set
Sensor 1 h1 S nc
Sensor 2 h˙1 S nc
Sensor 3 h S nc
Sensor 4 h˙ S nc
Sensor 5 Σh S c
Table III.3: Part of parameters of the four methods
CO θCO 0.012
CR
κCR 0.1s (10 time steps)
θCR 0.9
MOLO
M 2
N 20
k f ,1 10s (1000 time steps)
k f ,2 0.4s (40 time steps)
θ(5)MOLO,1 0.025m
θ(5)MOLO,2 0.015m
CCI
κCCI 10s (1000 time steps)
θCCI 0.001N
Four scenarios are considered as examples:
• Scenario 1: A ramp anomaly signal with slope 1m/s (0.01m per time step) added to sensor 3,
saturating at 10m;
• Scenario 2: A ramp anomaly signal with slope 1m/s (0.01m per time step) added to sensor 3,
saturating at 10m;
• Scenario 3: A ramp anomaly signal with slope 0.01m/s (0.0001m per time step) added to sensor
5, saturating at 10m; and
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• Scenario 4: A step disturbance from the ground with magnitude 0.2m, starting at t = 3000(30s).
The sensor anomalies in Scenario 1 and 3 start at t = 3000(30s). The sensor anomaly in Scenario
2 starts at t = 5(0.05s).
Fig. III.12 shows the system under a non-critical sensor anomaly happening during the steady
state of the system. During the observers’ transient state, the CR method eliminates false alarms as
shown in Fig. III.12b. At the time the sensor anomaly occurs, the CCI method switches to observer
3 for feedback as shown in Fig. III.12c, allowing more time for diagnosis. The CR method triggers
an alarm after detecting the sensor anomaly. The CO method isolates the anomalous sensor, and
calculates the sensor anomaly signal as shown in Fig. III.12d. The proposed algorithm integrating
the four methods successfully protects the system from a non-critical sensor anomaly happening
during the observers’ steady state.
Fig. III.13 shows the system under a non-critical sensor anomaly happening during the ob-
servers’ transient state. The CR method successfully detects the occurrence of the sensor anomaly
with about 0.06s time delay as shown in Fig. III.13b, which is caused by relatively large θCR (0.9)
compared to the observer poles (about 0.1). The CCI method switches to the observer without the
anomalous sensor later than the time step that the CR method detects the sensor anomaly. This is
because the observers cannot provide good state estimations during the observers’ transient state,
thus the observer without the anomalous sensor may not give the smallest divergence of the cal-
culated control input. This scenario shows the effectiveness of the CR method for sensor anomaly
detection during the observers’ transient state.
Fig. III.14 shows the system is subject to a critical sensor anomaly. In Fig. III.14b, the
averaged residuals are less noisy after the first update period. Group 1 successfully detects the
occurrence of the sensor anomaly, while group 2 does not. This scenario shows the effectiveness
of the MOLO method for a non-critical sensor anomaly diagnosis.
Fig. III.15 shows the system under disturbance from the ground. The CR method success-
fully distinguishes a disturbance from a sensor anomaly, and correctly estimates the disturbance
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(a) The estimated states of observer 0 and
observer 3 x˜0, x˜3, the real state x, and the
sensor measurement y of the system un-
der the non-critical sensor anomaly
(b) Alarms IF
(c) Observer index IFB selected for the
state feedback controller
(d) Estimated sensor anomaly signal γ˜
and the real sensor anomaly signal γ
Figure III.12: The suspension system under a non-critical sensor anomaly happening during the
steady state of the system
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(a) The estimated states of observer 0 and
observer 3 x˜0, x˜3, the real state x, and the
sensor measurement y of the system un-
der the non-critical sensor anomaly
(b) Alarms IF
(c) Observer index IFB selected for the
state feedback controller
Figure III.13: The suspension system under a non-critical sensor anomaly happening during the
observers’ transient state
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(a) The estimated states of closed-loop
observer 0 and the open-loop observer
(1,1), x˜0, xˆ1,1 the real state x, and the sen-
sor measurement y of the system
(b) Averaged residuals of both groups of
open-loop observers ravg,1,ravg,2
Figure III.14: The suspension system under a critical sensor anomaly
Figure III.15: Scenario 4: The calculated disturbance d˜ and the real disturbance d of the system
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signal.
III.6 Summary
In this chapter, the CO method and three new methods (CR, MOLO, and CCI) are integrated
to solve the sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation problem using multiple closed-loop and open-
loop observers. The closed-loop observers include one that uses all of the sensor measurements
for state estimation, and others that exclude a non-critical sensor. The open-loop observers do
not use any sensor measurements for state estimation. Based on these closed-loop and open-loop
observers, new methods are proposed and integrated to improve sensor anomaly diagnosis and
mitigation:
• The CR method can detect non-critical sensor anomalies during the observers’ transient state;
• The MOLO method can detect and isolate critical sensor anomalies; and
• The CCI method can mitigate the impact of non-critical sensor anomalies during the anomaly
diagnosis process.
The three new methods are integrated with a previously developed residual-based method
(CO method) to collaboratively address the sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation problem in
this chapter. The collaboration of the methods is illustrated in Figure III.1a and Table III.1. The
proposed algorithm allows any residual-based method to be integrated besides the CO method.
Simulation results show the effectiveness of our proposed framework.
This multi-observer sensor anomaly detection and mitigation approach can be easily ex-
tended to the multiple sensor anomalies case as long as the system observability still holds without
the anomalous sensors. Note that it may be impossible in general to detect every kind of sensor
anomaly. Some sensor anomaly may not be detected if the norm of the sensor anomaly signal
is smaller than a certain lower bound. The aim of our sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation
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method is to decrease this lower bound to reduce the anomalies that we cannot detect, and to allow
more time for other techniques to protect the system before it moves into a severe condition.
However, at a high level, the proposed framework has some limitations. For the critical
sensor anomalies, the proposed MOLO method cannot detect a ramp sensor anomaly signal with
arbitrary slope. The MOLO method does not provide detection guarantees for the critical sensor
anomaly. In addition, this framework is designed specifically for sensor anomalies in continuous
systems. However, many CPS cannot be simply modeled as continuous systems because many CPS
are hybrid by nature, containing both discrete and continuous variables. In hybrid CPS, different
types of anomalies may occur in either continuous process or discrete dynamics or both. Thus, the
improved sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework is not sufficient to detect anomalies
in hybrid CPS. All of these limitations are addressed in the next chapter, where we model CPS
as hybrid systems. We classify the anomalies in hybrid systems into different types. By utilizing
the relationship between the continuous and the discrete variables, we propose a new anomaly
detection method that can provide detection guarantees for various types of anomalies in hybrid
systems.
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CHAPTER IV
Conflict-driven Anomaly Detection for Hybrid Systems with Current-State Observable
Discrete Dynamics
IV.1 Introduction
In Chapter III, we improved the sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework to en-
hance the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). However, the improved framework has lim-
itations when it is used to detect general anomalies. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter I, many
CPS are hybrid systems consisting of both continuous and discrete variables. The improved sensor
anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework in Chapter III is developed for continuous systems,
thus it is not sufficient to detect anomalies on discrete variables or both continuous and discrete
variables in hybrid CPS.
In this chapter, we propose a new anomaly detection approach that addresses the limitations
of the sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework in the detection of general anomalies
in hybrid CPS. The proposed anomaly detection approach can provide formal detection guarantees
for different types of anomalies in hybrid CPS. This approach, which is called the conflict-driven
method, uses a hybrid observer to estimate both continuous and discrete variables. Based on all
possible anomalies for hybrid systems and the fact that the continuous and discrete variables are re-
lated in hybrid systems, the conflict-driven method leverages the estimated discrete and continuous
states along with their interrelationship to detect these challenging anomalies, as opposed to the
traditional methods which analyze either the continuous system or the discrete system separately.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
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1. We propose a conflict-driven method to provide guarantees on the detection of some types of
anomalies that are not detectable using traditional observer-based and residual-based methods in
addition to the anomalies that can be detected by the traditional methods. In the conflict-driven
method, we define three conflict types based on the relation between the discrete and continuous
variables of the hybrid systems. The conflict-driven method detects anomalies by checking the
occurrence of the conflicts.
2. We define a classification taxonomy for anomalies in hybrid systems. An anomaly in a hybrid
system may affect the continuous variables or the discrete variables or both. Some anomalies are
undetectable by only considering the continuous component of the system because the anomalous
system may have consistent input-output data with the system model under normal operation.
Some anomalies are undiagnosable by only considering the discrete component of the system
because the observed discrete event sequence of the anomalous system is the same as the system
under normal operation. In this dissertation, we classify the anomalies into eight different types
based on the variables that are affected, input-output data consistency, and diagnosability of the
anomaly.
3. We develop a new hybrid observer for anomaly detection. We use a Set-Valued Observer (SVO)
as the continuous state observer of the hybrid observer. With the SVO, we can apply the conflict-
driven method to hybrid systems with unobservable continuous components.
4. We provide a mapping between conflict types and anomaly types. Based on the occurrence of the
conflict types, we can identify if the anomaly is related to the continuous component of the system,
the discrete component or both.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section IV.2, we give an introduction
of the class of hybrid systems that are of interest. In Section IV.3, we briefly describe the hybrid
observer used in the conflict-driven method. In Section IV.4, we propose a classification taxon-
omy of anomalies in hybrid systems. In Section IV.5, we introduce the conflict-driven anomaly
detection method and demonstrate its effectiveness mathematically. In Section IV.6, we illustrate
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the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method using the simulated Positive Train Control (PTC)
system as introduced in Chapter I.2.2.3. A summary of this chapter is provided in Section IV.7.
IV.2 Modeling Framework
In this section, we describe the class of hybrid systems to which the conflict-driven method
can be applied. We formulate the class of hybrid systems mathematically. We partition the hy-
brid system into one nominal hybrid subsystem and at least one anomalous hybrid subsystem(s).
The nominal hybrid subsystem corresponds to the system under normal operation and different
anomalous hybrid subsystems correspond to the system under different anomalies.
IV.2.1 Notation
Let ‖ ·‖ denote∞-norm, ·˜ denote estimated variables, ∪˙ denote disjoint union, andσ denote
the ∞-norm ball of center 0 and of radius σ. In addition, x ∈ Rnx represents a vector, where its
ith element is indicated by x(i). A ∈ Rm×n represents a matrix. The linear span of a set of vectors
is denoted by span(·). For a set X ⊂ Rnx , we denote its closure, interior, and boundary by X, Xo
and ∂X respectively. Clearly, ∂X = X\Xo. The volume of the closed set X is denoted by Vol(X).
A polyhedron X is represented by X = S et(M,m) := {x : Mx ≤m}, where M ∈ Rm×nx and m ∈ Rm.
The detailed notations used in this chapter are described in Appendix B.
IV.2.2 System Modeling
Hybrid systems consist of a set of discrete states and a set of continuous states. In this
chapter, we consider that each discrete state has an invariant which describes the set of allowable
continuous states. We focus on hybrid systems which satisfy the following conditions.
System Conditions:
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1. The hybrid system is deterministic. That is, the discrete transitions of the hybrid system are deter-
ministic and the invariant in each discrete state is well-defined.
2. The number of discrete states is finite.
3. The hybrid system is memoryless. That is, the continuous dynamics in any discrete state are
independent of the previous discrete state.
4. The discrete transitions of the hybrid systems are controlled switchings. That is, the continuous
vector field may change discontinuously when the discrete state changes [10].
5. There is no discontinuity in continuous variables.
6. The discrete component of the system is current-state observable.
7. The invariant of each discrete state is static.
Remark 4. Conditions 1 to 4 limit our work to deterministic memoryless hybrid systems with
finite discrete states and controlled switchings. Condition 5 is imposed without any reset maps.
For example, a bouncing ball with autonomous jumps and discrete velocity changes or a system
with hysteresis does not fit into our work. Condition 6 allows us to design a discrete state observer,
which gives us a unique estimated discrete state after a finite number of observable discrete events
occur. The definition of current-state observable is introduced later in Definition 12. Condition
7 does not limit the class of systems. We only need to model the system in a way such that the
invariant of each discrete state is static. If a discrete state of the hybrid system has an invariant
changing with time, we need to partition the discrete state into several discrete states with static
invariants such that the system can fit into our work. Most hybrid CPS satisfy the above list of
system conditions, such as the train system and a gantry system described in [59].
Mathematically, a hybrid system can be modeled as a hybrid automaton
H = (X ,U ,Y , Init, f ield,E,φ,η), (IV.1)
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where each element is defined as
• X = Q×X: a set of discrete and continuous states
• U = Ψ×U: a set of discrete and continuous inputs
• Y = Ω×Y: a set of discrete and continuous outputs
• Init = (q(t0),x(t0)) ∈ X : an initial state
• f ield : X ×U → X: a time-invariant vector field
• E = Ψ∪˙Ω: a set of discrete events
• φ : Q×Ψ→ Q: a set of discrete transitions
• η : X ×U → Y: an output map consisting of a discrete output map ζ and a continuous output
equation h
– ζ : Q×Ψ→Ω: a discrete output map
– h : Q×X→ Y: a continuous output equation
The hybrid automaton captures both nominal system models with a set of nominal discrete
states Qn and anomaly models with a set of anomalous discrete states Q f , where “ f ” indicates
“fault”. The set of all discrete states is defined as Q = Qn∪˙Q f . We consider that a hybrid system
contains one nominal hybrid subsystem Hn and at least one anomalous hybrid subsystem(s) H f .
An example hybrid system is shown in Fig. IV.1. The nominal hybrid subsystem corresponds to
the system under normal operation and it contains the set of nominal discrete states. Different
anomalous hybrid subsystems correspond to different anomalies. An anomalous hybrid subsystem
contains a set of anomalous discrete states. An anomaly f transits the system from the nominal hy-
brid subsystem to the corresponding anomalous hybrid subsystem. The nominal hybrid subsystem
Hn can be derived by removing Q f and the events and transitions to and from Q f . The initial state
Init, which is a combination of initial discrete state q(t0) ∈ Qn and initial continuous state x(t0), is
not required to be known.
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Figure IV.1: An example hybrid systemH consisting of the nominal hybrid subsystemHn and one
anomalous hybrid subsystem H f
For each discrete state q ∈ Q, we associate continuous dynamics that can be represented by
a Linear Time Invariant (LTI) model, subject to process and measurement noise.
f ield : x(t+ 1) = Aqx(t) +Bqu(t) +w(t),
h : y(t) = Cqx(t) +v(t),
(IV.2)
where Aq ∈ Rnx×nx ,Bq ∈ Rnx×nu ,Cq ∈ Rny×nx are system matrices, x ∈ X ⊂ Rnx , u ∈ U ⊂ Rnu and
y ∈ Y ⊆ Rny are continuous states, inputs and outputs, respectively. The process and measurement
noise are represented by w ∈ Rnx and v ∈ Rny , respectively. We define the system noise as d(t) =
[w(t) v(t)]ᵀ and assume:
Assumption 4. The system noise at each time step is bounded, satisfying ∀i = t0, ..., t,d(i) ∈ Bd,
where Bd := {[w v]ᵀ : ‖w‖ ≤w,‖v‖ ≤ v} and the initial condition is bounded, satisfying x(t0) ∈Bxo ,
where Bxo := {x(t0) : ‖x(t0)‖ ≤ x}.
The continuous dynamical models of the system in anomalous discrete states are not required
to be known for anomaly detection using the conflict-driven method.
Discrete events E consists of discrete input events Ψ and discrete output events Ω. Addi-
tionally, discrete events E can be partitioned into observable events Eo and unobservable events
Euo, i.e., E = Eo∪˙Euo. Only observable events can be detected by an observer. We denote a set
of observable input events as Ψo and a set of unobservable input events as Ψuo. All of the output
events are observable.
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The ith discrete event occurs at time ti. The continuous evolutions occur in time t ∈ [ti−1 +
1, ti],∀i = 1,2, .... In reality, discrete events may occur between two adjacent sample times. We
assume:
Assumption 5. The occurrence of the discrete events can be captured at sample times. At most
one input event occurs within one sampling period. An output event occurs simultaneously with an
input event.
Note that the discrete state is changed one time step after a discrete input event occurs, that
is φ(q(ti),ψ) = q′(ti + 1), where q(ti),q′(ti + 1) ∈ Q.
To each discrete state q ∈ Q, we associate an invariant:
Invq = {x : ∀i = 1, ...,nx,βi ≤ x
(i) ≤ βi, } ⊆ X, (IV.3)
where β
i
and βi are constant values. An invariant is a hyperrectangle with a bounded interval on
each continuous state variable.
To each discrete transition φ(q,ψ) = q′, we associate a guard:
G(q,q′,ψ) = {x ∈ Invq : sGx(iG) ≥ cG}, (IV.4)
where iG ∈ {1,2, ...,nx}, cG is a scalar and sG is either −1 or 1. A guard is a hyperrectangle enclosed
by the boundary of the invariant ∂Invq and the hyperplane:
P(q,q′,ψ) = {x : x(iG) = sGcG}. (IV.5)
Our definitions of guard G(q,q′,ψ) and invariant Invq indicate that cG is between the lower and
upper bounds of the state variable x(iG) of the invariant Invq, i.e., βiG ≤ cG ≤ βiG . A guardG(q,q
′,ψ)
indicates that the transition ψ will take place if and only if the ithG state variable of sGx is greater
than or equal to cG in discrete state q. An invariant Invq indicates that the system can remain in
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discrete state q if and only if the continuous state x ∈ Invq\⋃ jG(q,q j,ψ j).
We define a post-guard hyperplane of guard G(q,q′,ψ) as:
Definition 11. Post-guard hyperplane of guard G(q,q′,ψ) is one of the hyperplanes forming the
boundary of the invariant ∂Invq, which satisfies (IV.6):
L(q,q′,ψ) = {x ∈ X : sGx(iG) ≥ cG ∧x(iG) ∈ {βiG ,βiG}}. (IV.6)
An example of post-guard hyperplane L(q,q′,ψ) is shown in Fig. IV.2. To simplify notation,
we denote cL as the value of x(iG), where x ∈L(q,q′,ψ). If P(q,q′,ψ) forms one of the hyperplanes
of ∂Invq, then L(q,q′,ψ) = P(q,q′,ψ). Otherwise, L(q,q′,ψ)∩P(q,q′,ψ) = ∅.
Figure IV.2: Visualization of the invariant Invq (the shaded rectangle), the hyperplane P(q,q′,ψ) of
guard G(q,q′,ψ), and the post-guard hyperplane L(q,q′,ψ) of discrete state q in 2−D continuous
state space
The proposed conflict-driven method utilizes a hybrid observer for state estimation. The
framework of the hybrid observer is introduced in [5], which is designed based on the Finite State
Machine (FSM) associated with the nominal hybrid subsystem. The FSM Mn is derived by ex-
tracting the discrete behavior from Hn, which is represented by tuple (Q,Ψ,Ω,q(t0),E,φ,ζ). In
order to get a unique estimate of the discrete state with the hybrid observer after finite number of
observable events, we assume:
Assumption 6. The FSM Mn is current-state observable.
Current-state observable is defined as:
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Definition 12. A FSM is current-state observable if there exists an integer k such that for any
unknown initial discrete state, the discrete state, after the ith observable discrete input event occurs,
can be uniquely determined from the observed input/output event pairs sequence up to i, i.e., i ≥ k
[5].
Note that one observable input/output event pair is considered as one input event to the
hybrid observer. Thus, after the kth observable input/output event pair occurs, the hybrid observer
can give a unique estimated discrete state. The necessary and sufficient condition of current state
observability is given in [5]. The time that the kth observable input/output event pair occurs is
denoted as tk.
IV.2.3 Nominal Hybrid Subsystem
In the nominal hybrid subsystem, we partition the invariant of each nominal discrete state
into an intermediate region and a normal operating region. Before introducing intermediate region
and normal operating region, we first define neighbor discrete state as
Definition 13. Neighbor discrete state qN ,q of nominal discrete state q is a nominal discrete state
that can by reached via one observable discrete event ψ ∈ Ψ from the discrete state q:
qN ,q = {q j ∈ Qn : ∃P(q,q j,ψ),q 6= q j}. (IV.7)
The set of neighbor discrete states of nominal discrete state q is called neighbor set Nq.
Then the intermediate regionRin,q,q j is the set of continuous states satisfy guard G(q,q j,ψ), where
q j ∈Nq:
Rin,q,q j = {x ∈ Invq : q j ∈Nq∧ sGx(iG) ≥ cG}, (IV.8)
where x(iG) is the state variable corresponding to guard G(q,q j,ψ). Since the invariant of each
nominal discrete state is compact 1, the intermediate region Rin,q,q j is compact as well. The in-
1A hyperrectangle is closed, compact and convex.
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termediate region Rin,q is the union of the intermediate regions Rin,q,q j , where q j ∈ Nq. That is,
Rin,q = ⋃∀q j∈NqRin,q,q j . The intermediate region Rin,q is not necessarily compact.
For each discrete state q ∈ Qn, we define a normal operating region as the set of continuous
states that are in the invariant but not the intermediate region Rin,q,
Rno,q = Invq\Rin,q. (IV.9)
To have an appropriate hybrid model for which the conflict-driven method can provide de-
tection guarantees, we pose the following assumption:
Assumption 7. The intermediate region is bounded by the hyperplane P(q,q j,ψ) corresponding
to the guard G(q,q j,ψ) and the post-guard hyperplane L(q,q j,ψ) and ∂Invq in each discrete state.
Rin,q ⊂ {x ∈ Invq : ∀q j ∈ Qn : ∃P(q,q j,ψ j),min(cG,cL) ≤ x(iG) ≤max(cG,cL)}. (IV.10)
The visualization of this assumption on 2−D space is shown in Fig. IV.3. The intermediate
region of discrete state q is the union of Rin,q,qk and Rin,q,q j . The intermediate region Rin,q is a
subset of the region bounded by the hyperplane P(q,q j,ψ j) and the hyperplane L(q,q j,ψ j) and
the region bounded by the hyperplane P(q,qk,ψk) and the hyperplane L(q,qk,ψk). System condi-
tion 5 and Assumption 7 indicate that P(q,qk,ψk) is one of the hyperplanes forming ∂Invqk and
P(q,q j,ψ j) is one of the hyperplanes forming ∂Invq j .
The basic principle of conflict-driven method is to check at each time step, whether or not the
sets of current and future continuous states, which are calculated using reachability analysis based
on the estimated set of continuous states, intersect with the invariant of the estimated discrete state.
The sets of continuous states include an initial set given by the continuous state observer, and a
forward reachable set which is the set of all continuous states that can be reached along trajectories
starting in the initial set. Reachable set calculation requires the following assumption.
Assumption 8. The continuous input signal is bounded, and the bound is known, i.e., ||u|| ≤ µ.
83
Figure IV.3: Normal operating and intermediate region. P(q,qk,ψk) is the hyperplane of the guard
G(q,qk,ψk), and L(q,qk,ψk) is the post-guard hyperplane. P(q,q j,ψ j) is the hyperplane of the
guard G(q,q j,ψ j), and L(q,q j,ψ j) is the post-guard hyperplane
Remark 5. Assumption 8 and system condition 5 indicate that the normal operating regions
are connected. The reachability analysis needs the continuous system to be open-loop stable or
marginally stable such that the reachable set is non-diverging. For anomaly detection purpose, we
do not need the continuous system to be open-loop stable or marginally stable. If the time step for
reachable set calculation is selected small enough, the reachable set will not diverge too much.
The detail of calculating the time step for reachability analysis is described in Section IV.5.
IV.2.4 Anomalous Hybrid Subsystem
An anomaly f ∈ Ψuo is defined as an unobservable input event that transits the nominal
hybrid subsystem Hn to one of the anomalous hybrid subsystems H f . Comparing to the nominal
hybrid subsystem, we define that the anomalous hybrid subsystem should satisfy at least one of the
following two conditions.
Anomaly Conditions:
1. Either the continuous dynamics or the invariant of at least one of the anomalous discrete states is
different from any of the nominal discrete states.
2. The observable discrete event sequence in the anomalous hybrid subsystem is different from that
in the nominal hybrid subsystem.
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Otherwise, the anomalous hybrid subsystem behaves exactly the same as the nominal hybrid sub-
system and the impact of the anomaly is insignificant.
According to the difference between the nominal hybrid subsystem and the anomalous hy-
brid subsystem, an anomaly f either affects the continuous variables or the discrete variables or
both. The continuous dynamics that are changed under anomaly f have two different mathematical
forms: multiplicative and additive [80]. A multiplicative anomaly is represented by the product of
a variable with the anomaly itself, such as a parameter change within a process. Under an additive
anomaly, a variable is influenced by an addition of the anomaly signal itself, such as offsets of sen-
sor values. Arguably, a multiplicative anomaly can be represented by an additive anomaly model
(e.g., Section 3.5 in [24]). Thus, we restrict our attention to additive anomaly models as follows.
x(t+ 1) = Aqx(t) +Bqu(t) +w(t) +Γ1γ1(t), (IV.11)
y(t) = Cqx(t) +v(t) +Γ2γ2(t), (IV.12)
where Γ1 ∈ Rnx×nx ,Γ2 ∈ Rny×ny are diagonal anomaly matrices with binary variables. The ith di-
agonal variable of Γ1 is 1 if and only if the ith state variable is added with an anomalous signal
γ1(t) ∈Rnx . The ith diagonal variable of Γ2 is 1 if and only if the ith output is added with an anoma-
lous signal γ2(t) ∈ Rny . Γ1 ,γ1 and Γ2 ,γ2 are not required to be known for anomaly detection using
conflict-driven method. Note that an additive anomaly γ1 on the state equation (IV.11) could be
transformed into an equivalent additive anomaly γ2 on the output equation (IV.12)2.
IV.3 Hybrid Observer
In this section, we give a brief overview of the hybrid observer, which consists of a discrete
state observer and a continuous state observer [5]. Under the hybrid observer framework in [5], we
propose to use a Set-Valued Observer (SVO) as the continuous state observer [79].
2Transformation between γ1 and γ2 : Γ2 = CΓ1 ,γ2(t) = Σt−1i=0A
i
qγ1(t−1− i).
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Given the nominal hybrid model Hn, we design a hybrid observer to estimate both the dis-
crete state and the continuous state of the system. The hybrid observerO consists of a discrete state
observer D and a continuous state observer C, as shown in Fig. IV.4. The discrete state observer
receives observable discrete input/output event pairs (ψ(t),ω(t)) and gives q˜(t). If no event pair is
received by time t, then the estimated discrete state is the same as that at the previous time step,
i.e., q˜(t) = q˜(t−1). The estimated discrete state q˜(t) may contain a set of estimated discrete states
until the occurrence of the kth observable input/output event pair. After the occurrence of the kth
observable input/output event pair, q˜(t), which contains a unique estimate, is passed to the corre-
sponding continuous state observer. The continuous state observer is designed as a SVO [79]. The
SVO gives a set of estimated continuous states X˜(y, t) using the continuous input u(t) and output
y(t).
Figure IV.4: The structure of the hybrid observer O
IV.3.1 Discrete State Observer
The discrete state observer is represented by a Finite State Machine (FSM) which is a tuple
D = (Q˜,ED,−, q˜(t0),ED, φ˜,−), where ED = (Ψ,Ω) is the set of discrete input/output event pairs
of Mn and “-” means that D does not contain the corresponding component as general FSM
mentioned in Section IV.2.2. The discrete state observer is tracking the set of possible discrete
states that the system can be in. Therefore, no discrete output events or discrete output map are
defined for discrete state observer.
The construction of the discrete state observer D follows the steps presented in [14]. It
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starts from the initial estimated discrete state q˜(t0): with an unknown initial discrete state of Mn,
q˜(t0) = Qn. Then we need to determine the set of possible transitions out of the discrete state in the
discrete state observer and the discrete states in the nominal discrete system Mn to which it can
transition. For each estimated discrete state q˜ ∈ Q˜, we identify the input/output event pairs (ψ,ω)
that label all the transitions out of any state q′ in q˜. These events are called the active event set of
q˜. For each pair (ψ,ω) in the active event set, we identify q ∈ Qn that can be reached from q′ ∈ q˜,
and these states return as a new q˜ in Q˜. This transition is added to φ˜ satisfying:
φ˜ := {q ∈ Qn : ∃q′ ∈ q˜, q ∈ φ(q′,ψ)∧ω = ζ(q′,ψ)}. (IV.13)
Repeat this step until no new q˜ and φ˜ can be added to D.
IV.3.2 Continuous State Observer
We use the SVO as the continuous state observer to construct a set of estimated continuous
states at each time step. The set given by the SVO is a polyhedron and can be represented by a
pair of matrices. In order to use the SVO we first describe an operator Rack which allows us to
calculate matrix pairs of a polyhedron. In the remainder of this section, we describe the set-valued
estimation of the SVO and discuss the estimation accuracy of the SVO by introducing a central
estimator.
IV.3.2.1 Rack Operator
Rack gives a set of possible matrix pairs which directly characterize a set S [79]. For M1 ∈
Rm×nx ,M2 ∈Rm, and m3 ∈Rm, define S ⊆Rnx as S = {x :M1x+M2z≤m3 for some z ∈R}. Define:
Rack[(M1 M2),m3] = {(M,m) ∈ Rm˜×nx ×Rm˜ : S = S et(M,m)}, (IV.14)
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where S et(M,m) = {x : Mx ≤m}.
Note that the set S is unique but its matrix representation is not because different ma-
trix representations (M,m) may contain different redundant constraints. For the sake of com-
putational efficiency, redundant constraints are removed after selecting one of the matrix repre-
sentations. Refer to [66] for different redundant constraints removing methods. The construc-
tion of the elements M,m can be achieved by eliminating the variable z through the Fourier-
Motzkin algorithm [43]. If k variables need to be eliminated, we can use Rack iteratively. That
is, Rackk[(M1 M2),m3] = Rack[Rackk−1[(M1′ M2′),m3′]], which is a multivariable form of
Rack[(M1 M2),m3]. Note that when we use Rack recursively for k times, then M2 is defined as
a Rm×k matrix corresponding to the k variables that need to be eliminated.
IV.3.2.2 Set-Valued Estimation
The SVO starts with the bound of the initial state Bxo and then at each time step computes
a set of estimated state-vectors, which is denoted as X˜(y, t− 1), based on the initial condition, the
measured output, and the (known) input. Fig. IV.5 shows how the SVO works for a 2−D system.
At each time step, the SVO computes a one-time step forward reachable set (enclosed by the green
dash-dotted line) based on the set of estimated continuous states (X˜(y, t−1), enclosed by the blue
solid line) at the previous time step, known system continuous dynamics, process noise bound, and
continuous input. Then using an output measurement and bounded measurement noise, the SVO
also computes a set of continuous states (denoted as Xˆ(y, t) and enclosed by the black dotted line).
The intersection of the one-time step forward reachable set and Xˆ(y, t) becomes the set of estimated
continuous states at the current time step X˜(y, t).
The set of state-vectors Xˆ(y, t) at time t based on a single measurement can be represented
by S et(Mˆ(t),mˆ(t)):
Xˆ(y, t) = {x : Mˆ(t)x ≤ mˆ(t)}, (IV.15)
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Figure IV.5: The visualization of the SVO in a 2-D system
where
Mˆ(t) =
 Cq−Cq
 ,mˆ(t) =
v1+y(t)v1−y(t)
 , (IV.16)
where 1 is a vector with all entires as “1”.
The set of estimated state-vectors X˜(y, t) at time t is represented by S et(M˜(t),m˜(t)):
X˜(y, t) = {x : M˜(t)x ≤ m˜(t)}. (IV.17)
The following three steps give the computational implementation of the SVO [79].
1. Initialization:
X˜(y, t0) = Xˆ(y, t0)∩Bxo , (IV.18)
where Xˆ(y, t0) = S et(Mˆ(t0),mˆ(t0)) and Mˆ(t0),mˆ(t0) are calculated using (IV.16) at time t0, and
Bxo = {x(t0) : ‖x(t0)‖ ≤ x} as mentioned in Assumption 4.
2. Calculate the set Xˆ(y, t) with the measured output:
Xˆ(y, t) = S et(Mˆ(t),mˆ(t)), (IV.19)
where Mˆ(t),mˆ(t) are calculated using (IV.16).
3. Calculate the set of the estimated continuous states at time step t, i.e., X˜(y, t) = S et(M˜(t),m˜(t)).
X˜(y, t) is the intersection of Xˆ(y, t) and all of the states evolved from X˜(y, t− 1) according to the
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known continuous dynamics, process noise bound and continuous input:
X˜(y, t) =

x(t) :

I −Aq −I
−I Aq I
0 0 I
0 0 −I
Mˆ(t) 0 0
0 M˜(t−1) 0


x(t)
x(t−1)
w(t−1)
 ≤

Bqu(t−1)
−Bqu(t−1)
w1
w1
mˆ(t)
m˜(t−1)


, (IV.20)
where I is an identity matrix with an appropriate dimension. The first two constraints in (IV.20)
correspond to the continuous dynamics of the system defined in (IV.2), third and fourth constraints
correspond to the bound of the process noise w, fifth constraint corresponds to the set Xˆ(y, t) and
sixth constraint corresponds to the set X˜(y, t − 1). Note that the constraints in (IV.20) have the
following form:
M1(t)x(t) +M2(t)
x(t−1)w(t−1)
 ≤m3(t). (IV.21)
In order to get the set of continuous states which satisfy (IV.20), we need to eliminate the variables
[x(t−1) w(t−1)]ᵀ ∈ R2nx and represent X˜(y, t)in the form of M˜(t)x(t) ≤ m˜(t). Therefore, we use
Rack operator for 2nx times iteratively:
(M˜(t),m˜(t)) ∈ Rack2nx
M1(t)x(t) +M2(t)
x(t−1)w(t−1)
 ≤m3(t)
 . (IV.22)
Remark 6. Note that if the order of the continuous system is large (say the order is over ten) which
largely increases the number of constraints and reduces the computation speed when removing
variables using Rack, then we can use a hyperrectangle with bounded intervals on continuous
state variables to overapproximate X˜(y, t) and reduce the number of constraints, improving the
computation efficiency while introducing some conservatism.
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Theorem 3.1 in [79] demonstrates the effectiveness of the computational implementation of
the SVO. This theorem indicates that the real system state at time t is guaranteed to be within
X˜(y, t) if the system is in one of the nominal discrete states.
IV.3.2.3 Central Estimator and Estimation Error
In order to understand the estimation accuracy of the SVO, a central estimator Φc is defined
in [79], which gives a state-vector with each entry as the mean of the upper bound and the lower
bound of the set X˜(y, t) for each state variable.
(Φcy)(t) = x˜c(t), (IV.23)
where x˜(i)c (t) = 12 (x˜
(i)
max(t) + x˜
(i)
min(t)) and i = 1,2, ...,nx, x˜
(i)
max(t) = max{x˜(i) : x˜ ∈ X˜(y, t)} and x˜(i)min(t) =
min{x˜(i) : x˜ ∈ X˜(y, t)}. Theorem 3.2 in [79] demonstrates that the performance of the central estima-
tor is pointwise optimal, which means that the current estimation error is the smallest possible for
the current measurement trajectory. Suppose the upper bound of the estimation error of the central
estimator is θ ∈ Rnx , i.e., |x(i)(t)− x˜(i)c (t)| ≤ θ(i),∀t, then we have:
|x(i)(t)− x˜(i)max(t)| ≤ θ(i),
|x(i)(t)− x˜(i)min(t)| ≤ θ(i),
(IV.24)
for all i = 1,2, ...,nx [79]. Note that with overapproximation using hyperrectangles, the maximum
and minimum estimated state along each state variable are unchanged and θ is not affected by
overapproximation.
For convenience, we define the estimation error xe(t) as the difference between the real con-
tinuous state x(t) and the central estimate x˜c(t), i.e., xe(t) = x(t)− x˜c(t).
Remark 7. Note that the continuous state observer could also be designed using another ob-
server/estimator due to the flexibility of the hybrid observer framework. With a continuous state
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observer which has a better estimation accuracy, we can get a tighter lower bound of the anoma-
lous signal with which the conflict-driven method can provide detection guarantees.
As mentioned in Section II.2, the SVO delivers a non-empty estimated set if the system is in
a nominal discrete state. If the SVO gives an empty estimated set, the system is identified to be
in an anomalous discrete state [76]. If the input-output data sequence generated by the anomalous
hybrid system can also be generated by the nominal hybrid subsystem, the SVO gives a non-empty
estimated set and fails to detect the anomaly. In the following section, we give a classification
taxonomy of anomalies in hybrid systems.
IV.4 Types of Anomalies
In this section, we propose a classification taxonomy of anomalies f in hybrid systems con-
sidered in this chapter. We only focus on anomalies happening after the nominal hybrid subsystem
is in its steady state and assume that:
Assumption 9. An anomaly f occurs after the discrete state observer enters its steady state, i.e.,
t f ≥ tk.
Based on the types of variables that are affected, we classify the anomalies into three different
types: Type-C, Type-D, and Type-B anomalies, where C represents “continuous”, D represents
“discrete”, B represents “both”.
As mentioned in Section IV.2.4, the anomalous hybrid subsystem should satisfy at least one
of two anomaly conditions. Under Type-C anomalies, the continuous dynamics of the anomalous
hybrid subsystem are different from those of the nominal hybrid subsystem, satisfying anomaly
condition 1. Some Type-C anomalies are easy to detect because the SVO gives an empty estimated
continuous state set. But some Type-C anomalies cannot be detected by existing methods because
the input-output data sequence of the anomalous discrete state in the anomalous hybrid subsystem
satisfies the continuous dynamics of the current estimated nominal discrete state. That is, with the
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same input and the initial state, the difference of the output of the anomalous hybrid subsystem
and the output of the nominal hybrid subsystem is always smaller than a certain threshold, but
the difference of the real system states in two subsystems is larger than the upper bound of the
estimation error of the nominal hybrid subsystem. An example anomaly can be the anomaly caused
by False Data Injection Attack introduced in [61]. We define this type of anomaly as an invisible
anomaly:
Definition 14. A Type-C anomaly f is an invisible anomaly if the input-output data sequence of
the anomalous discrete state in the anomalous hybrid subsystem satisfies the continuous dynamics
of the current estimated nominal discrete state. Otherwise, we say f is an visible anomaly.
Based on the definition of visible/invisible anomaly, we additionally classify Type-C anoma-
lies into two different types: Type-Cv and Type-Civ anomalies, where the subscript v represents
“visible” and iv represents “invisible”. Type-Cv anomalies can be easily detected by existing meth-
ods. The utilized hybrid observer contains a SVO. We can use the SVO to help detect Type-Cv
anomalies. The SVO gives an empty estimated continuous state set under Type-Cv anomalies.
Type-Civ is challenging to detect because the SVO still delivers a non-empty estimated continuous
state set at each time step.
Under Type-C anomaly, the norm of the estimation error is increased because the continuous
dynamics of the anomalous hybrid subsystem are different from those used for state estimation.
If the change of the estimation error is small, the impact of the anomaly is insignificant. We only
consider the anomalies under which the norm of the estimation error is larger than the upper bound
of the estimation error in nominal hybrid subsystem:
∀t ≥ t f ,q ∈ Q f =⇒ ‖xe(t)‖ > ‖θ‖. (IV.25)
Under Type-D anomalies, the discrete behavior of the anomalous hybrid subsystem is dif-
ferent from that of the nominal hybrid subsystem. In discrete systems, Type-D anomalies are
classified into two different types: diagnosable anomalies Type-Dd and undiagnosable anomalies
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Type-Dud, where d represents “diagnosable” and ud represents “undiagnosable” [14].
Definition 15. A Type-D anomaly f is undiagnosable if there exist two discrete event sequences
eA (the subscript represents “anomalous”) and eN (the subscript represents “nominal”) in system
M that satisfy the following conditions:
1. eA contains f and eN does not;
2. eA is of arbitrarily long length after f ; and
3. Pro j(eA) = Pro j(eN), where operator Pro j(·) projects a list of discrete event sequence to observ-
able discrete event sequence.
When no such pair of strings exists, f is said to be diagnosable in system M.
Diagnosable anomalies can be detected using the discrete state observer because the ob-
served discrete event sequence of the anomalous hybrid subsystem is different from the discrete
event sequence of the nominal hybrid subsystem after some time. Because the hybrid system we
consider is deterministic (system condition 1) and the nominal hybrid subsystem is known, all of
the possible discrete state sequences of the nominal hybrid subsystem are known based on the ob-
served discrete event sequences of the nominal hybrid subsystem. The hybrid observer we use in
this paper contains a discrete state observer. We can compare the estimated discrete state sequence
with the possible discrete state sequences to detect whether or not a Type-Dd anomaly occurs.
Under some anomalies, both the continuous dynamics and the discrete behavior of the nom-
inal hybrid subsystem are changed. We call them Type-B anomalies. A Type-B anomaly can be
considered as a combination of Type-C and Type-D anomalies. As shown in Fig. IV.6, Type-B
anomalies can be classified into four different types: Type-Bv,d, Type-Biv,d, Type-Bv,ud, and Type-
Biv,ud anomalies.
Based on our classification taxonomy, there are eight types of anomalies: Type-Cv, Type-Civ,
Type-Dd, Type-Dud, Type-Bv,d, Type-Biv,d, Type-Bv,ud, and Type-Biv,ud. For Type-Cv, Type-Civ,
Type-Dd, Type-Dud, Type-Bv,d, Type-Biv,d and Type-Bv,ud anomalies, we provide detection guar-
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Figure IV.6: Classification taxonomy of anomalies in hybrid systems
antees with the proposed conflict-driven method. For Type-Biv,ud anomaly, the proposed conflict-
driven method can detect in some cases but it cannot provide detection guarantees.
IV.5 Conflict-driven Anomaly Detection
In this section, we first give a brief introduction of conflict-driven anomaly detection. Then
we give theoretic analysis for anomaly detection. Finally, we talk about the relationship between
the conflict types and the anomaly types.
IV.5.1 Method Description
In the conflict-driven method, we define three conflict types and check for the occurrence of
the conflicts to detect anomalies. The work flow diagram is shown in Fig. IV.7. Note that this
method is used after the hybrid observer is in the steady state, i.e., t ≥ tk.
The conflict-driven method has five steps at each time step:
1. Check the estimated discrete state sequence:
After the discrete state observer gives the estimated discrete state q˜(t) at time t, an updated esti-
mated discrete state sequence can be formed up to time t. Then the method compares the updated
estimated discrete state sequence with all of the possible discrete state sequences. If the updated
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Figure IV.7: Conflict-driven anomaly detection
estimated discrete state sequence does not satisfy any of the possible discrete state sequences, an
anomaly is detected. Note that for the estimated discrete state sequence, we only use the estimate
with a unique estimated discrete state.
2. Calculate an initial set XI(t):
Given X˜(y, t) from the SVO, define XI(t) to be a zonotope3 that overapproximates X˜(y, t). A
zonotope, which is computationally efficient for reachability analysis of hybrid system [30], is
a Minkowski sum of a finite set of line segments and defined as
Definition 16. Zonotope Z is a set such that:
Z =(x˜c,< g1, ...,gp >) = {x ∈ Rnx : x = x˜c +Σi=pi=1bigi,−1 ≤ bi ≤ 1}, p ≥ nx, (IV.26)
where x˜c,gi ∈ Rnx are the center and generators, respectively.
Both p and nx determine the maximum number of vertices and facets.
3Note that the zonotope XI(t) may not be unique. In this paper, we use the smallest hyperrectangle to overapproxi-
mate X˜(y, t) and express the hyperrectangle in the form of zonotope. In this way, the zonotope XI(t) is unique.
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3. Calculate the reachable set Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)):
The δq˜(t) time-step forward reachable set Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)) starting from XI(t) is defined as
Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)) := {xR ∈ Rnx : ∃x(t0,t0+δq˜(t)),u(t0,t0+δq˜(t)−1),
x(t+ 1) = Aq˜(t)x(t) +Bq˜(t)u(t),‖u‖ ≤ µ,
(x(t0) ∈ XI(t))∧ (x(t0 +δq˜(t)) = xR)},
(IV.27)
where xR is continuous state, x(t0,t0+δq˜(t)) is the trajectory of the continuous state from time t0 to
t0 + δq˜(t), u(t0,t0+δq˜(t)−1) is the trajectory of the input signal from time t0 to t0 + δq˜(t) − 1, and the
time-step δq˜(t) ∈ Z≥0 is determined off-line and will be introduced later. The reachable set satisfies
Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)) ⊆ Aδq˜(t)q˜(t) XI(t) +σq˜(t), (IV.28)
where σq˜(t) =
1−‖Aq˜(t)‖δq˜(t)
1−‖Aq˜(t)‖ (‖Bq˜(t)‖µ+w). Refer to [30] for more details about reachable set calcula-
tion using zonotopes.
4. Check for conflicts:
We define three conflict types in this paper, as shown in Fig. IV.8.
Conflict A. The initial set is an empty set, i.e., XI(t) = ∅. This is equivalent to X˜(y, t) = ∅.
Conflict B. The initial set has no intersection with the invariant of the estimated discrete state
(XI(t)∩ Invq˜(t) = ∅).
Conflict C. The δq˜(t) time steps forward reachable set has no intersection with the invariant of the
estimated discrete state, i.e., Rδq˜(t)(XI(t))∩ Invq˜(t) = ∅.
If one of these conflicts occurs, the system is in an anomalous discrete state.
5. Map conflict types to anomaly types:
Based on the observed conflict types and estimated discrete state sequence, we can determine the
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possible types of anomalies (The detailed mapping is shown in Fig. IV.12 in Section IV.5.3).
Figure IV.8: Three conflict types shown in a 2−D system. The large rectangle (with blue and
yellow regions) is the invariant Invq˜(t) with guard G(q˜(t),q′,ψ). The blue region is the normal
operating regionRno,q˜(t) and the yellow region is the intermediate regionRin,q˜(t). XI(t) is the initial
set at time step t (three XI(t)s in the figure show the three different conflict types). Rδq˜(XI(t)) is the
δq˜-reachable set starting from the initial set XI(t)
Note that for Step 3, we need to appropriately determine δq˜(t) for each discrete state offline
to avoid false alarms4 and provide detection guarantees according to the following two steps:
1. In Invq, starting from the intersection of the invariant Invq and the hyperplane corresponding to
the ith guard G(q,qi,ψi) as defined by (IV.5) and Invq, we find the minimum time steps δq,i which
satisfies
Rδq,i+1(P(q,qi,ψi)∩ Invq)∩L(q,qi,ψi) 6= ∅. (IV.29)
If (IV.29) does not have a solution, it means that Conflict C never occurs when the real continuous
state is approaching to P(q,qi,ψi)∩ Invq. Then we set δq,i = 0. Note that δq,i may be different for
different guards in the same discrete state. The reason we use δq,i +1 is that the continuous system
is a discrete-time model and we want to ensure the δq,i time-step forward reachable set, starting
from any possible real continuous state when a transition occurs, has intersection with Invq in
nominal discrete state q.
2. Let δq = mini(δq,i). Note that δq may be 0. Then we only need to check Conflicts A and B in
discrete state q.
4If δq˜(t) is too large, the reachable set could be completely outside the invariant, causing false alarms.
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IV.5.2 Anomaly Detection
In this subsection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method in the
detection of different types of anomalies: Type-C, Type-D and Type-B anomalies. To simplify the
discussion, we focus on representing the anomaly as an additive anomaly on the output equation
γ2 .
IV.5.2.1 Type-C Anomaly
Under Type-Cv anomaly, Conflict A occurs if the norm of the anomalous signal exceeds a
certain threshold, which is given in Proposition 3. The occurrence of Conflict A indicates that
the constraints of the set of estimated continuous states X˜(y, t) described in (IV.20) are infeasible.
That is, if the norm of the anomalous signal is larger than the lower bound, then at least one of
the conditions in (M˜(t),m˜(t)) in (IV.20) is violated. Among the constraints in (M˜(t),m˜(t)), the
constraints in (Mˆ(t),mˆ(t)) (IV.16) describing Xˆ(y, t) are directly related to the anomalous signal γ2
based on anomaly model (IV.12). Therefore, we can get the lower bound of the anomalous signal
γ2 (IV.31) by violating the constraints corresponding to Xˆ(y, t), that is,
Mˆ(t)x(t) > mˆ(t). (IV.30)
Now we can state Proposition 3 as follows.
Proposition 3. Given a hybrid automaton H and assume the nominal hybrid automaton Hn is
available to build a hybrid observer O, if a Type-Cv anomaly occurs at time t f > tk satisfying
(IV.31), then Conflict A occurs.
‖Γ2γ2(t)‖ > 2v. (IV.31)
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Proof. If the anomalous signal γ2(t) satisfies (IV.31), then
‖y(t)−Cqx(t)−v(t)‖ > 2v. (IV.32)
Let the ith entry of y(t)−Cqx(t)− v(t) equal to ‖y(t)−Cqx(t)− v(t)‖. Then we have the
following two possibilities:
1) If y(i)(t)−C(i,:)q x(t)−v(i)(t) > 0, then
y(i)(t)−C(i,:)q x(t)−v(i)(t) > 2v. (IV.33)
By rearranging, we can get
−C(i,:)q x(t) > −y(i)(t) +v(i)(t) + 2v
−C(i,:)q x(t) > −y(i)(t) + v.
(IV.34)
2) Similarly, if y(i)(t)−C(i,:)q x(t)−v(i)(t) < 0, then we have
C(i,:)q x(i)(t) > y(i)(t) + v. (IV.35)
Then, (IV.20) is infeasible and Conflict A occurs, which means the input-output sequence is
inconsistent with the nominal hybrid subsystem.
As discussed before, the continuous variables are affected under Type-Civ anomaly, but the
SVO can still provide non-empty estimated continuous state set. In order to detect this type of
anomaly, we utilize the estimated states from both continuous and discrete state observers, and
take advantage of observation of a discrete event. This enables us to employ the contradictions
among estimated continuous and discrete states and the model parameters such as guards and
invariants to detect these challenging anomalies. These contradictions are formalized in Conflicts
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B and C. In what follows, we set the stage to present the main theorem-Theorem 3. This theorem
provides sufficient conditions on the lower bound of the anomalous signal under which the conflict-
driven method is guaranteed to detect Type-Civ anomalies. This lower bound is smaller than the
one presented in our previous work [86]. Similar to [86], we first find the lower bound of the
estimation error that creates either Conflict B or C, and then relate this bound to the lower bound
on the anomalous signal.
Suppose a Type-Civ anomaly occurs at time t f under which there is a large estimation error
on the ithG state variable, i.e., |xe(iG)| > θ(iG), and a discrete event ψ occurs at time te > t f which
associates a guard with condition on the ithG state variable, i.e., {x ∈ Invq : sGx(iG) ≥ cG}. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the projection ofRno,q onto the ithG state variable is bounded above by
cG, i.e., HiGRno,q ≤ cG (because sG = 1), where HiG ∈ Rnx is the projection row vector with the ithG
entry “1” and “0” elsewhere. The procedure for the case where HiGRno,q ≥ −cG (because sG = −1)
is identical. When this event occurs, transitioning the system from q to q′, we can only have two
possibilities for the central estimate at time te, either x˜c(te) ∈Rono,q, or x˜c(te) ∈Roin,q,q′ . Based on
the definitions of guard, invariant, post-guard hyperplane, and Assumption 7, along the ithG state
variable the upper bound of Invq is cL and the lower bound of Invq′ is cG. For brevity in notation
and as in this section we mainly consider G(q,q′,ψ), we refer to it as G.
As mentioned above, the central estimate x˜c(te) is either in the normal operating region or
the intermediate region when an observable event occurs. Consider the first possibility where
x˜c(te) ∈Rono,q, that is, when the real continuous state satisfies the guard, the central estimate is in
the normal operating region of discrete state q. The visualization of this case is shown in Fig. IV.9.
The goal is to find the lower bound of the estimation error along the ithG state variable, such
that:
• The initial set XI(te + 1) has no intersection with Invq′ .
We denote such minimum estimation error corresponding to G by z∗G. To find z
∗
G, it suffices to find
the minimum z such that for all x˜c(te + 1) the upper bound of XI(te + 1) is smaller than the lower
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure IV.9: Visualization in 2 − D when x˜(te) ∈ Rono,q and Conflict B occurs under Type-Civ
anomaly: (a) At time te, cG ≤ HiG < ε, discrete event ψ occurs. (b) At time te + 1, the discrete
state is changed to q′ and the real continuous state is evolved to x(te +1), satisfying the continuous
dynamics described by state matrices (Aq′ ,Bq′). Thus, x(te + 1) ∈ R1(x(te)) and HiGR1(x(te)) ≤
HiGAq′x(te) +σq′
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bound of Invq′ along the ithG state variable,
HiG x˜c(te + 1) +HiGθ < cG. (IV.36)
Note that at time te, the continuous state of the system along the ithG state variable HiGx(te) is
greater than or equal to cG, i.e., HiGx(te) ≥ cG. Meanwhile, HiGx(te) is smaller than the maximum
value of the one time step forward reachable set from P(q,q′,ψ)∩ Invq along the ithG state variable,
i.e., HiGx(te) < , where  = max(HiGR1(P(q,q′,ψ)∩ Invq)), as shown in Fig. IV.9a. After the
occurrence of event ψ, the estimated discrete state is changed to q′ at time te +1. If the state matri-
ces of the anomalous discrete state are still (Aq,Bq), which are different from the estimated state
matrices (Aq′ ,Bq′), then the Type-Civ anomaly becomes Type-Cv anomaly which can be detected
by observing the occurrence of Conflict A. If the state matrices of the anomalous discrete state are
changed to (Aq′ ,Bq′) after the occurrence of event ψ, then the SVO still provides non-empty set of
the estimated continuous states under the Type-Civ anomaly. In the following we consider the case
that the state matrices of the anomalous discrete state are changed to (Aq′ ,Bq′) after the occurrence
of event ψ. As shown in Fig. IV.9b, the set of all possible continuous states at time te + 1 can be
represented by:
∀x(te) ∈ Invq,cG ≤HiGx(te) < ,
x(te + 1) ∈ R1(x(te)) ⊆ Aq′x(te) +σq′ ,
(IV.37)
where σq′ = ‖Bq′‖µ+w.
Combining (IV.36), (IV.37) and the fact that z = HiGx−HiG x˜e, we can pose the problem of
finding z∗G as a robust optimization problem.
z∗G =minz z
s. t. z ≥ 0, z ≥HiGAq′x+σq′ +HiGθ − cG
∀x ∈ Invq′ ,cG ≤HiGx ≤ ,
(IV.38)
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(a) (b)
Figure IV.10: Visualization in 2D when x˜c(te) ∈ Roin,q,q′ and Conflict C occurs under Type-Civ
anomaly: (a) At time te, the maximum estimation error along x(iG) state variable is d, i.e., d =
|HiG x˜c(te)− cG |. (b) The reachable set at time te is Rδq(XI(te)) and its lower bound is HiGAδqq x−σq
By utilizing robust optimization method [7], we can convert (IV.38) to a linear programming
problem as follows:
z∗G =minJ,z z
s. t.
11
z−
J
ᵀρ1
0
 ≥
σq′ +HiGθ − cG0

ΛᵀJ ≥ (HiGAq′)ᵀ, J ≥ 0,
(IV.39)
where 0 ∈R2n×1 is a zero vector. x is in a polytopic uncertain set, i.e., Λx ≤ ρ1 for problem (IV.38),
where Λ ∈ R2n×n, ρ1 ∈ R2n×1 and J ∈ R2n×1 is a variable of the optimization problem.
For the second possibility, i.e., x˜c(te) ∈Roin,q,q′ , we are seeking the lower bound of the esti-
mation error along the ithG state variable such that it satisfies the following:
• The reachable set for δq time steps from any point within the initial set XI(te) has no intersection
with Invq.
The visualization of this case is shown in Fig. IV.10. Considering the worst case that the continuous
state is the furthest to the upper bound of ∂Invq along the ithG state variable, i.e., HiGx(te) = cG, our
objective can be equivalently changed to find the minimum distance between cG and HiG x˜c(te). We
denote this minimum distance by d∗G. Define d = |HiG x˜c(te)−cG | as the distance between P(q,q′,ψ)
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and the estimated state along the ithG state variable, which is also the maximum estimation error at
time te given the central estimated continuous state x˜c(te). With this definition, the initial set at time
te can be represented as XI(te) = {x : HiGx ∈ [cG +d−HiGθ,cG +d+HiGθ]} as shown in Fig. IV.10a.
Starting from this initial set XI(te), the projection of the reachable set for δq time steps forward
onto the ithG state variable becomes HiGA
δq
q x±σq, ∀x ∈ XI(te), where σq = 1−‖Aq‖
δq
1−‖Aq‖ (‖Bq‖µ+w). As
shown in Fig. IV.10b, if the lower bound of the reachable set Rδq(XI(te)) is greater than cL, i.e.,
HiGA
δq
q x−σq > cL, ∀x ∈ XI(te), then it is guaranteed that the δq time-step forward reachable set
starting from this initial set XI(te) has no intersection with the invariant Invq. We can pose the
problem of finding d∗G as the following robust optimization problem.
d∗G =mind d
s. t. d ≥ 0, HiGAδqq x−σq ≥ cL
∀x ∈ Invq,x ∈ XI(te).
(IV.40)
With a change of variables and by employing the robust optimization techniques [7], we can write
an equivalent problem to (IV.40) as a linear program.
d∗G =minD,J HiGD
s. t.
HiGA
δq
q
HiG
D−
J
ᵀρ2
0
 ≥
σq + cL0

ΛᵀJ ≥ − (HiGAδqq )ᵀ, J ≥ 0, D ≥ 0,
(IV.41)
where 0 is a zero vector with proper dimension, and D ∈ Rn is a vector with the ithG entry d and
other entries “0”. x is in a polytopic uncertain set, i.e., Λx ≤ ρ2 , where ρ2 ∈R2n×1 and J ∈R2n×1 is
the dual variable.
Now that we have introduced z∗G and d
∗
G, we can present the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3. Given a hybrid automaton H with the nominal hybrid automaton Hn available to
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build a hybrid observer O. Suppose a Type-Civ anomaly f occurs at time t f . If an event ψ ∈ Ψo
occurs at te > t f , which is supposed to transit the system from discrete state q to q′, and the guard
G(q,q′,ψ) is a condition on the real continuous state which is affected by the anomaly f , i.e.,
G(q,q′,ψ) : sGx(iG) ≥ cG and |xe(iG)| ≥ θ(iG), then the conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect
the anomaly, if the anomaly f satisfies:
‖Γ2γ2(t)‖ >max(‖Cq‖z∗q + ‖Cqθ‖+ 2v,‖Cq‖d∗q + ‖Cqθ‖+ 2v), (IV.42)
where z∗q = maxq′ z∗G and d
∗
q = maxq′ d
∗
G can be derived by solving the robust optimization problems
(IV.38) and (IV.40), respectively for all possible q′.
Proof. The solution z∗G is the lower bound of the estimation error which ensures XI(te+1)∩ Invq′ =
∅, i.e. ConflictB. The value of z∗G varies from one guard to another. Therefore, by considering z∗q,
we guarantee that at the discrete state q, regardless of guard, Conflict B occurs, if the estimation
error is larger than z∗q. On the other hand, the solution d∗G is the lower bound of the estimation error,
which ensures Rδq(XI(te))∩ Invq = ∅, i.e., Conflict C. The value of d∗G varies for different guards,
hence, we similarly take the maximum of these values for all possible q′, which is d∗q. Then it is
guaranteed that if the estimation error is larger than d∗q, regardless of guard, Conflict C occurs. By
combining the two conditions, we can conclude that if the estimation error xe(t) is larger than the
maximum value of z∗q and d∗q, then ConflictB or C is guaranteed to occur.
With the lower bound of the estimation error, we can get the lower bound of the anomalous
signal of Type-Civ anomaly based on (IV.12) such that ConflictB or C is guaranteed to occur.
Since the SVO is still giving non-empty estimated set under Type-Civ anomaly,
‖y(t)− y˜c(t)‖ ≤ ‖Cqθ‖+ v, (IV.43)
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where y˜c(t) = Cqx˜c(t) is the estimated output based on the central estimate. Then we have
‖Cqx(t) +v(t) +Γ2γ2(t)−Cqx˜c(t)‖ ≤ ‖Cqθ‖+ v
‖Cqxe(t) +v(t) +Γ2γ2(t)‖ ≤ ‖Cqθ‖+ v
‖Γ2γ2(t)‖− ‖Cqxe(t)‖− ‖v(t)‖ ≤ ‖Cqθ‖+ v.
(IV.44)
Then we have
‖Cqxe(t)‖ ≥ ‖Γ2γ2(t)‖− ‖v(t)‖− ‖Cqθ‖− v. (IV.45)
Based on (IV.42), it is clear that
‖Cq‖‖xe(t)‖ ≥max(‖Cq‖z∗q,‖Cq‖d∗q)
‖xe(t)‖ ≥max(z∗q,d∗q).
(IV.46)
Therefore the conflict-driven method provides guarantees on the detection of anomalous
signals that satisfy condition (IV.42), regardless of where the estimated state is located in the Invq
at the time of event. This concludes the proof.
Remark 8. Note that with the SVO as the continuous state observer, the value of z∗q and d∗q are
smaller than those in [86]. Therefore, the lower bound of the anomalous signal with which the
conflict-driven method can provide detection guarantee is smaller than that in [86].
IV.5.2.2 Type-D Anomaly
Under Type-D anomaly, the continuous dynamics of the anomalous discrete state are the
same as those of one of the nominal discrete states. There are two cases under a Type-D anomaly:
1) The continuous dynamics are the same as those of the current estimated discrete state; 2) The
continuous dynamics are different from those of the current estimated discrete state. Based on the
difference between the anomalous hybrid subsystem and the nominal hybrid subsystem mentioned
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(a) (b)
Figure IV.11: Visualization in 2−D under Type-D anomaly: (a) Conflict B occurs under the case
that Invoq f ∩ Invoqn = ∅; (b) Conflict C occurs under the case that Invoq f ∩ Invoqn = ∅
in Section IV.2.4, the invariant of at least one of the anomalous discrete states is different from
the estimated discrete state under the first case. Therefore, it is possible that the initial set or the
reachable set does not intersect with the invariants of the estimated discrete states and Conflict B
or C occurs as shown in Fig. IV.11. The conflict-driven method can guarantee to detect the first
case of Type-Dud anomalies if the open set of the invariants of the anomalous discrete states do
not intersect with those of the nominal discrete states, i.e., Invoqn ∩ Invoq f = ∅, as demonstrated in
Proposition 4. Under the second case, Conflict A will occur because the continuous dynamics of
the anomalous discrete states are different from the continuous dynamics of the estimated discrete
states, which is demonstrated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 4. Given a hybrid automaton H and assume the nominal hybrid automaton Hn is
available to build a hybrid observerO. Suppose a Type-D anomaly f occurs such that the discrete
state is changed from qn ∈ Qn to q f ∈ Q f , then the conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect
the anomaly if Invoqn ∩ Invoq f = ∅ and one of the following is true:
∃i ∈[1,nx]
min
x∈Invq˜(t)
‖x(i)− x˜(i)c (t)‖ ≥ θ(i),
(IV.47)
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or
∃iG ∈[1,nx],∀x ∈ XI(t)
HiGA
δq˜(t)
q˜(t) x−σq˜(t) > βiG
or
HiGA
δq˜(t)
q˜(t) x+σq˜(t) < βiG .
(IV.48)
Proof. Before Type-D anomaly occurs, the estimated discrete state q˜(t) is the nominal discrete
state qn, i.e., q˜(t) = qn. Under Type-D anomaly and the case that the continuous dynamics of the
anomalous discrete state are the same as the continuous dynamics of the current estimated nominal
discrete state, we have |xe(t)| ≤ θ. If (IV.47) is true, then the initial set XI(t) with the central estimate
x˜c(t) does not have any intersection with Invq˜(t), i.e., Invq˜(t)∩XI(t) = ∅. Conflict B occurs and the
anomaly is detected. In (IV.48), HiGA
δq˜(t)
q˜(t) x−σq˜(t) is the lower bound of the reachable set along the
ithG state variable and HiGA
δq˜(t)
q˜(t) x+σq˜(t) is the upper bound of the reachable set along the i
th
G state
variable. If (IV.48) is true, then the reachable set Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)) has no intersection with the invariant
Invq˜(t). Conflict C occurs and the anomaly is detected.
Proposition 5. Given a hybrid automaton H and assume the nominal hybrid automaton Hn is
available to build a hybrid observerO. Suppose a Type-D anomaly f occurs such that the discrete
state is changed from qn ∈ Qn to q f ∈ Q f and (Aqn ,Bqn) of qn is different from (Aq f ,Bq f ) of qn, then
the conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect the anomaly if the following is infeasible:

I −Aqn −I
−I Aqn I
0 0 I
0 0 −I
0 −Cq fAq f −Cq f
0 Cq fAq f Cq f


x(t)
x(t−1)
w(t−1)
 ≤

Bqnu(t−1)
−Bqnu(t−1)
w1
w1
v1− (y(t)−Cq fBq f u(t−1))
v1+ (y(t)−Cq fBq f u(t−1))

, (IV.49)
where I, 0 and 1 have appropriate dimensions.
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Proof. The first two constraints in (IV.49) correspond to the continuous evolution in estimated dis-
crete state qn. Third and fourth constraints in (IV.49) correspond to the bound of the process noise.
Fifth and sixth constraints in (IV.49) correspond to the measurement in anomalous discrete state q f .
The infeasibility of (IV.49) means the input-output data sequence of the anomalous discrete state
is different from that of the current estimated discrete state and the SVO gives an empty estimated
continuous state set. Therefore, Conflict A occurs and the Type-D anomaly is detected.
Note that by utilizing both continuous and discrete dynamics of the system to detect anoma-
lies, the conflict-driven method may detect a Type-D anomaly whether or not it is diagnosable.
According to Propositions 4 and 5, the conflict-driven method can provide detection guarantees
for Type-D anomalies, including undiagnosable anomalies, if 1) the invariants of the anomalous
discrete states do not intersect with the invariants of the nominal discrete states; or 2) the contin-
uous dynamics of the anomalous discrete states are different from those of the current estimated
discrete state.
IV.5.2.3 Type-B Anomaly
We have demonstrated the detection of Type-Cv, Type-Civ, Type-Dd, and Type-Dud anoma-
lies, which are summarized in Table. IV.1. Note that for Type-Dd anomaly, we use the discrete state
observer instead of checking the occurrence of the conflicts. Type-B anomalies combine Type-C
and Type-D anomalies. The conflict-driven method can also guarantee to detect Type-Bv,d, Type-
Bv,ud and Type-Biv,d anomalies. This method can detect but cannot provide detection guarantees
for Type-Biv,ud anomaly. Under Type-Biv,ud anomaly, if the incorrect estimated continuous state
set is consistent with the current estimated discrete state, then the conflict-driven method fails to
detect it.
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Table IV.1: Summary of Anomaly Detection
Anomaly Type Detection Guarantee?
Type-Cv If the anomalous signal satisfies (IV.31)
Type-Civ If an observable discrete input event occurs and the
anomalous signal satisfies (IV.42)
Type-Dd Yes
Type-Dud If the invariants of the anomalous discrete states do
not intersect with the invariants of the nominal dis-
crete states except the boundaries or the continuous
dynamics of the anomalous discrete state are differ-
ent from those of the current estimated state.
Type-Bv,d Yes
Type-Bv,ud Yes
Type-Biv,d Yes
Type-Biv,ud Not guaranteed. But it may be detected using the
conflict-driven method
IV.5.3 Relationship Between Conflict Types and Anomaly Types
With the occurrence of different conflict types and the estimated discrete state sequence, we
can determine the types of associated anomalies as well.
A mapping between the conflict types and the types of anomalies is shown in Fig. IV.12.
The inconsistency of the discrete event sequence means the anomaly is Type-Dd, Type-Bv,d or
Type-Biv,d. The occurrence of Conflict A means that the input-output sequence from system in the
anomalous discrete state is different from that in a nominal discrete state. Then we can conclude
that the anomaly type could be either Type-Cv, Type-Bv,d or Type-Bv,ud. The occurrence of Conflict
B or Conflict C means that the anomaly could be any type except Type-Cv. Note that the possible
types of anomalies are the same when ConflictB or Conflict C occurs.
Under some anomalies, multiple conflict types occur. If the discrete event sequence is incon-
sistent and Conflict A occurs, the anomaly is Type-Bv,d. If the discrete event sequence is inconsis-
tent and ConflictB or C occurs, the anomaly is Type-Biv,d. If ConflictB or C occurs and Conflict
A follows, the anomaly is Type-Bv,d or Type-Bv,ud. If Conflict B or C occurs, and Conflict A and
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the inconsistent discrete event sequence occur, then the anomaly is Type-Bv,d, which is shown as
the dash line in Fig.IV.12. The timing of the occurrence of different conflict types and inconsistent
discrete event sequence depends on the system and anomaly specifications. Note that Conflicts B
and C cannot occur after Conflict A because the initial set XI(t) is empty after the occurrence of
Conflict A.
Figure IV.12: Mapping between the anomaly types and the conflict types
Remark 9. With the types of conflicts and the observed events, we can have some information
about the anomalies in the system. If we know all of the possible anomalies in the system and the
corresponding anomalous hybrid subsystem, then we can end up doing anomaly isolation.
IV.6 Simulation Results
In this section, we revisit the Positive Train Control (PTC) system introduced in Chapter
I.2.2.3 with a specific scenario. We present the hybrid model, and select five different types of
anomalies in the system. Then we show the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method.
IV.6.1 Positive Train Control system
We give a simple representation of the train dynamics and Radio Block Controller (RBC)
reflecting the informal PTC cooperation protocol [23, 68]. The system diagram is shown in Fig.
IV.13. Note that the “conflict-driven monitor” is what we contribute in this chapter. We model
the train and its local controller as a hybrid system. The error signal is the continuous input to
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the system and the measured train position and velocity are the continuous outputs of the system.
The RBC takes discrete output events from the system and commands discrete input events to the
system. Both the discrete and the continuous input and output signals are sent to the conflict-driven
monitor to detect anomalies. If an anomaly is detected, the monitor notifies the Automatic Train
Protection (ATP) to brake the train. The PTC protocol consists of four discrete states (operating
modes) as shown in Fig. IV.14, which corresponds to the nominal Finite State Machine (FSM)
Mn:
1. far (faraway): the local train controller regulates the train speed freely, which is called Movement
Authority (MA).
2. neg (negotiation): the train communicates with the RBC asking for MA-extension.
3. cor (correcting): the train is braking.
4. fsa (failstate): the train is at full stop and awaits for manual clearance by the train operator.
Figure IV.13: Positive Train Control system diagram
Based on the hybrid system modeling framework in Section IV.2.2, we additionally partition
each mode of the PTC protocol into several discrete states such that the invariant of each discrete
state is a hyperrectangle. The continuous dynamics and the invariant in each discrete state depend
on the specific scenario. In this chapter, we consider that a train is scheduled to stop at the next
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Figure IV.14: Finite State Machine Mn of the Positive Train Control protocol
station. Suppose the train is equipped with a GPS receiver and a speedometer and has two different
local controllers with different parameters: one speed controller and one position controller. If the
train is in the far or neg mode, the train is controlled by the speed controller and the continuous
dynamics are described by matrices (Av,Bv). The difference between the far and the neg modes
is that the speed in the neg mode is unchanged. If the train is commanded to stop at the station,
the PTC protocol transits to the cor mode. In the cor mode, the train is controlled by the position
controller and the continuous dynamics are described by (Ap,Bp) under normal operation. The
continuous state of the train is x = [xp xv x f ]ᵀ, where xp, xv, x f are the train position, speed
and force, respectively. The continuous output of the train is y = [yp yv]ᵀ, where yp,yv are the
measured train position and speed, respectively. If the train is in the far mode, the reference speed
is 45m/s. If the train is in the cor mode, the reference position of the train is a ramp signal ending
at the station location and the train stops at the station under normal operation.
An example Type-Civ anomaly is shown in Fig. IV.15, which is in the anomaly mode cor-
responding to the anomalous hybrid subsystem. When the anomaly occurs, the system transits to
the anomaly mode with continuous dynamics described by matrices (Av,Bv,Γ2). If this anomaly
is detected, the system transits into the cor mode with the continuous dynamics (Ab,Bb). During
braking, if the anomaly is resolved, the system follows the command from the RBC to stop at the
station. Otherwise, the train comes to a full stop and then transits to the fsa mode, waiting for the
manual clearance by the train operator.
The system parameters are shown in Table IV.2. The normal operating regions and the inter-
mediate regions of the nominal discrete states are shown in Fig. IV.16. The green regions are the
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Table IV.2: PTC system parameters
Parameters Values
One track segment length 2000m
Location of sensors 1500m,3500m
Station location 5500m
Desired train speed in far mode 45m/s
Sampling time 0.1s
Figure IV.15: Nominal hybrid automaton Hn (in black solid lines) and an example Type-Civ
anomaly (in red dotted lines) of the PTC system. The numbers show the discrete states and state
matrices represent the continuous dynamics in the discrete states. No continuous dynamics in dis-
crete state 9 because the train is at full stop. In the anomaly mode, there are other anomalous
discrete states which are not shown in the figure
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normal operating regions when the train is in far mode. The violet regions are the normal operating
regions when the train is in the neg mode. The orange region is the normal operating region when
the train is in cor mode. The yellow regions are the intermediate regions in the nominal discrete
states.
Figure IV.16: The normal operating regions (the green, violet and orange regions) and the inter-
mediate regions (yellow regions) of the PTC system
The time step for reachability analysis of each discrete state is δ4 = δ5 = 9 and the rest are
δi = 0 when we follow the steps described in Section IV.5.
IV.6.2 Anomaly Detection Result
We choose the following five anomaly scenarios to illustrate the effectiveness of the conflict-
driven method. The first four anomalies are Type-Cv, Type-Civ, Type-Dd and Type-Dud. As dis-
cussed in Section IV.5, Type-Bv,d, Type-Bv,ud and Type-Biv,d anomalies are easy to detect because
they combine either Type-Cv or Type-Dd anomaly, which are easy to detect. For Type-B anomaly,
we choose the Type-Biv,ud anomaly.
• Type-Cv: A ramp anomalous signal with slope 100N/s is added to the state variable x f and this
anomaly could be due to an unexpected injection on the driving force from the train controller.
• Type-Civ: A ramp anomalous signal with slope 0.05m/s is added to the measured train position yp.
• Type-Dd: The RBC always grants the MA-extension.
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• Type-Dud: The train received commands from the RBC 40 seconds later than that under normal
operation.
• Type-Biv,ud: Combination of Type-Civ and Type-Dud anomalies.
The above anomalies start at 50s, transiting the system from the far mode (discrete state 2) to the
anomaly mode, and run until the end of the simulation. The effect of these anomalies if undetected
are as follows: Under the Type-Cv anomaly, the train arrives at the station earlier. Under the Type-
Civ anomaly, the train stops at a wrong location. Under the Type-Dd anomaly, the train remains in
the far mode and passes the station without stopping. Under the Type-Dud anomaly, the train first
passes the station and then the train position controller makes the train come back to the station.
Under the Type-Biv,ud anomaly, the train stops at a wrong location.
1) Type-Cv Anomaly: The SVO gives an empty estimated continuous state set under this
anomaly. Fig. IV.17 shows the detection performance of the conflict-driven method. After time
t = 58.4s, the estimated sets X˜(y, t) given by the SVO are empty and Conflict A occurs. This is
because after time t = 58.4s, the set of continuous states calculated based on the input signal (one
time-step forward reachable set starting from the estimated continuous state set at the previous time
step) and the set of continuous states calculated based on the output measurement do not intersect
with each other, i.e., the input-output data of the anomalous hybrid subsystem is inconsistent with
that of the nominal hybrid subsystem.
Figure IV.17: Simulation result under the Type-Cv anomaly with the occurrence of Conflict A
2) Type-Civ Anomaly: This anomaly cannot be detected by traditional methods. As shown in
Fig. IV.18, the conflict-driven method detects this anomaly at time 90.1s when Conflict C occurs.
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The estimated discrete state is 5, indicating that the train is communicating with the RBC to ask
for MA-extension. But the reachable set Rδ5(XI(901)) indicates that the train has already received
commands from the RBC. Therefore, Conflict C occurs, i.e., Rδ5(XI(901))∩ Inv5 = ∅.
Figure IV.18: Simulation result under the Type-Civ anomaly with the occurrence of Conflict C
3) Type-Dd Anomaly: This anomaly can be detected by existing discrete model-based meth-
ods. Fig. IV.19a shows that the anomaly is detected by the discrete state observer at time 90.4s.
At time 90.4s when Conflict B occurs, the estimated discrete state changed from 5 to 3 because
the RBC grants the MA-extension. But the discrete state under normal operation should change to
6, i.e., the RBC should deny the MA-extension. At time 90.4s Conflict B also occurs as shown in
Fig. IV.19b. The invariant of discrete state 3 along the position xp state variable is from 5500m to
7500m but the upper bound of the initial set XI(904) at time 90.4s is 3978m, i.e., XI(904)∩ Inv3 = ∅.
(a) Inconsistent discrete state sequence (b) ConflictB occurs
Figure IV.19: Simulation result under the Type-Dd anomaly
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4) Type-Dud Anomaly: This anomaly cannot be detected by existing discrete model-based
methods. As shown in Fig. IV.20, the conflict-driven method detects the anomaly at time t =
90.1s and Conflict C occurs. The estimated discrete state is 5. Because it takes 40 seconds more
for the train to receive command from the RBC than under normal operation, the reachable set
Rδ5(XI(901)) does not intersect with the invariant of the discrete state 5.
Figure IV.20: Simulation result under the Type-Dud anomaly with the occurrence of Conflict C
5) Type-Biv,ud Anomaly: Existing methods cannot detect general Type-Biv,ud anomalies.
The conflict-driven method cannot provide detection guarantees but has the possibility to detect a
Type-Biv,ud anomaly. Fig. IV.21 shows the detection performance of the conflict-driven method
under the Type-Biv,ud anomaly. This anomaly is detected by the conflict-driven method at time
90.1s when Conflict C occurs. The reason that this method can detect this anomaly is that the
estimated continuous state set is inconsistent with the estimated discrete state. Under Type-Biv,ud
anomaly, the estimated continuous state is larger than the actual continuous state. If the discrete
event “deny the MA-extension” occurs earlier than the system under normal operation and the
estimated discrete state changes from 5 to 6 earlier, then ConflictsB and Cmay not occur. Finding
the conditions for Type-Biv,ud anomaly that can be detected by the conflict-driven method is part
of future work.
IV.7 Summary
Hybrid CPS can be modeled as hybrid systems since hybrid CPS contain continuous dy-
namics and discrete behavior. In this chapter, we propose a classification taxonomy of anomalies
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Figure IV.21: Simulation result under the Type-Biv,ud anomaly with the occurrence of Conflict C
in hybrid systems based on the variables that are affected by the anomalies and the input-output
data consistency. We classify the anomalies in hybrid systems into eight different types: Type-
Cv, Type-Civ, Type-Dd, Type-Dud, Type-Bv,d, Type-Bv,ud, Type-Biv,d and Type-Biv,ud. To detect
these challenging anomalies in hybrid systems, we utilize the relation between the continuous and
discrete variables and propose a novel anomaly detection method: conflict-driven method.
This method utilizes a hybrid observer which consists of a discrete state observer and a
continuous state observer to detect various types of anomalies in hybrid systems. The discrete
state observer is designed as a finite-state automaton to estimate the discrete state of the system.
The continuous state observer is designed as a Set-Valued Observer (SVO) to estimate a set of
continuous states of the hybrid system. Based on the relation between the discrete and continuous
variables in hybrid systems, we define three different conflict types. We demonstrate that the
conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect Type-Cv, Type-Civ, Type-Dd, Type-Dud, Type-Bv,d,
Type-Bv,ud, and Type-Biv,d anomalies under certain conditions. Additionally, we give a mapping
between the types of conflicts and the types of anomalies.
We used a simplified Positive Train Control (PTC) system to illustrate the effectiveness of
the conflict-driven method. Based on the simulation results, we showed that the conflict-driven
method can also detect some Type-Biv,ud anomaly even though the conflict-driven method cannot
provide detection guarantees for Type-Biv,ud anomalies.
The conflict-method expands the capabilities of anomaly detection in hybrid systems, how-
ever, this method has some limitations when applied to more general hybrid systems. The hybrid
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observer used in the conflict-driven method requires the discrete component of the hybrid system
to be current-state observable in order to give a unique estimated discrete state. However, some
hybrid systems contain unobservable discrete events such that the discrete components are not
current-state observable. Moreover, this method requires the knowledge of guard conditions is
known a priori. Sometimes it may be impossible to know the guard conditions a priori. In addi-
tion, the hybrid observer uses the SVO as the continuous state observer to estimate the continuous
state of the system. The SVO requires that no discontinuity exists in continuous variables. Thus,
the hybrid observer cannot be used for hybrid systems with discontinuity in continuous variables
during discrete transitions. To address these limitations, we propose a new observer framework
which only uses the continuous measurements for state estimation and anomaly detection. This
framework is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
A Novel Hybrid Observer Design for State Estimation and Anomaly Diagnosis Applied to
Hybrid Systems with Unobservable Discrete Events
V.1 Introduction
In Chapter IV, we proposed the conflict-driven anomaly detection method for hybrid sys-
tems. However, the conflict-driven method has some limitations when applied to a wider class of
hybrid systems as discussed in Section IV.7. In the hybrid system formalism in Section IV.2.2,
each discrete transition is associated with a discrete event and a guard condition. For some hybrid
systems, each discrete transition is also associated with a reset function, which resets the value of
the continuous state of the system when a discrete transition occurs. In addition, the guard condi-
tions and reset functions corresponding to the discrete transitions may be unknown a priori and the
discrete events are unobservable. Estimating the state and diagnosing anomalies for these hybrid
systems can be challenging.
In this chapter, we propose a new observer framework which consists of two continuous state
observers to estimate state and diagnose anomalies for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete
events, such as the microgrid system with unplanned islanding mentioned in Section I.2.3.3. The
two continuous state observers use different sets of sensors and the same continuous system model
associated with the current estimated discrete state (assuming that the initial discrete state of the
system is given) to estimate the continuous state of the system. Based on the estimated continu-
ous state trajectories, the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) method is used to estimate the current
continuous model of the system. To determine the current discrete state of the system, we run
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multiple continuous models in parallel for a finite time period, including the known continuous
models of the system and the estimated continuous model provided by the RLS. The discrete state
can be uniquely determined if the continuous dynamics of different discrete states are distinguish-
able1. We call this framework the Convergence Ratio Multi-model Hybrid Observer (CRMMHO)
framework. The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. We propose the CRMMHO framework to estimate both the discrete and the continuous variables
for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete events;
2. We use the CRMMHO framework to diagnose anomalies in more general hybrid systems; and
3. We apply the CRMMHO framework in the simulated microgrid system to validate its effectiveness.
V.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we describe the class of hybrid systems of interest and formally state the
problem.
V.2.1 Notation
Let ‖ · ‖ denote∞-norm, ·˜ denote estimated variables. In addition, x ∈Rn represents a vector,
where its ith element is indicated by x(i). A ∈ Rn×m represents a matrix, where its ith row and jth
column are indicated byA(i,:) andA(:, j), respectively. The detailed notations are shown in Appendix
C.
1Two continuous systems are distinguishable if for any non-zero initial continuous states and the same input, the
outputs of the two continuous systems are not identical for a finite time period [58].
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V.2.2 Hybrid Systems
In this chapter, we consider the class of hybrid systems that can be represented by a tuple
H = (X ,U ,Y, Init, f ield,φ,h, fr), where each element is defined as
• X = Q×X: a set of discrete and continuous states
• U = Ψ×U: a set of discrete and continuous inputs
• Y: a set of continuous outputs
• Init = (q(t0),x(t0)) ∈ X : an initial state
• f ield : X ×U → X: a time-invariant vector field
• φ : Q×Ψ→ Q: a set of discrete transitions
• h : Q×X→ Y: a continuous output equation
• fr : x(ti) = fr(x(ti−1),ψ(i)): a reset function, where ti is the time when the ith discrete event occurs
For each discrete state q ∈Q, we associate continuous dynamics that can be represented by a Linear
Time Invariant (LTI) model, subject to process and measurement noise.
f ield : x(t+ 1) = Aqx(t) +Bqu(t) +w(t)
h : y(t) = Cx(t) +v(t)
(V.1)
where x ∈ Rnx ,u ∈ Rnu ,y ∈ Rny are the system continuous state, continuous input and continuous
output, Aq ∈ Rnx×nx ,Bq ∈ Rnx×nu are system matrices which depend on the discrete state q, C ∈
Rny×nx is the system output matrix, which is the same for all q ∈ Q. The process and measurement
noise are represented by w ∼N (0,W) and v ∼N (0,V), respectively, where ‖w‖ ≤ w and ‖v‖ ≤ v.
The initial continuous state x(t0) is unique but unknown.
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To each discrete transition φ(q,ψ) = q′, we associate a guard condition:
G(q,q′,ψ) = {x ∈ Rnx : sGx ≥ cG} (V.2)
where cG is a vector and sG is a matrix. The guard condition indicates that the discrete transition
ψ occurs if the system is in discrete state q and the continuous state satisfies sGx ≥ cG.
In this chapter, we assume
Assumption 10. The initial discrete state q(t0) is known.
The ith discrete event ψ(i) occurs at time ti. The continuous evolutions of the system in one
discrete state occur in time t ∈ [ti−1 + 1, ti], for all i = 1,2, .... We assume
Assumption 11. No discrete event occurs between two adjacent sample time boundaries and at
most one discrete event occurs at one sample time boundary.
Assumption 12. The matrix pair (Aq,C) is observable for the initial discrete state q(t0) ∈ Q.
As mentioned in Section V.1, we use Kalman filters in the proposed CRMMHO framework.
To ensure the convergence of Kalman filter gains, we assume:
Assumption 13. The continuous system in each discrete state is stable or marginally stable, i.e.,
λ(Aq) ≤ 1,∀q ∈ Q, where λ(Aq) is the eigenvalues of matrix Aq.
The objective of this chapter is to design an observer for state estimation and anomaly diag-
nosis for hybrid systems that
1. not all discrete events ψ are observable; and
2. not all guard conditions G(q,q′,ψ) and reset functions fr are known a priori.
Remark 10. Note that the proposed CRMMHO framework still works under the extreme case that
there are no observable discrete events ψ and we do not have any knowledge of guard conditions
G(q,q′,ψ) and reset functions fr.
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V.3 Observer Design
In this section, we first introduce the proposed Convergence Ratio Multi-model Hybrid Ob-
server (CRMMHO) framework for the class of hybrid systems described in Section V.2. Then
we demonstrate the effectiveness of the CRMMHO framework. Finally, we show how to use the
CRMMHO framework to diagnose anomalies.
V.3.1 Observer Framework Description
As shown in Fig. V.1, the CRMMHO framework for state estimation and anomaly diagnosis
consists of two continuous state observers and integrates three methods: the Convergence Ratio
(CR) [85], the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) [37] and the model selection. The two continuous
state observers are designed to be Kalman filters2, which estimate the continuous state of the
system using different sets of measured outputs. The continuous state observer 0 uses all of the
measured outputs. The continuous state observer 1 uses any subset of measured outputs, which still
ensure the observability of the continuous system. Based on the estimated continuous states xˆ0 and
xˆ1 by the two continuous state observers, the CR method calculates the estimation errors x˜e,0 and
x˜e,1 for both of the continuous state observers. If the norm of xˆ0− xˆ1 is larger than a threshold θCR,
it indicates that a discrete transition has occurred and the continuous state observers enter their
transient state. Then the estimated state x˜ is updated based on x˜e,0. Otherwise, x˜ = xˆ0. After some
time steps, the norm of xˆ0 − xˆ1 will reach a steady state and not change much at each time step.
Then, we record the time step tss and start to use an on-line system identification method, which
is the RLS in this chapter3, to recursively estimate the current system matrices at each time step.
When the norm of a posteriori error of the RLS is smaller than a certain threshold θRLS , it means
that the matrix estimation has converged and we record the number of time steps ∆tRLS needed
for the estimated matrices to converge. Then the estimated system matrices are used by the model
2The continuous state observers can also be designed as Luenberger observers [85].
3Note that we can use other on-line system identification method under the CRMMHO framework.
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selection method to determine the current discrete state. In the model selection method, multiple
continuous system models run in parallel for ∆t time steps (the derivation of ∆t is given in Step 7 in
Section V.3.1.3) with x˜(tss) as the initial continuous state. The multiple running models include all
known continuous models and the estimated continuous model by the RLS. Based on each model,
we can calculate a residual, which is the difference between the measured output from the system
and the output calculated from the model. The norms of the residuals from the running models are
compared. The model with the smallest norm of the residual corresponds to the estimated discrete
state if the continuous dynamics of the current discrete state are distinguishable from all of other
known continuous dynamics. However, it is possible that the system enters some unknown discrete
state with unknown continuous dynamics. If the norm of the smallest residual is much larger than
the norm of the residual calculated based on the estimated continuous dynamics from the RLS,
then the system is considered to be subject to some unknown anomaly.
Remark 11. Note that the model selection method in the CRMMHO framework only runs multiple
models for a short period of time ∆t. If the system stays in one discrete state much longer than
∆RLS , then the maximum value of ∆t is given by Equation (V.15). In addition, the model selection
method only calculates a single output vector for each model at one time step. But set-membership
methods give a set of output vectors (or state vectors) for one model at one time step. The amount of
computation time running the multiple continuous models for ∆t time steps is less than the amount
of computation time used by set-membership methods running multiple models all the time. Thus,
the proposed CRMMHO framework is more computationally efficient.
Remark 12. In the model selection method, we compare the norm of the residuals from multiple
continuous models to determine the current discrete state. The residuals are functions of system
dynamics. The concepts of large or small residual norm are used for purpose of development,
selection and solution of the model selection method. We assume that the dynamics of different
continuous models are similar to the extent that the concept of large and small residual norm can
be universally applied. The validation of this discussion is system-specific and part of future work.
First, we briefly describe how Kalman filter and the RLS work in Sections V.3.1.1 and
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Figure V.1: The CRMMHO framework
V.3.1.2, respectively. Then we give a detailed description of the CRMMHO framework in Sec-
tion V.3.1.3.
V.3.1.1 Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter is the most widely used state estimator for linear systems with known
uncertainties. The standard Kalman filter derivation is given here
xˆ(t|t−1) = Aqxˆ(t−1) +Bqu(t−1)
P(t|t−1) = AqP(t−1)Aᵀq +W
K(t) = P(t|t−1)Cᵀ(V+CP(t|t−1)Cᵀ)−1
xˆ(t) = xˆ(t|t−1) +K(t)(y(t)−Cxˆ(t|t−1))
P(t) = (I−K(t)C)P(t|t−1)(I−K(t)C)ᵀ+K(t)VKᵀ(t)
(V.3)
where K is the Kalman gain and P is the covariant matrix reflecting the accuracy of estimates. It
is well known that the Kalman gain K will converge if the system is open-loop stable [61]. In
practice the Kalman gain usually converges in a few steps. Without loss of generality, we assume
the Kalman filter to be already in the steady state and define
P, lim
t→∞P(t|t−1), K, PC
ᵀ(V+CPCᵀ)−1. (V.4)
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Based on Assumption 13, we use the constant Kalman gains in the CRMMHO framework and its
demonstration.
V.3.1.2 Recursive Least Squares
The RLS is an on-line system identification method which can use given measurements to
estimate unknown system parameters. We use the RLS to estimate the continuous system matrices
(A˜, B˜).
In our case, we have
x(t) =
[
Aq Bq
] x(t−1)u(t−1)
 (V.5)
where u(t− 1) is known, and we use x˜ as an estimate of x. Let Ξ =
A˜
ᵀ
B˜ᵀ
 and ξ =
x˜u
. RLS finds
the best linear function Ξ that computes the value of x˜ from the values of ξ. Then Ξ can be used to
estimate
[
Aq Bq
]
. The RLS procedure is as follows:
εo(t) = x˜0(t)−Ξᵀ(t−1)ξ(t−1)
Ξ(t) = Ξ(t−1) + GRLS(t−1)ξ(t−1)
1 +ξᵀ(t−1)GRLS(t−1)ξ(t−1)ε
ᵀ
o(t)
GRLS(t) = GRLS(t−1)− GRLS(t−1)ξ(t−1)ξ
ᵀ(t−1)GRLS(t−1)
1 +ξᵀ(t−1)GRLS(t−1)ξ(t−1)
(V.6)
where εo is a priori error and GRLS is the adaptation gain. Initially, define GRLS(t0) = cI, where c
is a large positive constant (e.g. 1000) and I is an identify matrix.
V.3.1.3 Work Flow of the CRMMHO Framework
As shown in Fig. V.2, the detailed work flow of the CRMMHO framework is described as
follows:
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Figure V.2: Flow chart of the CRMMHO framework
1. Initialization:
The estimated initial discrete state is the same as the real initial discrete state q˜(t0) = q(t0) = q0
based on Assumption 10. The initial guess for the RLS is Ξ(0) =
A
ᵀ
q0
Bᵀq0
 and GRLS(t0) = cI.
2. Estimate xˆ0(t) and xˆ1(t) using two Kalman filters:
Note that the two Kalman filters are using the same estimated continuous state at the previous time
step x˜(t−1) for state estimation. With constant Kalman gains, the estimated continuous states by
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the two Kalman filters are given as follows:
xˆ0(t) = Aq˜x˜(t−1) +Bq˜u(t−1) +K0(y(t)−C(Aq˜x˜(t−1) +Bq˜u(t−1)))
= xˆ(t|t−1) +K0(y(t)−Cxˆ(t|t−1))
= (I−K0C)xˆ(t|t−1) +K0y(t)
xˆ1(t) = Aq˜x˜(t−1) +Bq˜u(t−1) +K1(y1(t)−C1(Aq˜x˜(t−1) +Bq˜u(t−1)))
= xˆ(t|t−1) +K1(y1(t)−C1xˆ(t|t−1))
= (I−K1C1)xˆ(t|t−1) +K1y1(t)
(V.7)
where xˆ0 ∈Rnx , xˆ1 ∈Rnx are the estimated continuous states by continuous state observers 0 and 1,
respectively, C1 ∈ Rn′y×nx is the output matrix used by continuous state observer 1, y1 ∈ Rn′y is the
output variable used by continuous state observer 1, and xˆ(t|t− 1) = Aq˜x˜(t− 1) +Bq˜u(t− 1). Note
that n′y < ny.
Then compare the norm of the difference of the estimated continuous states ‖xˆ0 − xˆ1‖ with the
threshold θCR. If ‖xˆ0 − xˆ1‖ > θCR, then continue on Step 3. Otherwise, stay in Step 2 for the next
time step. Note that the threshold θCR may be different for different discrete states because the
impact of the noise on state estimation is different in different discrete states. Adaptive θCR should
be used to make sure the change of discrete state can be successfully detected. Refer to [77] on
how to determine an adaptive threshold using a data-driven method.
3. Calculate the estimation errors x˜e,0(t), x˜e,1(t) using the CR method:
x˜e,0(t) = (I−K0C)(K0C−K1C1)†(xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t))
x˜e,1(t) = (I−K1C1)(K0C−K1C1)†(xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t)),
(V.8)
where (K0C−K1C1)† is the pseudo-inverse of matrix (K0C−K1C1), that is (K0C−K1C1)† =
[(K0C−K1C1)ᵀ(K0C−K1C1)]−1(K0C−K1C1)ᵀ.
4. Calculate the estimated continuous state x˜(t):
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x˜(t) = xˆ0(t) + x˜e,0(t) (V.9)
5. Check whether or not the continuous state estimation has entered a new steady state:
When the system enters a new discrete state, ‖xˆ0 − xˆ1‖ reaches a new steady state which is larger
than θCR. We compare the following
|‖xˆ0(t+ 1)− xˆ1(t+ 1)‖− ‖xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t)‖|
‖xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t)‖ (V.10)
which indicates the change of ‖xˆ0 − xˆ1‖, with a threshold θdi f f to determine whether or not the
continuous state estimation has entered a new steady state. If (V.10) is smaller than θdi f f , record
the current time step tss and continue on Step 6. Otherwise, go back to Step 2 for the next time
step.
6. Estimate the system matrices using the RLS following the procedure introduced in Section V.3.1.2.
Then the estimated system matrices (A˜, B˜) are as follows
A˜ = [Ξ(1:nx,1:nx)]ᵀ
B˜ = [Ξ(nx+1:nx+nu,1:nx)]ᵀ
(V.11)
In addition, we use a posteriori error ε to track the convergence of the system matrices estimation
ε(t) = x˜(t)−Ξᵀ(t)ξ(t) (V.12)
If ‖ε(t+ 1)‖ ≤ θRLS , then we record the time steps ∆tRLS for convergence and continue on Step 7.
Otherwise, we go back to Step 2 for the next time step.
7. Determine the discrete state of the system:
For each known continuous model and the estimated continuous model, we can calculate the output
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starting from time tss:
yo,qˆ(tss + j) = Cxo,qˆ(tss + j)
= CA jqˆx(tss) +Σ
j−1
i=0CA
i
qˆBqˆu(tss + j−1− i)
(V.13)
where qˆ = 0,1,2,3..., 0 indicates the continuous model estimated by the RLS, 1,2,3... indicate the
continuous models of discrete states 1,2,3..., respectively, xo,qˆ and yo,qˆ are the state and output
calculated using the continuous model.
The residual is the difference between the measured output from the system and the calculated
output from each continuous model:
rqˆ(tss + j) = y(tss + j)−yo,qˆ(tss + j) (V.14)
We introduce a similarity index for each continuous model to help find the continuous model which
has the closest behavior to the current continuous dynamics of the system. The similarity index for
each continuous model is defined as the mean of the norm of the residual calculated based on the
continuous model:
Iqˆ =
1
∆t
Σ∆tj=1‖rqˆ(tss + j)‖, where ∆t = max(∆tRLS ,
2nx−ny
ny−nu ) (V.15)
Then we compare the smallest Iqˆ, where qˆ 6= 0 with I0. If Iqˆ < θI I0, where θI is a pre-defined
threshold, then the system is currently in discrete state qˆ and the estimated discrete state q˜ equals
to qˆ. Otherwise, the system is in an unknown discrete state.
Note that two discrete events may occur close to each other or even in adjacent time steps.
For example, discrete event ψ1 makes the system transition from discrete state 1 to 2 and discrete
event ψ2 makes the system to transition from discrete state 2 to 3. Suppose ψ2 occurs right after the
occurrence of ψ1 and the matrix estimation by the RLS has not converged. Then the CRMMHO
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cannot identify the discrete state 2 after the occurrence of discrete event ψ1. The CRMMHO only
estimates the current discrete state, which is 3. Suppose ψ2 occurs after the matrix estimation by
the RLS has converged. Then the CRMMHO can identify both the discrete state 2 and discrete
state 3 with some time delay. An extreme case is that the system never stays in one discrete state
for a long time such that the matrix estimation by the RLS never converges. Then the CRMMHO
framework can only estimate the continuous state of the system.
V.3.2 Demonstration
Among the seven steps in the CRMMHO framework mentioned in Section V.3.1, there are
three key steps. One is the CR method which estimates the continuous state of the system. The
second is the RLS method which estimates the continuous model of the current discrete state.
The third is the model selection which estimates the current discrete state of the system. In this
section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the CR, the RLS and the model selection methods
mathematically, respectively.
The CR method uses two continuous state observers to calculate the estimation errors of
the two observers. Then the calculated estimation errors are used to correct the continuous state
estimated by the plain Kalman filter. In [85], it is demonstrated that the CR method can provide
a good estimation error calculation using Luenberger observers when the system is subject to
process noise. Theorem 4 demonstrates that the same result remains for Kalman filters in the case
that the Kalman filters are using incorrect state matrices for state estimation. The reason that the
CR method is not affected by incorrect state matrices is that the two continuous state observers
(Kalman filters) are using the same state matrices for state estimation. The CR method takes the
difference of the estimated states of the two continuous state observers to calculate the estimation
errors, then the effect of the incorrect state matrices are canceled out.
Theorem 4. Given a hybrid system H, suppose the difference of the state matrices between the
discrete states q1 and q2 is (∆Aq1,q2 ,∆Bq1,q2), where ∆Aq1,q2 = Aq1 −Aq2 and ∆Bq1,q2 = Bq1 −Bq2 ,
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then the estimation errors x˜e,0, x˜e,1 calculated using Equation (V.8) are the same as the actual
estimation errors of the two observers in sensor noise free case, i.e., v = 0.
Proof. The linear system of discrete states q1 and q2 is
x(t+ 1) = Aqx(t) +Bqu(t) +w(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(V.16)
where q = q1,q2.
At time ti when a discrete transition occurs, the discrete state is changed from q1 to q2. Since
the discrete event is unobservable, the observers are still using the state matrices (Aq1 ,Bq1) for state
estimation after time ti.
Let us focus on observer 0 in this proof. The proof is similar for observer 1.
The estimated continuous state given by observer 0 is shown in Equation (V.7). Then the
estimation error of observer 0 is
xe,0(t) = x(t)− xˆ0(t)
= x(t)− (I−K0C)xˆ(t|t−1)−K0y(t)
= (I−K0C)(x(t)− xˆ(t|t−1))
(V.17)
The estimation difference of the two observers is
xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t) = xe,1(t)−xe,0(t)
= (K0C−K1C1)(x(t)− xˆ(t|t−1))
(V.18)
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Then the calculated estimation error for observer 0 based on Equation (V.8) is
x˜e,0(t) = (I−K0C)(K0C−K1C1)†(xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t))
= (I−K0C)(x(t)− xˆ(t|t−1))
= xe,0(t)
(V.19)
Therefore, with inaccurate state matrices, the estimation error can still be correctly calculated
in the sensor noise free case.
According to [85], the CR method is affected by sensor noise. Here we give the upper bound
of the calculation error of the estimation error under bounded sensor noise.
xe,0(t)− x˜e,0(t) = xe,0(t)− (I−K0C)(K0C−K1C1)†(xˆ0(t)− xˆ1(t))
= (I−K0C)(K0C−K1C1)†(K1v1(t)−K0v(t))
(V.20)
So the upper bound is ‖(I−K0C)(K0C−K1C1)†(K1 +K0)‖v.
Remark 13. According to Theorem 4, the calculation of the estimation error does not require the
continuous dynamics of discrete state q2 to be observable. Therefore, we only assume that the
continuous dynamics of the initial discrete state q(t0) are observable in Assumption 12 to ensure
the estimation error convergence in the initial discrete state.
With the calculated estimation error, we can update the estimated continuous state of the
system x˜(t) according to Equation (V.9). With the updated estimated continuous state, we use the
RLS to calculate the state matrices of discrete state q2. Proposition 6 demonstrates the convergence
of the estimated matrices by proving that the norm of a posteriori error ε(t) (V.12) is smaller
than the norm of a priori error εo (V.6) in the noise free case. We state the proposition here for
convenience. For the detailed proof, refer to [16].
Proposition 6. In the RLS algorithm (V.6), the norm of a posteriori error ε(t) is smaller than the
norm of a priori error εo at each time step.
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With the estimated continuous system matrices by the RLS method, we can use the estimated
matrices as a reference to help determine the current discrete state of the system. As mentioned in
Section V.1, we can uniquely determine the discrete state of the system if the current continuous
dynamics are distinguishable from the continuous dynamics of other discrete states. The formal
definition of distinguishability is given in [58].
Definition 17. The continuous dynamics (Aq1 ,Bq1) and (Aq2 ,Bq2) are said to be distinguishable
on [t0, t0 +T ], if for any non-zero
(xq1(t0),xq2(t0),u(·)) ∈ Rnx ×Rnx ×Rnu , (V.21)
the outputs yq1(·) and yq2(·) are not identical to each other on [t0, t0 +T ].
The necessary and sufficient condition for distinguishability in the noise free case in con-
tinuous time is given in [58]. The theorem and its proof for the discrete-time continuous system
is similar to that in [58]. For convenience, we restate the theorem and give its proof under our
modeling formalism.
Theorem 5. The continuous models described by Equation (V.1) (w = 0,v = 0) of two discrete
states q1 and q2 with the same initial condition x(ti) are distinguishable in time [ti, ti + ∆t] if and
only if
∆t ≥ 2nx−ny
ny−nu and 2nx > ny and ny > nu
and
Dq1,q2 =

Cq1,q2 0 0 ... 0
Cq1,q2Aq1,q2 Cq1,q2Bq1,q2 0 ... 0
Cq1,q2A2q1,q2 Cq1,q2Aq1,q2Bq1,q2 Cq1,q2Bq1,q2 ... 0
... ... ... ... 0
Cq1,q2A∆tq1,q2 Cq1,q2A
∆t−1
q1,q2Bq1,q2 ... ... Cq1,q2Bq1,q2

(V.22)
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has full column rank, where
Aq1,q2 =
Aq1 00 −Aq2

Bq1,q2 =
Bq1Bq2

Cq1,q2 =
[
C −C
]
(V.23)
Proof. The outputs of (Aq1 ,Bq1) and (Aq2 ,Bq2) with the same initial continuous state x(ti) are
yq1(ti + j) = CA
j
q1x(ti) +CΣ
j−1
i=0A
i
q1Bq1u(ti + j−1− i)
yq2(ti + j) = CA
j
q2x(ti) +CΣ
j−1
i=0A
i
q2Bq2u(ti + j−1− i)
(V.24)
Suppose q1 is the actual current discrete state and q2 is one of the possible discrete states of the
system. The residual rq2(ti + j) is
rq2(ti + j) = yq1(ti + j)−yq2(ti + j)
= C(A jq1 −A jq2)x(ti) +CΣ j−1i=0 (Aiq1Bq1 −Aiq2Bq2)u(ti + j−1− i)
(V.25)
If the continuous dynamics of discrete states q1 and q2 are distinguishable, then rq2(t+ j) = 0,∀ j =
0,1, ...,∆t holds only when the initial continuous state x(ti) and all of the inputs u are 0, i.e.,
Dq1,q2

x˜(ti)
x˜(ti)
u(ti)
...
u(ti +∆t−1)

= 0 (V.26)
admits only trivia solution. That is, the matrix Dq1,q2 ∈ R((∆t+1)×ny)×(2nx+∆t×nu) is a square or tall
matrix ((∆t+ 1)×ny ≥ 2nx +∆t×nu) and has full column rank.
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Suppose the current discrete state of the system is q1 during the model selection step. If
the continuous dynamics of two discrete states q1 and q2 satisfy Theorem 5, then the residual
calculated based on the continuous models of q2 is non-zero in time [tss, tss + ∆t] in the noise free
case. If the continuous dynamics of all of the discrete states are distinguishable, then we can
uniquely determine the current discrete state. Otherwise, the discrete state which has the smallest
norm of residual is not guaranteed to be the actual discrete state of the system. Theorem 5 provides
the condition of distinguishability in the noise free case. However, the hybrid system we consider
in this chapter contains process and sensor noise as described in Section V.2. If the continuous
dynamics of discrete states q1 and q2 are distinguishable, the residual rq2 calculated in the noisy
system case may still equal to 0 because of the system noise. Therefore, we provide a condition to
address the noisy system case. Since the discrete state q1 is the current discrete state of the system,
the continuous dynamics of q1 are subject to system noise. The discrete state q2 is one of the
possible discrete states of the system and the continuous dynamics of q2 are ideal (w = 0,v = 0).
Then, the outputs of (Aq1 ,Bq1) and (Aq2 ,Bq2) with the same initial continuous state x(tss) are
yq1(tss + j) = CA
j
q1x(tss) +CΣ
j−1
i=0A
i
q1Bq1u(tss + j−1− i) +CΣ j−1i=0Aiq1w(tss + j−1− i) +v(tss + j)
yq2(tss + j) = CA
j
q2x(tss) +CΣ
j−1
i=0A
i
q2Bq2u(tss + j−1− i)
(V.27)
The residual rq2(tss + j) is
rq2(tss + j) = yq1(tss + j)−yq2(tss + j)
= C(A jq1 −A jq2)x(tss) +CΣ j−1i=0 (Aiq1Bq1 −Aiq2Bq2)u(tss + j−1− i)
+CΣ j−1i=0A
i
q1w(tss + j−1− i) +v(tss + j)
(V.28)
If rq2(tss+ j) 6= 0,∀ j= 0,1, ...,∆t, then it is guaranteed that the continuous dynamics of q1 and q2 are
not the same. That means if the following holds from time tss to time tss + ∆t, then the continuous
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dynamics of q1 and q2 are different:
∀ j = 0,1, ...,∆t
‖C(A jq1 −A jq2)x(tss) +CΣ j−1i=0 (Aiq1Bq1 −Aiq2Bq2)u(tss + j−1− i)‖ ≥ ‖CΣ j−1i=0Aiq1w(tss + j−1− i) +v(tss + j)‖
≥ ‖C‖Σ j−1i=0 ‖Aq1‖iw+ v
(V.29)
Note that the condition (V.29) is a sufficient condition. It is possible that we can distinguish
the two continuous models of discrete states q1 and q2 although (V.29) is not satisfied.
V.3.3 Anomaly Diagnosis
Anomalies may occur in hybrid systems, causing a change in continuous dynamics. Some
anomalies have been studied before and we know how those anomalies affect the continuous dy-
namics of the system, especially the anomalies caused by traditional faults. For the anomalies that
we have a priori knowledge about, we can model them as discrete states which are part of the hy-
brid systems associated with unobservable discrete events. The CRMMHO framework can detect
anomalies by detecting the occurrence of the discrete event and isolate anomalies by identifying
the current discrete state. For some anomalies, however, we do not have a priori knowledge, espe-
cially the anomalies caused by attacks. For the anomalies that we do not have a priori knowledge
about, we do not model them as part of the hybrid system model. The CRMMHO framework
can detect anomalies by detecting a change in the continuous dynamics of the system, and the
continuous dynamics estimated by the RLS can provide some insight about the anomalies.
V.4 Simulation Result
In this section, we show the simulation result of our motivating example - the microgrid
system. First, we present the hybrid model of the microgrid system. Then, we compare the state
140
estimation performance of the proposed CRMMHO framework with a plain Kalman filter.
V.4.1 Microgrid System
As introduced in Section V.1, unplanned islanding may occur within the system, threatening
worker safety and interrupting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) management. Traditional Is-
landing Detection Methodology (IDM) can detect the occurrence of the unplanned islanding, but
they cannot provide state estimation during the diagnosis.
As shown in Fig. I.2, the microgrid system we consider in this chapter contains two DERs,
two buses, one transmission line and two local loads. The hybrid model of the microgrid system
contains three discrete states under normal operation: grid-tied, islanded and synchronization, as
illustrated in Fig. V.3. Suppose initially the system is in the islanded discrete state and it is
commanded to connect to the grid; then the system transitions to the synchronization discrete state
to synchronize the amplitude and phase of the voltage in the microgrid with that in the grid. After
the synchronization is finished, the microgrid is connected to the grid and the system transitions to
the grid-tied discrete state. Under normal operation, the islanding is scheduled, which transitions
the system from the grid-tied discrete state to the islanded discrete state. The continuous model
in each discrete state contains 40 continuous states, all of which are measured. For the detailed
modeling of the microgrid, refer to [72].
The proposed observer framework CRMMHO contains two Kalman filters. Suppose all of
the continuous state variables can be directly measured. Kalman filter 0 uses all 40 measurements
and Kalman filter 1 uses 24 measurements for state estimation. The parameters of the proposed
observer framework are shown in Table V.1. Note that in order to compare the following thresh-
olds with corresponding variables (the difference of the estimated continuous states between the
two continuous state observers and residual), we normalize the variables based on the mean and
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standard deviation of the variables under normal operation, as shown in (V.30).
xnorm =
x− x
σx
(V.30)
where xnorm is the variable, x is the mean of the variable, and σx is standard deviation of the
variable.
Table V.1: Parameters of the CRMMHO framework
Parameters Value
θCR 4
θdi f f 4
θRLS 4
θI 100
To illustrate the effectiveness of the CRMMHO framework, we consider the unplanned is-
landing scenario. We run the simulation for 10s. An unplanned islanding occurs at time 3s and the
system stays in the islanded discrete state until the end of the simulation.
Figure V.3: Hybrid model of the microgrid system
V.4.2 Simulation Result
We compare the result of the CRMMHO framework with the plain Kalman filter 0 to show
the effectiveness of the CRMMHO framework in state estimation and anomaly diagnosis. For
142
continuous state estimation, we compare the 15th estimated state variable, the current of bus 1 on
the q-axis4, which is used by the power controller to control the DER on bus 1 when the system is
in the islanded discrete state. If the estimation of the current is bad, the controller cannot provide
good control performance for the system, and may even damage the system under severe cases.
Fig. V.4 shows the real and the estimated currents by the CRMMHO and the plain Kalman filter
0. From the simulation result we can see that after the unplanned islanding occurs, the estimated
current by the plain Kalman filter has an offset compared to the real current in the steady state.
The reason that the plain Kalman filter cannot provide a good state estimation after the occurrence
of the unplanned islanding is because the continuous model used by the observer is the continuous
model in the grid-tied discrete state as opposed to the continuous model in the islanded discrete
state. In contrast, the estimated current by the CRMMHO can track the real current well. Fig. V.5
shows the real and the estimated discrete state by the CRMMHO. The estimated discrete state is
uniquely determined at 4.1s, which is 1.1s after the occurrence of the unplanned islanding. The
1.1s detection delay is caused by the convergence time of ‖xˆ0− xˆ1‖ and the RLS. In summary, the
anomaly caused by the unplanned islanding is successfully diagnosed and we can provide a good
state estimation during the diagnosis of the unplanned islanding.
Figure V.4: The real current x(15), the estimated continuous currents x˜(15), xˆ(15)0 by the CRMMHO
and the plain Kalman filter 0 under unplanned islanding (note that the real current x(15) overlaps
with the estimated continuous state x˜(15) by the CRMMHO)
4In a synchronous machines, the axis of the field winding in the direction of the DC field is the d-axis. 90 degrees
later than the d-axis is the q-axis [38].
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Figure V.5: The real discrete state q, estimated discrete state q˜ by the proposed observer under
unplanned islanding
V.5 Conclusion & Future Work
In this chapter, we proposed a novel observer framework, the Convergence Ratio Multi-
model Hybrid Observer (CRMMHO), for state estimation and anomaly diagnosis for hybrid sys-
tems with unobservable discrete events. The CRMMHO consists of two continuous state observers
and three major methods: the Convergence Ratio (CR), the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) and the
model selection. First, the CR method estimates the continuous state of the system. Then, the RLS
method estimates the continuous system matrices. Finally, the model selection method uniquely
determines the current discrete state. We demonstrated the CRMMHO framework in state esti-
mation and anomaly detection mathematically and showed its effectiveness using the simulated
microgrid system.
The CRMMHO has the following advantages compared to existing methods. It does not
require a priori knowledge of the discrete transitions. The discontinuity in continuous variables is
allowed. The CRMMHO is more computationally effective because: 1) it only uses two continuous
state observers to estimate the continuous state of the system; and 2) the multiple continuous
models only run for a short period of time and give a single output vector for each model per time
step to determine the discrete state of the system. Note that this framework is flexible. The RLS
method can be replaced with other on-line system identification methods and the model selection
method can be replaced with any model falsification [74, 75] or model invalidation methods [35].
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More work needs to be done on improving the CRMMHO framework. The CRMMHO
framework assumes that the initial discrete state of the system is given. However, the initial dis-
crete state may not be known a priori. To relax the assumption of the known initial discrete state,
we can run multiple continuous state observers in parallel, each corresponding to one known con-
tinuous models. By checking the convergence of the residual of each continuous state observer,
we can determine the initial discrete state. In addition, in order to determine the discrete state
of the system by analyzing residuals, we assume that the dynamics of different continuous mod-
els are similar to the extent that the concept of large and small residual norm can be universally
applied. This assumption needs to be validated for specific system in the future. Under the CR-
MMHO framework, there are some thresholds, such as θCR, θI that we need to determine based
on the specific system that we apply to. In order to determine θI , we need quantify the level of
distinguishability based on the noise level. The impact of different levels of distinguishability on
the residual should be studied, providing guidance on setting θI .
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions and Future Work
VI.1 Conclusions
This dissertation focuses on improving the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) by en-
hancing the utility of traditional observer-based anomaly diagnosis and mitigation methods. With
the integration of the cyber world and the physical world, CPS have fast responses to the sur-
rounding environment, such as changing markets and disturbances. As the world transitions to full
integration of the cyber and physical realms, the unique challenges that CPS security face include
not only traditional physical faults or attacks but also faults or attacks from the cyber domain.
These cross-domain faults or attacks can cause anomalies in the physical systems, or even threaten
public safety. In this dissertation, we enhance the security of CPS by improving on the traditional
anomaly diagnosis and mitigation approaches that address anomalies caused by faults or attacks.
We leverage the observer-based approach which is one of the most widely used anomaly diagnosis
and mitigation techniques. An observer-based approach has the advantage that it can not only di-
agnose anomalies but also estimate the current state of the system. The estimated system state can
help human operators understand how to resolve the anomaly as well as ensure the safety of the
system.
The work done in the dissertation can be divided into three major parts, which are presented
in Chapters III, IV and V, respectively. We have summarized the contributions of each chapter
using a microgrid system as an example.
In Chapter III, we focus on anomalies in sensors and model CPS as continuous systems.
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Under the multi-observer framework, three new methods are proposed and integrated to improve
sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation. The three new methods respectively:
1. enable anomaly detection for some sensor anomalies during the observers’ transient state;
2. detect some anomalies on critical sensors; and
3. potentially mitigate the impact of the anomalous sensor during the diagnosis process.
If we take one operation mode of the microgrid system as an example, such as the islanded op-
eration mode, then the multi-observer sensor anomaly diagnosis and mitigation framework can
be used to diagnose sensor anomalies and mitigate the impact of these sensor anomalies in the
microgrid system.
In Chapter IV, we extend the work in Chapter III to hybrid systems, which consist of both
continuous dynamics and discrete behavior. Additionally, the anomaly type is not limited to sensor
anomalies. Assuming that the discrete behavior of hybrid systems is current-state observable, the
contributions of this chapter are:
1. We propose a conflict-driven method to provide guarantees on the detection of some types of
anomalies that are not detectable using traditional observer-based and residual-based methods in
addition to the anomalies that can be detected by the traditional methods.
2. We define a classification taxonomy for anomalies in hybrid systems based on the variables that
are affected, input-output data consistency, and diagnosability of the anomaly.
3. We develop a new hybrid observer, which uses a Set-Valued Observer (SVO) as the continuous
state observer, for anomaly detection. With the SVO, we can apply the conflict-driven method to
hybrid systems with unobservable continuous components.
4. We provide a mapping between conflict types and anomaly types. Based on the occurrence of the
conflict types, we can identify if the anomaly is related to the continuous component of the system,
the discrete component or both.
147
Using the microgrid system as an example, we can take all three operation modes (islanded, grid-
tied and synchronization) into consideration. Assuming that we know when and which discrete
event occurs if the system is under normal operation (the discrete events of the system are observ-
able), we also know the invariants (allowable continuous state space) of the system in different
nominal discrete states. Suppose the microgrid system is accidentally connected to the grid before
the microgrid voltage is synchronized with the voltage in the grid. Then the conflict-driven method
can detect the anomaly because the phase and the frequency of the islanded microgrid voltage are
outside the invariant of the system in grid-tied operation mode.
In Chapter V, we consider a wider class of hybrid systems, including hybrid systems with
unobservable discrete events. With unobservable discrete events, the discrete behavior of the hy-
brid systems may not be current-state observable and the conflict-driven anomaly detection method
is not applicable. We address this in Chapter V with the contributions being:
1. We propose the Convergence Ratio Multi-model Hybrid Observer (CRMMHO) framework to esti-
mate both the discrete and the continuous variables for hybrid systems with unobservable discrete
events;
2. We use the CRMMHO framework to diagnose anomalies in more general hybrid systems; and
3. We apply the CRMMHO framework in the simulated microgrid system to validate its effectiveness.
For the microgrid system, if the discrete events of the system are not observable, then the conflict-
driven method proposed in Chapter IV because the hybrid observer used in the conflict-driven
method cannot estimate the discrete state of the system. The CRMMHO framework proposed
in Chapter V is able to address this issue. If unexpected and unobservable islanding occurs to
the grid-tied microgrid system, the CRMMHO framework can detect and isolate this anomaly by
identifying that the discrete state of the microgrid is changed to islanded.
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VI.2 Future Work
This dissertation enhances the utility of traditional observer-based anomaly diagnosis and
mitigation methods in securing CPS. The methods proposed in this dissertation present opportuni-
ties for future work.
For hybrid system anomaly diagnosis, the invariant set is crucial since it describes the rela-
tionship between the continuous and discrete variables. In Chapter IV, the invariant set is formed
based on both the continuous dynamics and safety constraints of the system for the corresponding
discrete state. We use a hyperrectangle to do overapproximation which introduces some conser-
vatism. The hyperrectangle may contain some continuous states which can never be reached when
the system is under normal operation. In the future, we can use polyhedrons with fewer constraints
to do overapproximation during set calculation to balance the estimation accuracy and the com-
putation speed. In addition, an invariant of a discrete state may be a function of the continuous
dynamics of the previous discrete state. Using a pre-determined invariant may also require an
overapproximation. This can be addressed by determining the invariant of each discrete state dy-
namically. If we use a model predictive controller to control the system, we would have knowledge
of the control input that we will apply to the system for next several time steps. With the known
control input, we can calculate more conservative reachable sets as well as invariant sets dynami-
cally to improve the estimation accuracy. In the future, we can integrate the conflict-driven method
and the model predictive control to improve hybrid system anomaly diagnosis.
We have already done anomaly mitigation for continuous CPS in Chapter III. However, no
work is done for anomaly mitigation for hybrid CPS in this dissertation. A majority of previous
literature introduces off-line anomaly mitigation algorithms developed for hybrid systems [88].
However, anomalies may change system behavior abruptly, and anomaly mitigation strategies must
be used on-line or even used before the anomaly is diagnosed so that the stability and safety of the
system is maintained under anomalies. The results of anomaly mitigation for continuous systems
or discrete systems may not be directly applied to hybrid systems since some hybrid systems
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may contain unique properties, such as Zeno behavior or instability caused by fast switchings.
Additionally, anomalies in hybrid system could disrupt both the continuous dynamics and discrete
behavior. So the anomaly mitigation strategies should maintain both the continuous performance
including various stabilities, such as Lyapunov stability and input-to-state stability, and the discrete
specifications that the hybrid system should follow. Developing an on-line anomaly mitigation
algorithm for hybrid systems would represent an important extension of current capabilities.
In observer-based anomaly diagnosis, the fidelity of the system model is crucial to the diag-
nosis performance. If the system model is perfectly known, observer-based anomaly diagnosis can
guarantee the diagnosis of anomalies and provide zero false positives. However, in reality, there
are always system uncertainties, such as system noise and system modeling error and large parts
of systems are poorly or not observable. Acquiring a high fidelity system model is never an easy
task. Moreover, a high fidelity model may consume a lot of computational power. However, a
low fidelity model can cause significant false positives and false negatives. To apply the proposed
observer-based anomaly diagnosis proposed in this dissertation, it is important to understand and
measure the diagnosis performance. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is a
graphical plot illustrating the diagnostic ability of an anomaly diagnosis algorithm, could be used
to help human operators choose the optimal threshold used in the diagnosis algorithm which can
balance false positives or false negatives and the fidelity of the system model. Measuring the
performance of different diagnosis algorithms for a specific system is one of our future works.
The main assumption of observer-based anomaly diagnosis is that the physics-based system
model is known a priori. However, in real applications, the physics-based system model may not
be available. Or maybe only part of the system has a known physics-based system model. There
are other types of models besides physics-based models that can be used to represent a system
and support anomaly diagnosis. For example, a statistical model could be developed using a data-
driven method. Phenomenological models define relationships of variables to capture aspects of
the physics or chemistry of the system; these model forms are often tuned statistically. Different
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types of models may capture different aspects of the system. The models developed using these
methods can be used as a replacement for the models used in the observer-based anomaly diag-
nosis methods. However, as these models are non-deterministic, there may be false positives or
negatives, which may be partially addressed by integrating these different types of models together
to achieve better anomaly diagnosis. Intuitively, there are two ways of integration: a structural way
and a non-structural way. In a structural way, we need to translate different models using a stan-
dardized model template in such a way so that the information provided by different models can be
shared among the models. In a non-structural way, different types of models can be integrated us-
ing neural networks or other clustering approaches. Designing a flexible framework to effectively
integrate various system models to diagnose anomalies in CPS is a future research direction.
As mentioned in Chapter I, CPS integrate the cyber world and the physical world to form
large scale systems. CPS are composed of multi-domain subsystems. Modeling large scale CPS
is challenging. One potential solution is to build CPS models in a distributed way. In distributed
modeling, the system is decomposed into sub-systems spatially with weak interactions between
them. Then those sub-systems are integrated together concurrently [18]. Another potential solution
could be combinatorial modeling. Similar to distributed modeling, in combinatorial modeling, the
system is also decomposed into sub-systems. But the decomposition may not be based on spatial
distribution and strong coupling may still exist between sub-systems. When combining the sub-
system models, the coupling between the sub-system models should be taken into consideration.
Additionally, the level of abstraction of the sub-system models should be consistent. Lastly, the
CPS model should be verified such that it can provide sufficient resolution for different usage
purposes, such as control and anomaly diagnosis. Modeling and verification of large scale CPS
model is another future research direction.
In this dissertation, we demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed methods using dif-
ferent simulated systems, such as the suspension system, the Positive Train Control system and
the microgrid system. By using different simulated systems, we have illustrated that our proposed
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methods have wide applications in various CPS. The application domain of the proposed meth-
ods is broader than the investigated applications. To make an actual contribution to the industry,
we need to implement the proposed methods in real systems. For each proposed observer-based
anomaly diagnosis and mitigation method, there are some thresholds that need to be pre-defined
by human operators with some knowledge of the system. The values of the thresholds are system-
specific. When implementing the proposed methods in a real system, how to tune the thresholds
using the ROC curve to achieve satisfactory anomaly diagnosis performance is a future research
direction.
As CPS are prevalent in critical infrastructures, the security of CPS faces different kinds of
challenges in real applications. Sophisticated anomaly diagnosis is needed to enhance the security
of CPS compared to either physical systems or cyber systems. It is impossible to make CPS
impregnable since there may always be a smart attacker designing an intelligent attack on the
system. The aim of proposing new anomaly diagnosis is to increase the cost of launching an attack
and decrease the losses caused by an anomaly.
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Appendix A
Appendices of Chapter III
Proof of CO method
Theorem 0 Given an ideal control system (III.1) with w(t) = 0 and v(t) = 0, when sensor i f is
anomalous at time step t, the observer i f gives the smallest norm estimation error if the anomaly
signal satisfies
‖γ(t)‖ > ‖LiΓi‖−1(‖Ei f xe,i f (t)‖+ ‖Eixe,i(t)‖), i 6= i f . (VI.1)
Proof. When sensor i f is anomalous, Γi f = 0
(m−1)×1. Then the estimation error of observer i f is
xe,i f (t+ 1) =x(t+ 1)− x˜i f (t+ 1) = Ei f xe,i f (t). (VI.2)
In contrast, the estimation error of observer i (i 6= i f ) is
xe,i(t+ 1) =x(t+ 1)− x˜i(t+ 1) = Eixe,i(t)−LiΓiγ(t). (VI.3)
Therefore, if (VI.1) holds, the following is true
‖xe,i f (t+ 1)‖ < ‖xe,i(t+ 1)‖ ∀i = 0,1...,mnc∧ i 6= i f . (VI.4)
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Remark 14. Remark: There is no physical meaning for ‖γ(t)‖. Theorem 0 gives a lower bound of
γ(t) that the residual-based detection method could be used to select observer i f , which is the one
without the anomalous sensor i f .
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Given an ideal control system (III.1) with w(t) = 0 and v(t) = 0, the biases d˜µ(ν)(t) and
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) are calculated according to (III.21) and (III.22) respectively, with the following results:
1. When the system is under disturbance,
∀µ,ν =0,1, ...,mnc∧µ 6= ν,
d˜µ(ν)(t) =d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) = d(t).
2. When the system is under sensor anomaly,
∀µ,ν =0,1, ...,mnc∧µ 6= ν,
d˜µ(ν)(t) =d˜ν(µ)(t),
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) 6=d˜Λ,ν(µ)(t) i f Vµ 6= Vν.
d˜µ(ν)(t) =(DᵀD)−1Dᵀ[x˜e,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−Eµx˜e,µ(ν)(t)], (VI.5)
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ[x˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−EΛ,µx˜e,Λ,µ(ν)(t)], (VI.6)
where DΛ,µ = (Vµ)−1D, and EΛ,µ = (Vµ)−1EµVµ.
Proof. 1) According to Lemma 1, x˜e,µ(ν) = xe,µ if a disturbance exists. By substituting (III.10) to
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(III.21), the calculated bias becomes
d˜µ(ν)(t) =(DᵀD)−1Dᵀ[Eµxe,µ(t) +Dd(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)] = d(t). (VI.7)
Similarly,
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =((DΛ,µ,)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1[Eµeµ(t) +Dd(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)] = d(t). (VI.8)
2) Under sensor anomaly, the estimation error cannot be correctly calculated. Therefore,
x˜e,µ(ν) in (III.17) and xe,µ in (III.12) are substituted to (III.21) to calculate the difference between
two biases based on two observers,
d˜µ(ν)(t)− d˜ν(µ)(t) = (DᵀD)−1Dᵀ[xe,µ(t+ 1)−Eµeµ(t) +Eµ(Eν−Eµ)−1(LνΓν−LµΓµ)γ(t)
−xe,ν(t+ 1) +Eνxe,ν(t)−Eν(Eν−Eµ)−1(LνΓν−LµΓµ)γ(t)]
=0.
(VI.9)
When the biases are calculated based on (III.22), then
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1[x˜e,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−Eµx˜e,µ(ν)(t)], (VI.10)
d˜Λ,ν(µ)(t) =((DΛ,ν)ᵀDΛ,ν)−1(DΛ,ν)ᵀ(Vν)−1[x˜e,ν(µ)(t+ 1)−Eνx˜e,ν(µ)(t)], (VI.11)
are obtained for observer µ and ν, respectively. Based on (VI.9), the following is true
x˜e,µ(ν)(t+ 1)−Eµx˜e,µ(ν)(t) = x˜e,ν(µ)(t+ 1)−Eνx˜e,ν(µ)(t). (VI.12)
So ifVµ 6=Vν, then ((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1 6= ((DΛ,ν)ᵀDΛ,ν)−1(DΛ,ν)ᵀ(Vν)−1. Thus d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) 6=
d˜Λ,ν(µ)(t).
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Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 Given a control system (III.1) with bounded sensor noise and w(t) = 0, ‖x˜e,µ(ν)(t)−
xe,µ(t)‖ is bounded by ‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v.
Proof. When sensor noise exists in the system, the estimation error evolution becomes
xe,µ(t+ 1) = Eµxe,µ(t)−Lµvµ(t). (VI.13)
Then, the difference of the estimated states between two observers µ and ν becomes
xe,µ,ν(t+ 1) = Eνxe,ν(t)−Eµxe,µ(t)−Lνvν(t) +Lµvµ(t). (VI.14)
Therefore, the calculated estimation error becomes
x˜e,µ(ν)(t) = xe,µ(t)− (Eν−Eµ)−1(Lνvν(t)−Lµvµ(t)). (VI.15)
So, ‖x˜e,µ(ν)(t)−xe,µ(t)‖ is bounded by ‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+ ‖Lµ‖)v.
Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 Given a control system (III.1) with bounded process noise and v(t) = 0, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖
is bounded.
Proof. Estimation error can still be correctly calculated when the system is subject to process noise
as proved in Lemma 2.
156
Then the bias calculated based on (III.22) becomes
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =d(t) + ((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1w(t). (VI.16)
Therefore, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖ is bounded by ‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖w.
Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 Given a control system (III.1) with bounded sensor noise and w(t) = 0, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖
is bounded.
Proof. When the system has sensor noise, by substituting (VI.15) to (III.22),
d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t) =d(t)− ((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1[
(Eν−Eµ)−1(Lνvν(t+ 1)−Lµvµ(t+ 1))−Eµ(Eν−Eµ)−1(Lνvν(t)−Lµvµ(t))].
(VI.17)
Therefore, ‖d˜Λ,µ(ν)(t)−d(t)‖ is bounded by ‖((DΛ,µ)ᵀDΛ,µ)−1(DΛ,µ)ᵀ(Vµ)−1‖(1+‖Eµ‖)‖(Eν−Eµ)−1‖(‖Lν‖+
‖Lµ‖)v.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Given a control system (III.1), and an open-loop observer (III.3), the following
results can be drawn:
1. If all of the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle, then the estimation error of an open-loop
observer is bounded;
2. If one or more of the eigenvalues of A lie on the unit circle and ‖A‖ = 1, then the estimation error
of an open-loop observer is bounded.
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Proof. The real state of the system is
x(t) = Atx(t0) +Σt−1i=0A
iBu(t−1− i) +Σt−1i=0Aiw(t−1− i). (VI.18)
The state estimated by the open-loop observer is
xˆ(t) = Atxˆ(t0) +Σt−1i=0A
iBu(t−1− i). (VI.19)
Then, the estimation error of the open-loop observer is
xe,o(t) =Atxe,o(t0) +Σt−1i=0A
iw(t−1− i). (VI.20)
1. If all of the eigenvalues of A lie inside the unit circle, then Atxe,o(t0) is converging and according
to [47]
lim
i→∞{A
i} j1, j2 = 0 j1, j2 = 1, ...,n, (VI.21)
where {Ai} j1, j2 is the element at the jth1 row and the jth2 column of Ai. Let A¯( j1, j2) = max({Ai} j1, j2),
where i = 0,1, ..., t−1 and A¯ is formed by A¯( j1, j2). Then,
Σt−1i=0A
iw(t−1− i) ≤A¯Σt−1i=0w(t−1− i). (VI.22)
Since the random process noise w has zero-mean and bound w, Σt−1i=0A
iw(t− 1− i) is bounded as
well.
2. If one or more of the eigenvalues of A lie on the unit circle, then Atxe,o(t0) is bounded. The other
term Σt−1i=0A
iw(t− 1− i) is a linear combination of the random vector Aiw(t− 1− i). For a vector
Aw(t), each element is a linear combination of zero-mean random variables in vector w(t) with the
elements in the same row of A as coefficients
A( j,:)w(t) = Σni=1A
( j,i)w( j)(t). (VI.23)
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Since ‖A‖ = 1, i.e., Σni=1|A( j,i)| ≤ 1 based on the definition of ∞-norm, Aw(t) is a zero-mean ran-
dom vector with bound w. Thus, Aiw(t− 1− i) is also a zero-mean random vector with bound w.
Therefore, Σt−1i=0A
iw(t−1− i) is bounded.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Given a control system (III.1), an open-loop observer is updated every κ f ,g time
steps. The impact of the system noise on the averaged residual (VI.24) is mitigated.
ravg,g(t+ ( jN −1)κ f ,g) = 1jN Σ
jN
j=1rg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g), (VI.24)
where jN is a positive integer.
Proof. Since the process noise and sensor noise are zero-mean vectors,
Σ∞i=0w(i) =0
nx×1,
Σ∞i=0v(i) =0
ny×1.
(VI.25)
The residual generated by a single open-loop observer over one update period is
rg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g) = y(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g)−Cxˆg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g)
=Cx(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g) +v(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g)−Cxˆg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g)
=CAte(( jN − j)κ f ,g) +v(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g) +Σt−1i=0CAiw(t−1 + ( jN − j)κ f ,g− i).
(VI.26)
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Then the averaged residual is
ravg,g(t+ ( jN −1)κ f ,g) = 1jN Σ
jN
j=1rg(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g)
=
1
jN
Σ
jN
j=1(CA
te(( jN − j)κ f ,g) +v(t+ ( jN − j)κ f ,g) +Σt−1i=0CAiw(t−1 + ( jN − j)κ f ,g− i)).
(VI.27)
If jN →∞, then
ravg,g(t+ ( jN −1)κ f ,g) = 1jN Σ
jN
j=1CA
txe(( jN − j)κ f ,g). (VI.28)
Therefore, the impact of system noise is mitigated.
Tables of Notations in Chapter III
Table A.1: Table of Matrices
Matrices Meaning
A,B,C,D,F,Γ System matrices, controller gain, and sensor anomaly vector
Ci,Li,Γi,Ei Output matrix, observer gain, anomaly vector, state matrix for observer
i, Ei = A−LiCi
Vi A collection of eigenvectors of matrix Ei
EΛ,i,BΛ.i,DΛ,i Transformed matrices for observer i
Table A.2: Table of Variables
Variables Meaning
x,y,u,w,v,d,γ System state, output, input, process noise, sensor noise, disturbance and
sensor anomaly signal
w,v Bounds of the process noise and the sensor noise
mnc Number of the non-critical sensors
nx,ny,nu,nd Dimensions of system state, output, input, and disturbance
S nc,S c Sets of non-critical sensors and critical sensors
yi,vi Output and sensor noise for observer i
xe,i,xe,o Estimation error of closed-loop observer i and an open-loop observer
x˜i Estimated state by closed-loop observer i
xˆg,i Estimated state by open-loop observer i in group g
tss Time steps for a closed-loop observer to reach its steady state
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Table A.3: Table of Variables
Indicators,
index
Meaning
IA, IF , ID Alarms for anomaly, sensor anomaly, and disturbance
i f Anomalous sensor index
IFB Index of the closed-loop observer for feedback
Table A.4: Table of Notations for the CO Method
Meaning
Qi Weighting matrix for observer i
θCO Threshold for the CO method
ri The residual generated by closed-loop observer i
γ˜ Calculated anomaly signal
Table A.5: Table of Notations for the CR Method
Meaning
xe,µ,ν The difference of estimated states of two observers
x˜e,µ(ν), x¯e,µ(ν) Estimation error of observer µ calculated based on observers µ and ν and its
upper bound
x˜e,Λ,µ(ν) The calculated estimation error of observer µ after changing the coordinates
x˜e,µ Overall estimation error of observer µ, which is a function of x˜e,µ(ν), ν =
0,1, ...,mnc∧ ν 6= µ
x˜e,Λ,µ Overall estimation error of observer µ after changing the coordinates
cri, j Convergence ratio of the jth state estimation error of observer i
d˜µ(ν) The bias based on the calculated estimation error x˜e,µ(ν)
d˜Λ,µ(ν), d¯µ(ν) The bias based on the calculated estimation error x˜e,Λ,µ(ν) and its upper bound
κCR Time steps for the CR method
θCR Threshold to determine the occurrence of an anomaly
θd,µ(ν),ζ(η) Threshold to distinguish a sensor anomaly from a disturbance
φν Weighting ratio of calculated estimation error x˜e,µ(ν)
ψµ(ν) Weighting ratio of calculated bias d˜Λ,µ(ν)
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Table A.6: Table of Notations for the MOLO Method
Meaning
M,N The number of open-loop observers groups and the number of open-loop ob-
servers in one group
κ f ,g, κ∆,g Update period, update interval between two adjacent open-loop observers for
group g
rg,i Residual signal of observer i in group g
Hg,ravg,g Leading observer, averaged residual in group g
θMOLO,g Threshold for the MOLO
Table A.7: Table of Notations for the CCI Method
Meaning
κCCI , θCCI Horizontal window, threshold for the CCI method
∆ui Control input difference of closed-loop observer i
Table A.8: Table of Other Notations
Meaning
x( j) The jth element of a vector x
A( j,:) The jth row of a matrix A
A( j1, j2) The element at jth1 row j
th
2 column of a matrix A‖ · ‖ The infinity norm ‖ · ‖∞
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Appendix B
Appendices of Chapter IV
Tables of Notations in Chapter IV
Table B.1: Table of Systems
Meaning
H,Hn,H f ,Mn Hybrid automaton, nominal hybrid automaton, anomalous hybrid au-
tomaton and nominal Finite State Machine
X , U , Y , Init,
f ield, E, φ, η
State, input, output, initial state, field vector, discrete events, discrete
transitions, and output map of hybrid automaton H
X,U,Y A set of continuous states, inputs and outputs
Q,Ψ,Ω A set of discrete states, inputs and outputs
Ψo,Ψuo A set of observable input events and a set of unobservable input events
E,Eo,Euo A set of discrete events, E = Ψ∪˙Ω, a set of observable events and a set
of unobservable events
ζ A discrete output map
h A continuous output equation
Qn,Q f A set of nominal discrete states and a set of anomalous discrete states
Invq,βi,βi Invariant of discrete state q, the lower bound and the upper bound of the
invariant along the ith state variable
G(q,q′,ψ),
P(q,q′,ψ)
Guard condition and its hyperplane corresponding to discrete transition
φ(q,ψ) = q′
L(q,q′,ψ) Post-guard hyperplane of guard G(q,q′,ψ)
qN ,q Neighbor discrete state of nominal discrete state q
Nq Neighbor set of nominal discrete state q
Rin,q,Rno,q Intermediate region and normal operating region of discrete state q
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Table B.2: Table of System Matrices
Meaning
Aq,Bq,Cq,Γ1,Γ2 System matrices of discrete state q and anomaly vector on state equation
and output equation, respectively
Table B.3: Table of System Variables
Meaning
x,y,u,w,v, γ1, γ2,
d
System state, output, input, process noise, sensor noise, anomaly sig-
nals added to the state equation and output equation, respectively, and
system noise d = [w v]ᵀ
w,v,µ Upper bounds of the norm of process noise, sensor noise and input,
respectively
Bd,Bxo Bounds of system noise and uncertain initial continuous state, respec-
tively
nx,ny,nu Dimensions of system state, output, and input
Table B.4: Table of Observer Variables
Meaning
O,C,D Hybrid observer, continuous state observer and discrete state observer
q˜(t), Xˆ(y, t),
X˜(y, t), x˜c(t)
Estimated discrete state, a set of possible continuous states based on
a single measurement, estimated continuous state set, and the central
estimated continuous state at time step t
xe Estimation error of the continuous state observer
θ Upper bound of the estimation error of the central estimated continuous
state
Rack Rack operator used by the Set-Valued Observer (continuous state ob-
server)
Table B.5: Table of the Conflict-driven Method
Meaning
XI(t) Initial set at time step t
Z, x˜c,gi Zonotope and its center and generators
Rδq˜(t)(XI(t)) δq˜(t)-time step forward reachable set starting from initial set XI(t)
Table B.6: Table of Variables Used in Robust Optimization
Meaning
HiG Projection row vector with the ithG entry “i” and “0” elsewhere
J,ρ1,ρ2,Λ Matrices and vectors used in robust optimization after changing variables
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Table B.7: Table of Positive Train Control System
Meaning
xp, xv, x f Train position, speed and force
yp,yv Measured train position, speed and force
(Av,Bv),
(Ap,Bp),
(Ab,Bb)
Continuous dynamics under speed control and position control, and during
braking, respectively
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Appendix C
Appendices of Chapter V
Tables of Notations in Chapter V
Table C.1: Table of Systems
Meaning
H Hybrid automaton
X , U , Y , Init,
f ield, φ, h, fr
State, input, output, initial state, field vector, discrete transitions, con-
tinuous output equation, and reset function of hybrid automaton H
X,U,Y A set of continuous states, inputs and outputs
Q,Ψ A set of discrete states and inputs
G(q,q′,ψ) Guard condition corresponding to discrete transition φ(q,ψ) = q′
Aq,Bq,C System matrices of discrete state q
Table C.2: Table of System Variables
Meaning
x,y,u,w,v System continuous state, output, input, process noise and sensor noise
w,v Upper bounds of the norm of process noise and sensor noise, respec-
tively
W, V Covariance matrix of process noise and sensor noise, respectively
nx,ny,nu Dimensions of system continuous state, output, and input
∆Aq1,q2 , ∆Bq1,q2 Difference of state matrices between discrete states q1 and q2
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Table C.3: Table of Observer and the Convergence Ratio (CR) Variables
Meaning
q˜, xˆ0, xˆ1, x˜ Estimated discrete state, estimated continuous state by continuous state
observer 0, estimated continuous state by continuous state observer 1,
estimated continuous state by the CRMMHO
xe,0,xe,1 Estimation errors of the continuous state observers 0 and 1, respectively
x˜e,0,x˜e,1 Calculated estimation errors of the continuous state observers 0 and 1,
respectively
P Covariance matrix of Kalman filter
K Kalman filter gain
tss The steady state time step of the CR method
θCR Threshold for the difference of the estimated continuous states of the
two continuous state observers
θdi f f Threshold for the change of the difference of the estimated continuous
states of the two continuous state observers
Table C.4: Table of the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) Variables
Meaning
A˜, B˜ Estimated system matrices
Ξ, ξ Estimated matrix Ξᵀ = [A˜ B˜] and input vector
GRLS The RLS adaptation gain
εo, ε A priori error and a posteriori error
∆tRLS Time steps used for the RLS to converge
Table C.5: Table of the Model Selection Variables
Meaning
yo,q˜ Output of continuous model q˜
rq˜ Residual signal of continuous model q˜
Iq˜ Similarity index of continuous model q˜
θI Threshold for the model selection method
∆t Time steps used to run the models
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